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CVE-2026-45010

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Improper Authentication Throttling in phpMyFAQ check

CVE-2026-45010

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication Throttling

CWE:

CWE-307

Impact:

Administrative Account Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.2 contains an improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts in the /admin/check endpoint, which allows arbitrary user IDs to be checked without session binding or rate limiting.

An unauthenticated attacker can systematically brute-force six-digit TOTP codes to bypass two-factor authentication and obtain full administrative access.

Affected context

This vulnerability exists in phpMyFAQ deployments that expose the administrative interface and rely on TOTP-based two-factor authentication for additional protection.

The affected /admin/check endpoint:

  • Accepts a user identifier as a request parameter instead of deriving it from a bound session
  • Processes multiple TOTP validation attempts without per-user or per-origin throttling
  • Does not enforce robust anti-automation controls at the TOTP verification layer

The risk is most pronounced when administrative interfaces are reachable over the network and not shielded by additional access controls.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible phpMyFAQ administrative /admin/check endpoint
  • Required access: No prior authentication; the attacker can be fully unauthenticated
  • Trigger point: Submission of repeated POST requests containing arbitrary user IDs and sequential or systematic TOTP values
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • TOTP verification is not bound to an authenticated session or stable user context
  • There is no effective rate limiting, lockout, or exponential backoff on failed TOTP attempts
  • The six-digit TOTP space is finite and small enough to brute-force when unrestricted

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a failure to enforce limits on repeated authentication attempts and to bind the verification of a second factor to a specific authenticated session.

This maps to CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts, where an authentication mechanism permits unlimited or poorly controlled retries.

Conceptually, the /admin/check endpoint treats each TOTP verification as an independent, stateless event:

  • It trusts a caller-provided user identifier rather than deriving identity from a secure session
  • It does not apply per-account lockouts, attempt counters, or request pacing

As a result, the TOTP mechanism degrades from a strong second factor to a guessable numeric token under automated attack.

Potential impact

  • Administrative account takeover by successful TOTP brute forcing
  • Full access to phpMyFAQ administration features, including content modification and configuration changes
  • Exposure or manipulation of stored FAQs, user data, and system settings
  • Potential pivot into underlying infrastructure, depending on how phpMyFAQ is integrated with other systems
  • Undermining of two-factor authentication trust for affected users

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on hardening both the authentication workflow and the second-factor verification surface:

  • Enforce strict rate limiting and request throttling on TOTP verification endpoints, with per-account and per-origin limits
  • Introduce account-level lockouts, cooldown periods, or step-up verification after repeated failures
  • Bind TOTP verification to an already authenticated session, avoiding reliance on user identifiers supplied by the client
  • Avoid exposing second-factor verification endpoints that can be called without prior primary-factor authentication
  • Apply generic anti-automation controls (CAPTCHAs, device fingerprints, anomaly detection) around sensitive authentication flows
  • Design the system so that second factors complement, rather than replace, robust primary-factor protections and monitoring

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level and operational indicators:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag authentication endpoints that:
  • Accept user identifiers as request parameters during second-factor verification
  • Lack counters, throttling logic, or lockout paths after repeated failures
  • Look for TOTP or OTP verification functions that do not reference session state or authenticated identity
  • Configuration and policy checks:
  • Enforce requirements that all authentication flows implement rate limiting and lockout policies
  • Mandate that second-factor checks are tied to a verifiable, authenticated session context
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Analyze logs for high-volume TOTP verification attempts, especially from a single IP, network, or user identifier
  • Set alerts on repeated failed TOTP submissions that exceed expected usage patterns

Automated security testing and API-focused scanners can be configured to test for unrestricted authentication retries and missing lockout behavior.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-9pq7-mfwh-xx2j
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-unauthenticated-two-factor-authentication-brute-force-via-admin-check-endpoint

Frequently asked

questions

The vulnerability is broadly exploitable wherever the phpMyFAQ administrative interface is network-accessible and not further restricted. Any attacker capable of sending HTTP requests to the /admin/check endpoint can attempt to brute-force TOTP codes.

No. The described behavior allows an unauthenticated attacker to supply arbitrary user IDs and TOTP values directly to the endpoint, without first logging in with a valid password or existing session.

The most robust fix pattern is to bind TOTP verification to an authenticated session, derive the user identity from server-side state, and enforce strict rate limiting and lockout controls on failed attempts. Second-factor checks should not be exposed as standalone, stateless endpoints.

Design authentication flows around principles of least exposure and strong retry controls: always couple second-factor verification with established sessions, enforce per-user and per-origin retry limits, introduce lockouts or cooldowns after failures, and regularly review authentication-related code paths for missing throttling or session binding.

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