Summary
Admidio contains an authorization flaw in its document and file move workflow that allows users with upload access to one folder to move files from unrelated folders. This may expose files from private folders and remove them from their original locations, affecting both confidentiality and integrity.
Affected context
The vulnerability occurs in the document management workflow when a state-changing request authorizes the destination folder but does not verify the user's permission to access the source file's folder. Deployments are at risk when users can upload to at least one folder and the file-move functionality is available.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Admidio document and file management functionality
- Required access: An account with upload permission for at least one folder
- Trigger point: The file move operation using separate source-file and destination-folder identifiers
- Why exploitation is possible: Authorization is checked for the destination folder but not for the source folder associated with the selected file
Why this happens
The underlying flaw is an object-level authorization failure caused by validating only one resource in a multi-resource operation. The move workflow checks whether the actor may upload to the destination folder, but fails to confirm that the actor may view, modify, or remove the source file. This maps primarily to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key and is also consistent with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization.
Potential impact
- Private file contents may be disclosed to unauthorized users
- Files may be removed from their original folders
- Users may relocate or tamper with files outside their authorized scope
- Organizational records and document structure may be disrupted
- Confidentiality and integrity of stored documents may be compromised
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation should apply authorization checks to every resource involved in a state-changing operation, rather than relying solely on destination permissions.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Verify source-file ownership or access rights before permitting a move
- Confirm destination permissions independently
- Resolve resource identifiers server-side and authorize the complete operation
- Avoid trusting client-supplied identifiers as evidence of authorization
- Use centralized, deny-by-default authorization policy enforcement
- Apply least privilege to file-management roles
- Log and review cross-folder file moves, especially involving restricted locations
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can identify similar issues through:
- Static analysis for authorization checks that cover only one of several user-controlled resource identifiers
- Code review of move, copy, rename, export, and sharing operations
- Tests that attempt cross-tenant, cross-folder, and private-to-public resource transitions
- Policy checks requiring source and destination authorization for multi-object state changes
- Audit monitoring for unexpected access to or movement of files from restricted folders
- Automated security testing that exercises object-level authorization boundaries

