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CVE-2026-44937

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

SSRF Webhook Forgery (CWE-918) in Rancher Fleet

CVE-2026-44937

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Denial of Service and Repository Downgrade

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

An issue in SUSE Rancher Fleet's unauthenticated webhook handling allows forged webhook requests to be accepted as legitimate.

If exposed to remote attackers, this can be abused to trigger denial-of-service conditions or downgrade attacks against other repositories managed by the system.

Affected context

The vulnerability arises in environments where Rancher Fleet uses unauthenticated webhooks to react to external events, such as repository updates or CI/CD notifications.

In such setups, Fleet may treat any incoming webhook on the exposed endpoint as trusted, without robust authentication or origin validation.

This risk is heightened when the webhook endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks and is configured to orchestrate actions across multiple repositories or clusters.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Publicly or externally reachable webhook endpoints exposed by Rancher Fleet.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the unauthenticated webhook URL (no credentials needed).
  • Trigger point: Submission of crafted webhook requests that appear structurally valid and trigger repository-related operations.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The webhook implementation trusts unauthenticated or weakly authenticated requests, allowing attackers to forge events and indirectly influence downstream repository workflows, leading to denial-of-service conditions or forced downgrades.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where a server-side component initiates internal or privileged actions based on attacker-controlled input.

In this case, the webhook endpoint accepts untrusted requests without strong authentication, treating them as authoritative triggers for repository or deployment workflows.

This design couples external, unauthenticated input directly to internal operations, enabling forged events to cause harmful state changes, such as overloading processes (DoS) or orchestrating repository downgrades.

Potential impact

  • Remote attackers could cause denial-of-service by repeatedly triggering expensive repository syncs or related operations.
  • Attackers may force repository downgrade operations, rolling back to earlier, potentially insecure versions.
  • Automated deployment pipelines can be disrupted, delaying updates or introducing instability in managed clusters.
  • Misconfigured or interconnected repositories could experience cascading operational issues from repeated forged events.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigations focus on tightening trust boundaries around webhook handling and limiting the power of externally triggered actions:

  • Prefer strongly authenticated webhooks (e.g., HMAC signatures, mutual TLS, or token-based validation) to ensure only trusted sources can trigger actions.
  • Introduce strict validation of webhook payloads and enforce allowlists of trusted senders and repositories.
  • Decouple high-impact operations (such as downgrades or destructive repository actions) from unauthenticated, automatically triggered workflows.
  • Apply least-privilege configuration for Fleet's repository permissions so that automatically triggered tasks can only perform the minimal necessary changes.
  • Place webhook endpoints behind API gateways, WAFs, or ingress controllers with rate limiting and IP/method filtering.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines configuration review, network monitoring, and automated checks:

  • Use static configuration analysis or policy-as-code (e.g., OPA, Kyverno) to flag unauthenticated or overly permissive webhook endpoints.
  • During code or infrastructure reviews, look for webhooks that trigger repository operations without robust signature verification or access control.
  • Monitor logs for unusual webhook activity patterns, such as high-frequency triggers, unexpected sources, or repeated downgrade operations.
  • Deploy intrusion detection or API gateway analytics to detect anomalous traffic to webhook endpoints and enforce rate limits.
  • Leverage security scanning tools that can identify SSRF-like patterns or insecure webhook configurations in infrastructure-as-code definitions.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/rancher/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-jmf4-m7j9-g72r

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, when the webhook endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks and remains unauthenticated, a remote attacker can send forged requests to exploit the issue.

The attacker primarily needs network access to the exposed webhook URL; no user credentials are required if the webhook is unauthenticated or weakly authenticated.

Introduce strong authentication and integrity checking for all webhook endpoints, restrict which sources are allowed to send events, and reduce the privileges of actions that webhooks can trigger.

Adopt a design where external triggers are always authenticated, validated, and limited in scope, apply security policies to infrastructure-as-code configurations, and regularly review webhook-related configurations and permissions as part of your CI/CD governance.

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