Summary
OpenReception stores tenant-controlled link values and renders them on the patient-facing landing page without filtering unsafe URL schemes. A patient who clicks a malicious link may execute JavaScript in the application origin, allowing plaintext form data to be read or altered before client-side encryption occurs.
Affected context
The vulnerability can occur in deployments where a tenant administrator with permission to manage tenant links can save attacker-controlled URL values in the website, imprint, or privacy-statement configuration. Those values are exposed through the public API and rendered as anchor destinations in the patient-facing SvelteKit interface without adequate URL-scheme validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Patient-facing landing-page links
- Required access: Permission to modify the affected tenant link configuration, such as TENANT_ADMIN access
- Trigger point: A patient clicks a configured link rendered by the landing page
- Why exploitation is possible: The application accepts and renders unsafe URL schemes, allowing script execution in the patient browser origin
- Data condition: Patient information must be entered or otherwise available in the page before client-side encryption is performed
Why this happens
The root cause is insufficient output and URL-scheme validation for tenant-controlled link values. Treating configuration data as a safe navigation target allows attacker-controlled content to become executable browser code when placed in an anchor destination.
This maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation, because untrusted data reaches an HTML-rendering component without enforcing an allowlist of non-executable URL schemes or applying an equivalent safe-link policy. Client-side encryption does not prevent compromise when malicious code executes before plaintext data is encrypted.
Potential impact
- An attacker may read patient form data before encryption
- Malicious code could alter or suppress submitted patient information
- Patient sessions may be abused within the affected application origin
- Confidentiality of appointment-related information may be compromised
- The platform's server-untrusted-relay trust model could be undermined
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on treating tenant link settings as untrusted input throughout the application lifecycle.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Allowlisting safe URL schemes such as HTTPS and, where appropriate, HTTP
- Rejecting executable or browser-interpreted schemes during validation and again before rendering
- Rendering external destinations through safe, constrained link components
- Applying contextual output encoding and framework-supported attribute escaping
- Separating administrative configuration from executable client-side behavior
- Limiting tenant administration privileges and reviewing changes to public-facing links
- Enforcing a restrictive Content Security Policy as defense in depth
- Minimizing sensitive data exposure to browser scripts and preserving encryption boundaries where practical
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect similar issues through:
- Static analysis rules for user-controlled values reaching HTML attributes or link components
- Code review checks for dynamic href or URL construction without scheme allowlisting
- Tests covering malicious and unexpected URL schemes in tenant configuration fields
- Browser-based security testing that verifies rendered links cannot execute script code
- Policy enforcement requiring centralized safe-link validation for public-facing URLs
- Automated security review tools that identify stored input flowing into client-side navigation elements

