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CVE-2026-48056

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

Improper Input Validation (CWE-20) in Streambert IPC

CVE-2026-48056

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Input Validation

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-749

Impact:

Arbitrary Local Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Streambert improperly validates executable paths provided to its run-download IPC handler, allowing a compromised renderer process to launch arbitrary local binaries with the application's privileges. This is a critical-risk condition because renderer compromise can be escalated into code execution on the user's system.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Streambert's Electron IPC communication, specifically the run-download handler that accepts an executable path from a renderer process. Risk is present when a renderer process can be compromised and the handler forwards insufficiently validated paths to privileged operating-system execution functionality.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Electron renderer-to-main-process IPC
  • Required access: Control of, or code execution within, a Streambert renderer process
  • Trigger point: Invocation of the run-download IPC handler with an executable path
  • Why exploitation is possible: The handler does not adequately constrain or verify the supplied path before launching it with application privileges

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient validation of security-sensitive input crossing a privilege boundary. An executable path received through IPC is treated as suitable for process execution without enforcing an appropriate allowlist, canonicalization policy, or trusted origin.

This maps primarily to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation. The exposed IPC capability also relates to CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function, because a renderer-accessible handler provides access to a powerful operation without sufficiently restricting its inputs and caller context.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may execute arbitrary local binaries
  • Malicious code could run with the privileges of the Streambert application
  • User data or application credentials could be accessed or modified
  • The attacker could establish persistence or affect other local applications
  • A compromised renderer could be escalated into broader desktop compromise

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in renderer-supplied IPC data and minimizing the authority exposed through application handlers.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting executable launches to a narrowly defined allowlist of trusted binaries and actions
  • Canonicalizing paths and rejecting traversal, ambiguous, relative, or unexpected path forms
  • Separating download functionality from process execution where execution is not required
  • Enforcing sender validation and explicit authorization for privileged IPC handlers
  • Applying least privilege to the Electron application and any spawned child processes
  • Using secure Electron defaults, including an isolated renderer and narrowly scoped preload APIs
  • Treating renderer input as untrusted even when it originates from an application-controlled page

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify similar issues through:

  • Static analysis for IPC handlers that pass renderer-controlled values to process-spawning or shell-execution APIs
  • Code review checks for missing path canonicalization, allowlists, sender validation, and authorization
  • Policy enforcement that prohibits arbitrary executable paths in renderer-accessible interfaces
  • Runtime telemetry correlating renderer IPC calls with child-process creation and unexpected binary locations
  • Automated security review tools configured to flag dangerous Electron APIs and untrusted data flows

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/truelockmc/streambert/releases/tag/2.5.0
github.comgithub.com/truelockmc/streambert/security/advisories/GHSA-x267-77m6-qjc9

Frequently asked

questions

It is not necessarily directly reachable from the network. Exploitation generally depends on first compromising or controlling a Streambert renderer process, potentially through malicious content or another application weakness.

An attacker needs the ability to influence the renderer process sufficiently to invoke the run-download IPC handler and provide a crafted executable path.

Treat all renderer-provided paths as untrusted, avoid exposing arbitrary process execution through IPC, and permit only narrowly defined operations on approved executable targets.

Use secure Electron isolation defaults, minimize preload and IPC capabilities, validate and authorize every privileged request, and review all data flows from renderer code to operating-system APIs.

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