Summary
The Linux kernel CIFS client incorrectly trusted authority-bearing fields in cifs.spnego key descriptions that could be created from userspace, treating them as if they originated from the kernel.
Under certain conditions, an attacker able to create or manipulate cifs.spnego keys via request_key(2) or add_key(2) could inject fake identity or authority metadata, potentially impacting authentication or access control behavior in CIFS/SMB mounts.
Affected context
This vulnerability exists in the Linux kernel CIFS/SMB client when:
- The system uses the CIFS client to mount or access SMB shares.
- The kernel relies on cifs.spnego keys, whose descriptions include fields such as pid, uid, creduid, and upcall_target, to coordinate with cifs.upcall.
- Userspace processes can invoke request_key(2) or add_key(2) to create keys of type cifs.spnego.
In such environments, the kernel may incorrectly treat user-created key descriptions as if they were kernel-originated, blurring the trust boundary between kernel and userspace.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Kernel key management subsystem in systems using the CIFS/SMB client.
- Required access: Ability to run code on the system and call request_key(2) or add_key(2) to create or influence cifs.spnego keys. Typically requires local user access; further constraints may be imposed by system keyring policies.
- Trigger point: Authentication or credential negotiation for CIFS/SMB operations where the kernel requests or looks up a cifs.spnego key and consumes its description fields.
- Why exploitation is possible: The CIFS client logic treated authority-bearing fields (pid, uid, creduid, upcall_target) in cifs.spnego key descriptions as trustworthy kernel-originated data, without robust validation that the descriptions were generated only by the kernel. This allowed untrusted userspace-created keys to masquerade as kernel-authored inputs.
Why this happens
The core issue is improper input validation at the kernel/userspace boundary for key descriptions, aligning with CWE-20 (Improper Input Validation).
The cifs.spnego key type embeds authority-bearing metadata (such as process ID and user IDs) in its description, which is later interpreted by cifs.upcall and associated CIFS client code as if it reliably reflects kernel state. However, the Linux key management APIs allow userspace to create keys of this type directly via request_key(2) or add_key(2). The CIFS client did not sufficiently distinguish between keys created by its internal, trusted mechanism (using spnego_cred) and keys fabricated in userspace.
Conceptually, the bug is that untrusted, user-controlled descriptive fields were accepted as authoritative identity and context information. Rather than enforcing strict provenance checks or scoping, the code path relied on format and type alone, trusting data that should have been considered untrusted input.
Potential impact
- Local users may be able to spoof authority-bearing metadata (pid, uid, creduid, upcall_target) used during CIFS/SMB authentication flows.
- CIFS/SMB mounts could potentially be associated with misleading or incorrect credentials, affecting access control decisions at the SMB server or client.
- Logging, auditing, or attribution around CIFS operations could become unreliable, as forged identity information is consumed as if kernel-originated.
- In misconfigured or tightly integrated environments, forged key descriptions could contribute to broader credential misuse or privilege-related confusion within CIFS-related workflows.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on enforcing strict trust boundaries between kernel and userspace for authority-bearing metadata:
- Ensure that kernel subsystems that interpret key descriptions or similar metadata only accept values derived from trusted internal sources, not arbitrary userspace-provided data.
- Gate the acceptance of sensitive key types (such as cifs.spnego) on internal state, such as a private, kernel-controlled credential (e.g., spnego_cred), so that only keys requested under that context are trusted.
- Treat all data arriving from userspace, even via structured kernel APIs like request_key(2) or add_key(2), as untrusted unless provenance is verifiably kernel-only.
- Apply least-privilege principles to keyring access: restrict which users and processes may create or modify security-sensitive key types to reduce attack surface.
- Where feasible, design protocols so that identity and authority data is derived from well-defined kernel structures or cryptographically protected tokens, rather than free-form descriptions.
How teams detect issues like this
Possible detection and assurance strategies include:
- Code review focus: Examine kernel and low-level components that consume key descriptions, credentials, or identity-bearing fields for any assumptions that such data is kernel- or system-originated. Flag paths where userspace can provide data of the same type or format.
- Static analysis patterns: Configure tooling to highlight flows where:
- Userspace-controllable data (key descriptions, ioctl parameters, netlink payloads) is used to populate security-sensitive fields like UIDs, PIDs, or credential selectors.
- Trust decisions are made based solely on type or format, without checking provenance or call context.
- Policy and configuration checks: Review keyring and security policy configurations (e.g., LSMs, keyring permissions) to ensure ordinary users cannot create or modify highly sensitive key types such as cifs.spnego.
- Runtime monitoring: Log and monitor creation and usage of special-purpose key types by unprivileged users. Unexpected patterns of cifs.spnego key creation from non-system processes can be a signal of misuse or attempted exploitation.

