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CVE-2026-47701

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

Credential Disclosure (CWE-200) in OpenTelemetry Operator

CVE-2026-47701

Awaiting Analysis

Vulnerability type

Category:

Sensitive Information Disclosure

CWE:

CWE-200

Impact:

Disclosure of service-account tokens and other mounted sensitive files

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.7)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

CVE-2026-47701 is a high-severity information disclosure vulnerability in the OpenTelemetry Operator's TargetAllocator handling of Prometheus ServiceMonitors. A tenant who can modify a matched ServiceMonitor may cause the Collector to read a sensitive mounted file and send its contents as bearer authorization to a tenant-controlled endpoint.

Affected context

The issue affects OpenTelemetry Operator deployments before 0.152.0 when TargetAllocator Prometheus custom-resource support is enabled. Risk is present where tenant-controlled ServiceMonitors are selected by the Collector, sensitive files are mounted in the Collector pod, and the Collector can connect to a target chosen through the ServiceMonitor configuration.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Prometheus ServiceMonitor configuration processed by the TargetAllocator
  • Required access: Permission to create or update a ServiceMonitor selected by the relevant serviceMonitorSelector and serviceMonitorNamespaceSelector
  • Trigger point: Collector scrape configuration generation and subsequent periodic scraping
  • Required deployment condition: The Collector pod must contain a service-account token or another sensitive file
  • Network condition: The Collector must be able to reach the attacker- or tenant-controlled scrape target
  • Why exploitation is possible: The selected bearerTokenFile value is preserved as a credentials-file reference, allowing the Collector to read the file and transmit its contents as an HTTP bearer credential

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an insufficient trust-boundary check when translating ServiceMonitor endpoint configuration into Collector HTTP authentication settings. A tenant-controlled file reference is treated as an acceptable credentials-file path without restricting access to sensitive filesystem locations. This behavior maps to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because protected credentials or mounted files can be disclosed through an outbound scrape request.

Potential impact

  • A service-account JWT or another mounted secret may be disclosed.
  • An attacker could use exposed credentials against Kubernetes APIs within the service account's permissions.
  • Sensitive application or infrastructure files may be transmitted outside the intended trust boundary.
  • Repeated scrape intervals could cause continued credential exposure.
  • The Collector's network position and permissions could increase the consequences of disclosure.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing trust in tenant-controlled ServiceMonitor fields and preventing monitoring configuration from selecting arbitrary filesystem paths.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Restricting credentials-file references to an explicit, allowlisted set of non-sensitive paths.
  • Rejecting ServiceMonitor endpoint configurations that reference protected filesystem locations.
  • Applying deny-by-default filesystem access policies for monitoring resources.
  • Separating tenant-controlled monitoring configuration from privileged Collector workloads.
  • Mounting only the files required by the Collector and avoiding unnecessary service-account token exposure.
  • Running Collector service accounts with the minimum Kubernetes permissions required.
  • Limiting Collector egress to approved scrape destinations.
  • Maintaining deployment configurations that include the relevant filesystem-access control by default.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this issue through:

  • Static analysis and configuration checks for unvalidated bearerTokenFile or credentials-file propagation.
  • Code review signals involving ServiceMonitor fields crossing tenant boundaries into Collector authentication settings.
  • Admission policies that reject sensitive filesystem paths in monitoring resources.
  • Kubernetes audit review for unexpected ServiceMonitor creation or modification.
  • Network monitoring for Collector requests carrying bearer authorization to unapproved destinations.
  • File-access and process telemetry showing Collector reads of service-account tokens or unrelated mounted secrets.
  • Automated dependency and security review tools that flag missing filesystem-access restrictions or insecure configuration translation.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/commit/95a8c2a3dc64a762d3ab8eba8c903b5702a03a9c
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/pull/5104
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/releases/tag/v0.152.0
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-cxh2-4639-vmc5

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable through the Kubernetes control plane when a tenant has permission to create or update a ServiceMonitor selected by the affected Collector. The Collector must also be able to reach the chosen scrape destination.

The attacker needs ServiceMonitor write access within the namespaces and label scope selected by the TargetAllocator configuration. They do not necessarily need direct access to the Collector pod.

The safest pattern is to prevent tenant-controlled ServiceMonitor fields from referencing arbitrary files, enforce explicit path allowlists or deny rules, and ensure that sensitive files are not unnecessarily mounted in Collector pods.

Apply least privilege to Collector service accounts, restrict monitoring-resource permissions, enforce admission policies for sensitive fields and paths, limit Collector egress, and continuously audit file access and outbound scrape behavior.

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