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CVE-2026-47269

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

Authorization Bypass / Access Control Misconfiguration

CVE-2026-47269

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authorization Bypass / Access Control Misconfiguration

CWE:

CWE-284

Impact:

Bypass of Remote-Access Restrictions and Authentication Policy

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

pam_usb's deny_remote feature is intended to block USB-based authentication over remote sessions, allowing it only on local terminals.

Due to an incomplete check of the utmpx address field for IPv4-mapped IPv6 connections, some SSH logins are incorrectly classified as local, allowing an attacker with a registered USB token to authenticate remotely as if they were physically present.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in Linux environments using pam_usb for hardware-backed authentication where:

  • The deny_remote option is enabled to restrict USB logins to local sessions
  • PAM is used for SSH authentication via pam_usb
  • The SSH daemon listens on the IPv6 wildcard address (::) with AddressFamily any (commonly on Debian/Ubuntu)
  • utmpx records incoming IPv4 SSH sessions as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x)

In this context, IPv4 SSH connections can be misclassified as local sessions, weakening the intended remote-access control policy.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: SSH or other remote login services that rely on pam_usb with deny_remote enabled.
  • Required access:
  • Ability to reach the target host over the network (e.g., SSH connectivity).
  • Physical possession of a USB device or removable media that the system has been configured to trust for pam_usb authentication.
  • Trigger point: A remote authentication attempt over SSH (or similar) where the connection is recorded in utmpx as an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address (::ffff:x.x.x.x).
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • pam_usb only inspects the first 32 bits of the ut_addr_v6 field to determine if a session is remote.
  • For IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, this word is zero while the actual IPv4 address is stored in a different word.
  • As a result, the remote-detection code path is skipped and the session is treated as local, bypassing deny_remote=true.

Why this happens

This issue stems from a flawed access control decision based on incomplete inspection of session metadata.

The deny_remote logic attempts to distinguish local from remote sessions using utmpx.ut_addr_v6, but only checks ut_addr_v6[0] != 0 as a proxy for "has a network address."

On systems where IPv4 connections are recorded as IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:x.x.x.x), the relevant address bits are stored in ut_addr_v6[3], leaving ut_addr_v6[0] as zero.

Because of this incorrect assumption about address layout, the remote-check branch is never executed for these sessions, causing remote logins to be treated as local.

This aligns with CWE-284 (Improper Access Control): the software enforces a policy ("no remote pam_usb authentication") using an incorrect condition that fails under a common configuration, effectively disabling the restriction for a large class of remote connections.

Potential impact

  • Remote users in possession of a trusted USB device may be able to authenticate over SSH despite deny_remote being enabled.
  • Administrative policies that require physical presence for certain accounts or operations can be undermined.
  • Attackers who steal or temporarily obtain a registered USB token could gain full remote access to accounts protected by pam_usb.
  • Security assumptions about "local-only" authentication workflows can be invalidated, impacting compliance and risk assessments.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on making remote/local detection robust and reducing reliance on fragile connection heuristics:

  • Implement address checks that correctly handle IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 layouts rather than relying on a single word in ut_addr_v6.
  • Favor higher-level indicators of session type (e.g., explicit TTY vs. network session classification) rather than inferring from raw address fields alone.
  • Treat any session with a non-empty remote endpoint as remote by default, adopting a "secure by default" stance when detection is ambiguous.
  • Where feasible, require an additional authentication factor for remote sessions instead of assuming USB tokens imply physical presence.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to accounts using pam_usb, ensuring that a compromise of USB-based auth does not automatically grant broad administrative control.
  • Consider segmenting policies so that critical accounts do not rely solely on USB-based local presence checks for security decisions.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can approach detection and assurance for this class of flaw through:

  • Code-level review:
  • Examine PAM modules and authentication helpers that branch on utmpx or similar session data to enforce "local-only" policies.
  • Flag patterns where only a portion of an address structure is checked (e.g., single-element checks in multi-word address arrays).
  • Static analysis and policy checks:
  • Use static analyzers or linters to identify suspicious uses of ut_addr_v6 and similar structures where all components are not considered.
  • Define internal coding guidelines for handling IP address representations, and enforce them in CI.
  • Configuration and runtime validation:
  • Review SSH daemon and PAM configurations to identify deployments that combine deny_remote-style options with AddressFamily any or :: listeners.
  • Perform controlled tests: attempt USB-based authentication over SSH with deny_remote enabled and verify that it is rejected as expected.
  • Automated code scanning tools:
  • Integrate automated code review or SAST tools into the development workflow to surface access control decisions that depend on low-level address fields or brittle heuristics.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/mcdope/pam_usb/commit/804fe24eae3d742d8be05fd015e36abc3c7d94e5
github.comgithub.com/mcdope/pam_usb/security/advisories/GHSA-jmmj-qhrq-w45g

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. While the feature is designed to distinguish local from remote sessions, the flaw allows certain remote SSH connections to be treated as local, enabling remote exploitation when the attacker has a recognized USB device.

The attacker needs network access to the target service (such as SSH) and physical possession of a USB device or removable media that has already been registered with pam_usb for the target account.

The safest pattern is to correct the session classification logic so that it reliably detects remote sessions across IPv4, IPv6, and IPv4-mapped IPv6 cases, and to default to treating ambiguous or unknown address states as remote rather than local.

Treat low-level connection metadata with caution, validate assumptions against real system behavior, and design access control logic to fail closed: when there is uncertainty about whether a session is local or remote, enforce the stricter policy and avoid relying on single-field heuristics.

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