/

CVE-2026-45685

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Uncaught Parser Panic on Malformed MongoDB Messages (CWE-248) in OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation

CVE-2026-45685

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Input Validation and Error Handling

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-248, CWE-704

Impact:

Denial of Service (Telemetry Agent Crash)

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation's MongoDB TCP parser can be triggered to panic by sending malformed MongoDB wire messages over the network.

Because the parser processes attacker-controlled payloads before full validation, a remote unauthenticated attacker can crash the telemetry agent and cause denial of service for observability on the affected process or node.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects environments using OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation versions 0.1.0 through 0.8.x with MongoDB protocol parsing enabled.

The issue appears in the MongoDB TCP parser that inspects database traffic for observability purposes.

It manifests when the parser operates on raw network payloads and encounters malformed MongoDB wire messages that are not robustly validated before being parsed into internal structures.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-exposed MongoDB traffic observed by the eBPF telemetry agent
  • Required access: Ability to send TCP packets that appear as MongoDB wire messages to a monitored endpoint (no authentication to the agent required)
  • Trigger point: Delivery of a single crafted malformed MongoDB message that passes into the MongoDB TCP parser
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser processes raw, attacker-controlled bytes with insufficient upfront validation and relies on assumptions about structure; invalid states or type conversions can cause an uncaught panic, terminating the telemetry agent process

Why this happens

The core issue is a lack of defensive input validation and error handling in the MongoDB TCP parser, which directly processes untrusted network payloads.

The parser assumes that incoming MongoDB wire messages conform to expected lengths, types, and formats.

When a malformed message violates those assumptions, operations such as incorrect length handling, unsafe casting, or unchecked indexing can cause a runtime panic that is not recovered from.

This maps to CWE-248: Uncaught Exception or Signal combined with CWE-20: Improper Input Validation and CWE-704: Incorrect Type Conversion or Cast, where untrusted input leads to error conditions that terminate the process instead of being gracefully handled.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers can crash the telemetry agent, disrupting observability for affected processes or nodes
  • Loss of metrics, traces, and logs related to MongoDB traffic during the outage window
  • Reduced visibility during incidents, making detection and response harder
  • Potential cascading monitoring gaps if multiple agents are targeted across a fleet

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation centers on defensive parsing and resilience to malformed inputs:

  • Introduce strict, layered validation of MongoDB wire messages before deeper parsing or casting occurs (e.g., length checks, field bounds, and type verification).
  • Treat protocol parsers as untrusted-input boundaries and implement robust error handling that converts unexpected states into logged errors rather than panics.
  • Use safe parsing patterns that avoid unchecked indexing and unsafe type conversions on attacker-controlled data.
  • Design telemetry agents to be fault-tolerant: isolate protocol parsing components and ensure that a failure in one parser does not terminate the entire agent.
  • Apply least-privilege and process isolation so that a crash in telemetry components does not impact core application workloads.

How teams detect issues like this

To detect and manage this class of vulnerability, organizations can:

  • Use static analysis or linters to flag unchecked type conversions, panics, and unsafe assumptions in code paths that handle network input.
  • Review protocol parsers during code review with a focus on bounds checking, length validation, and error propagation, especially where untrusted network traffic is processed.
  • Instrument telemetry agents themselves with health checks and watchdogs that detect repeated crashes and automatically restart or quarantine failing components.
  • Employ fuzz testing against protocol parsers (e.g., MongoDB wire protocol fuzzers) to uncover panic-inducing edge cases before release.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/releases/tag/v0.9.0
github.comgithub.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/security/advisories/GHSA-j8p6-96vp-f3r9

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. An attacker who can send TCP traffic that appears as MongoDB wire messages to an endpoint monitored by the eBPF instrumentation can remotely trigger the parser and potentially crash the telemetry agent.

Not necessarily. The attack targets the telemetry parser, not the database itself. As long as the attacker can send crafted traffic that the agent observes, they can attempt to exploit the vulnerability without authenticating to the agent.

The safest pattern is to harden the parser with strict input validation and comprehensive error handling so malformed messages are rejected gracefully. Parsing logic should never rely on unchecked assumptions about untrusted data, and any unexpected condition should result in a handled error, not a panic.

Preventive strategies include treating all protocol parsers as high-risk boundaries, enforcing defensive coding standards for handling untrusted input, integrating fuzz testing into CI for parsers, and using static analysis and code review checklists focused on panics, unchecked casts, and bounds violations in network-facing code.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.