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CVE-2026-47125

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Missing Authorization in Arcane Docker Management Interface

CVE-2026-47125

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Supply-Chain Compromise via Global Configuration Tampering

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Arcane versions prior to 1.19.2 expose a system-wide environment variables endpoint without enforcing admin-level authorization.

Any authenticated non-admin user can overwrite the global .env.global file, influencing every project's Docker Compose deployment and potentially enabling supply-chain compromise, data exfiltration, or widespread service disruption.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Arcane deployments where:

  • The /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint is enabled and reachable to regular authenticated users
  • The .env.global file is used for variable substitution across multiple Docker Compose projects
  • Projects rely on shared environment variables for critical configuration values such as image registries, database URLs, or secret keys

In such environments, a non-admin user who can authenticate to Arcane can influence configuration that other users implicitly trust in their project definitions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Arcane HTTP API (PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables)
  • Required access: Any authenticated non-admin account with a bearer token or API key
  • Trigger point: Sending a crafted PUT request that updates .env.global values referenced in other users' compose files
  • Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint that controls global environment variables lacks an admin authorization check, allowing lower-privileged users to perform a configuration operation intended only for administrators

Why this happens

The core issue is a missing authorization control on an endpoint that modifies highly sensitive, system-wide configuration.

Arcane exposes /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables to authenticated users but does not verify that the caller has administrative privileges before allowing writes to .env.global.

This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where the application fails to enforce permission checks on a critical function, effectively granting non-admin users the ability to alter configuration that affects all projects.

At a design level, privileged configuration operations share the same access level as routine user actions, rather than being isolated behind a stricter authorization policy.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may redirect container image pulls to attacker-controlled registries by overriding variables such as REGISTRY or IMAGE
  • Attackers could introduce malicious images, leading to remote code execution on the Docker host during deployments
  • Global overrides of DATABASE_URL and related settings could enable credential exfiltration or unintended database access paths
  • Disruption or outage across many or all projects by corrupting essential environment variables used at deployment time
  • Undermining integrity of CI/CD pipelines and deployment workflows that rely on trusted global environment configuration

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict authorization boundaries and reducing the blast radius of shared configuration:

  • Ensure that endpoints which modify system-wide configuration are restricted to clearly defined admin roles, with explicit authorization checks on every write operation
  • Separate per-project configuration from truly global configuration to limit the impact of compromised accounts
  • Apply least-privilege principles to API keys and bearer tokens, granting only the minimal capabilities required for project-level operations
  • Introduce configuration change controls, such as approval workflows or mandatory reviews, for modifications to environment templates that affect multiple projects
  • Where possible, avoid relying solely on a single global environment file for critical secrets or registry configuration; use scoped secrets management systems designed for multi-tenant isolation

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and monitor this class of issue using a combination of code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Code review patterns: Flag any API routes that mutate shared or global configuration and verify they consistently enforce admin or elevated-role checks
  • Static analysis: Use rules to identify controller or handler methods that bypass authorization middleware or omit role checks while performing sensitive operations
  • Access logs and telemetry: Monitor for unusual patterns of calls to /api/environments/*/templates/variables, especially from non-admin accounts or service tokens
  • Policy enforcement: Implement automated checks in CI/CD to ensure that critical endpoints are annotated with required authorization attributes or decorators
  • Configuration drift monitoring: Track and alert on unexpected changes to .env.global and other shared configuration artifacts, correlating changes to specific user identities or API keys

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/security/advisories/GHSA-jpjh-jm2p-39hh

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the Arcane API is exposed over the network and reachable by authenticated users, a remote attacker with valid credentials can exploit the missing authorization to update global variables.

No. The issue specifically stems from the fact that non-admin authenticated users can call the endpoint that updates .env.global, effectively performing an operation that should be reserved for administrators.

Apply explicit authorization checks to all endpoints that modify global or shared configuration, ensuring that only designated admin roles can access them. Centralize access control logic to minimize the risk of overlooking checks on sensitive routes.

Adopt a defense-in-depth strategy for access control: define clear privilege boundaries, use role-based access control for all configuration-modifying endpoints, enforce mandatory authorization middleware in the API layer, and include automated tests and reviews that focus on access control coverage across sensitive operations.

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