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CVE-2026-46558

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Cross-Workspace Access Control (CWE-639) in Plane

CVE-2026-46558

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-639, CWE-862

Impact:

Cross-Tenant Data Exposure and Manipulation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Plane suffers from a cross-workspace access control flaw that allows any authenticated user to interact with assets belonging to other workspaces.

Under affected versions, a user can read, copy, delete, or overwrite assets outside their own workspace boundaries when asset requests are not properly scoped or revalidated.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in Plane's multi-workspace (multi-tenant) environment where different teams or organizations share the same deployment.

It manifests when asset operations (such as fetching, copying, updating, or deleting files or records) are authorized solely on the basis of the requester being authenticated, without reliably enforcing that the asset belongs to the caller's workspace.

Any deployment that relies on workspace separation for security and privacy is at risk when using affected versions.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Plane's authenticated asset management endpoints (e.g., file or resource APIs tied to workspaces)
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user account in any workspace on the same Plane instance
  • Trigger point: Performing asset operations while referencing assets that logically belong to a different workspace
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side authorization logic does not consistently verify that the target asset's workspace matches the user's workspace, leading to an IDOR-style cross-workspace bypass

Why this happens

The core issue is an authorization design flaw where access decisions for assets are not fully bound to workspace ownership.

Instead of enforcing that each requested asset is associated with the caller's current workspace and permissions, the system appears to rely on weaker checks (e.g., generic authentication, asset identifiers, or partially validated context).

This maps to CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key, where user-supplied identifiers or references enable access to other tenants' resources, and to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, reflecting incomplete enforcement of per-workspace authorization rules.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized reading of assets from other workspaces, exposing potentially sensitive project data
  • Copying or cloning of assets across workspaces, enabling data leakage or unwanted data sharing
  • Deletion of assets belonging to other workspaces, causing data loss or operational disruption
  • Overwriting existing assets in other workspaces, enabling data tampering and integrity compromise
  • Undermining the logical tenant isolation that organizations rely on for privacy and compliance

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on enforcing strict, server-side authorization checks that bind every asset operation to both the authenticated user and the asset's workspace.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Implementing ownership checks that ensure the asset's workspace identifier aligns with the user's authorized workspace(s) before any read, write, copy, or delete operation proceeds
  • Designing APIs so that workspace context is derived from the authenticated session or token, not from untrusted client input alone
  • Using centralized authorization middleware or policy engines to enforce consistent workspace- and role-based access control across all asset endpoints
  • Minimizing direct reliance on user-controlled identifiers for access decisions and validating any such identifiers against server-side workspace mappings
  • Applying least-privilege principles to roles so users can only manage assets within explicitly assigned workspaces

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically involves both code-level review and behavioral monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review: Look for asset or file APIs where access control checks use only authentication or simple existence checks and do not confirm that the resource's workspace matches the caller's workspace context
  • Authorization pattern review: Identify endpoints that accept workspace or asset identifiers directly from client parameters without cross-checking them against the authenticated user's allowed workspace list
  • Logging and anomaly detection: Enable detailed audit logs for asset operations, then detect patterns where one user account accesses assets across multiple, unrelated workspaces
  • Automated security testing: Use API-focused security scanners or custom test harnesses to systematically attempt cross-workspace access using different authenticated accounts

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/makeplane/plane/releases/tag/v1.3.1
github.comgithub.com/makeplane/plane/security/advisories/GHSA-qw87-v5w3-6vxx

Frequently asked

questions

Any user with a valid account in an affected Plane instance could potentially access or modify assets in other workspaces, regardless of their intended scope of access, as long as they can reference those assets through the vulnerable endpoints.

No special or administrative role is inherently required; a regular authenticated user account is sufficient, since the flaw lies in cross-workspace authorization rather than in role-based privilege elevation.

The most robust fix is to enforce workspace-aware authorization at every asset operation by confirming that the asset's workspace matches one of the user's authorized workspaces, ideally via centralized, reusable authorization logic rather than ad hoc checks.

Design multi-tenant systems with tenant isolation as a first-class requirement: derive tenant context from authenticated sessions or tokens, avoid trusting client-supplied identifiers for authorization, standardize access control through shared middleware or policy engines, and include multi-tenant access tests in your CI and security testing pipelines.

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