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CVE-2026-45790

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269) in Dokploy PaaS

CVE-2026-45790

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Privilege Management

CWE:

CWE-269

Impact:

Organization Takeover and Privilege Escalation

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Dokploy contains an authorization flaw that can allow a user with permission to create members, or a privileged self-hosted user, to assign an owner role when creating an account. Because owner accounts cannot be demoted through normal organization controls, successful abuse may result in permanent organization takeover.

Affected context

The issue affects Dokploy deployments where organization member creation and account provisioning rely on role values supplied to server-side procedures. Risk is highest when a user has member-creation privileges or when a self-hosted administrative interface permits privileged users to create accounts with selectable roles without enforcing a strict authorization policy.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Dokploy organization member-invitation and account-creation procedures
  • Required access: A user account with member:create permission, or privileged access to the self-hosted account-provisioning functionality
  • Trigger point: Creation or invitation of an account with an owner-level role
  • Why exploitation is possible: Server-side authorization does not adequately constrain which roles these account-creation paths may assign, and owner privileges cannot subsequently be demoted through normal organization controls

Why this happens

The underlying defect is improper privilege management, mapped to CWE-269. Role assignment is insufficiently constrained at a sensitive account-creation boundary, allowing a caller with narrower member-management privileges—or a privileged self-hosted operator—to obtain or grant a role with organization-wide authority. The system also lacks an effective lifecycle control for reversing an owner assignment, turning an authorization mistake into a potentially persistent takeover condition.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may obtain permanent owner-level control of an organization
  • An attacker could manage members, projects, deployments, and organization settings
  • Sensitive application or deployment data may be exposed or modified
  • Malicious accounts could be used to maintain persistence
  • Deployments or infrastructure integrations may be disrupted or altered

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing server-side role authorization and reducing trust in client-supplied role values.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Allowing member-creation procedures to assign only explicitly permitted non-owner roles
  • Requiring separate, narrowly scoped authorization for owner creation or transfer
  • Enforcing organization and platform-wide role policies independently of UI restrictions
  • Providing controlled owner-demotion, ownership-transfer, and account-recovery workflows
  • Applying least privilege to self-hosted administrative operators and service accounts
  • Recording and alerting on privileged role assignments and unexpected ownership changes
  • Testing authorization decisions with both permitted and deliberately over-privileged role requests

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess for this class of issue through:

  • Static analysis and code review of account-creation procedures for direct use of caller-supplied role values
  • Authorization tests that verify lower-privileged users cannot create or invite owner-level accounts
  • Review of server-side permission checks rather than relying on frontend role restrictions
  • Audit-log searches for newly created owner accounts, ownership changes, and unusual invitations
  • Policy enforcement requiring approval or independent authorization for high-impact role assignments
  • Automated security testing of role matrices, including escalation and persistence scenarios

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/commit/a07106d649991ea09892220873ea3243766c3e08
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/pull/4475
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/releases/tag/v0.29.6
github.comgithub.com/Dokploy/dokploy/security/advisories/GHSA-fm9p-wmpw-gxjh

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through Dokploy's authenticated application procedures when the attacker has the required member-creation permission or privileged self-hosted access. It does not generally represent an unauthenticated attack.

Not necessarily. A user with member:create permission may be able to reach the vulnerable invitation path, while the separate account-creation path requires privileged self-hosted access.

Enforce role eligibility on the server, reject owner-role assignments from ordinary member-creation flows, and require a separate, strongly authorized ownership-management process.

Maintain an explicit role-permission matrix, test every account-management endpoint against that matrix, minimize privileged operator access, and monitor ownership changes for unexpected activity.

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