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CVE-2026-48026

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

Stored XSS (CWE-79) in lakeFS Web UI Markdown Rendering

CVE-2026-48026

Received

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Scripting

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Authenticated Session Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

lakeFS Web UI renders Markdown repository objects as HTML without adequately sanitizing the resulting content, allowing stored cross-site scripting. A user with write access to a repository branch may commit a malicious Markdown file, causing scripts to run in the authenticated sessions of users who view the file or related repository pages.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in lakeFS deployments where the Web UI renders Markdown files from repository objects as HTML without effective output sanitization. It is relevant when a user can write objects to a repository branch and other users can open those objects or browse repository and directory pages that display a malicious README.md.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: lakeFS Web UI Markdown rendering
  • Required access: Write access to a repository branch or another path that permits committing Markdown objects
  • Trigger point: A victim opens the malicious Markdown file or navigates to a repository or directory where it is rendered
  • Why exploitation is possible: Repository-controlled Markdown is converted to browser-rendered HTML without reliably neutralizing active script content

Why this happens

The underlying bug is insufficient output encoding and sanitization when converting untrusted Markdown into HTML.

Because repository contributors can control the Markdown content, treating the rendered result as trusted browser markup allows attacker-supplied scripts to execute in the origin of the lakeFS Web UI.

This maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting').

Potential impact

  • An attacker-controlled script may execute in another user's authenticated browser session
  • Sensitive information available to the Web UI may be exposed
  • Unauthorized actions may be performed with the victim's permissions
  • Repository data or configuration may be altered through victim-assisted requests
  • Other users may be targeted through malicious repository or directory README content

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on treating all repository-authored Markdown as untrusted content.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Sanitize rendered HTML with a well-maintained allowlist that excludes scripts, event handlers, dangerous URLs, and active browser content
  • Prefer secure Markdown rendering modes that produce inert text or strictly constrained HTML
  • Apply context-appropriate output encoding and avoid inserting unsanitized HTML into the DOM
  • Use a restrictive Content Security Policy as defense in depth
  • Limit repository write permissions and review changes to user-facing documentation files
  • Keep authenticated sessions, cookies, and privileged browser actions protected with appropriate origin and browser security controls
  • Provide an administrative control to disable Markdown rendering where safe rendering cannot be guaranteed

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect related risks through:

  • Static analysis rules for unsanitized Markdown-to-HTML rendering and unsafe DOM insertion
  • Code review checks for direct use of HTML rendering APIs, innerHTML-like sinks, and incomplete sanitization allowlists
  • Security tests containing harmless markup and script-like control characters to verify that rendered output remains inert
  • Browser-based tests that confirm repository-controlled content cannot execute in authenticated UI contexts
  • Policy enforcement requiring approved sanitization libraries, restrictive Content Security Policy headers, and review of user-controlled content flows
  • Monitoring for unexpected script execution, unusual authenticated UI requests, or suspicious changes to README and Markdown objects

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/treeverse/lakeFS/blob/77539527e987fb05c27e3e74c59c0a46a05c47a0/webui/src/pages/repositories/repository/fileRenderers/useMarkdownProcessor.tsx
github.comgithub.com/treeverse/lakeFS/security/advisories/GHSA-c2r5-5j4w-2xff

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Write access is generally needed to place the malicious Markdown object, but any authenticated or otherwise authorized user who views the rendered content may be affected.

Not necessarily. Exploitation depends primarily on access to the lakeFS Web UI and the ability to commit or cause others to view attacker-controlled Markdown content.

Treat Markdown as untrusted input, sanitize the generated HTML with a strict allowlist, and prevent active content from reaching browser HTML execution contexts.

Combine secure rendering defaults, restrictive repository permissions, automated browser security tests, code review for unsafe DOM sinks, and defense-in-depth controls such as Content Security Policy.

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