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CVE-2026-44887

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Code Injection in Pi.Alert Web Configuration Editor

CVE-2026-44887

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Code Injection

CWE:

CWE-94

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Pi.Alert's web-based configuration editor allows arbitrary Python code to be injected into the pialert.conf file, which is later executed by the background scan daemon using Python's exec().

When web protection is disabled (the default setting), an unauthenticated attacker can abuse this behavior to achieve remote code execution as the daemon process via the web interface.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Pi.Alert deployments that:

  • Expose the web configuration interface, and
  • Use the default setting with web protection disabled, or otherwise allow unauthenticated access, and
  • Have the background scan daemon configured to read and execute pialert.conf using Python's exec().

The risk is highest on systems where the Pi.Alert web UI is reachable from untrusted networks or the internet.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Pi.Alert web configuration interface (HTTP/S).
  • Required access: Network access to the Pi.Alert web UI. In default configuration with web protection disabled, no authentication is required.
  • Trigger point: Submitting or modifying configuration content through the web-based editor so that malicious Python code is written into pialert.conf.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application treats the configuration file as executable Python code and processes it with exec(), without constraining its contents to a non-executable data format or validating/sanitizing user-supplied configuration input.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection'). Pi.Alert uses a configuration mechanism in which pialert.conf is effectively Python code that is executed via exec() by the background daemon.

The web-based configuration editor allows raw content from HTTP requests to be written directly into this file without enforcing a strict data-only format or applying robust validation. As a result, attacker-controlled input can change not only configuration values but also inject arbitrary executable Python statements. When the daemon loads pialert.conf, the injected code runs with the daemon's privileges, turning a configuration interface into a code execution vector.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary Python code as the Pi.Alert daemon user.
  • Full compromise of the host running Pi.Alert, depending on daemon privileges and system hardening.
  • Installation of persistent backdoors or malware on the underlying device.
  • Tampering with network monitoring results, including hiding intrusions or generating false alerts.
  • Lateral movement into other systems on the same network using the compromised host as a pivot.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on removing executable semantics from configuration handling and tightening access to management interfaces:

  • Replace exec()-based configuration loading with a data-only format (e.g., INI, YAML, JSON) parsed by non-executing libraries.
  • Treat configuration as data, not code: introduce a strict schema for allowed keys, types, and ranges, rejecting unknown or malformed entries.
  • Constrain any remaining dynamic behavior so that user-supplied values cannot alter control flow or introduce new code paths.
  • Enforce authentication and authorization on all administrative web endpoints, and disable anonymous access by default.
  • Restrict network exposure of the Pi.Alert web interface using firewalls, reverse proxies, or VPNs so that it is not reachable from untrusted networks.
  • Run the Pi.Alert daemon under a dedicated, least-privileged account and avoid unnecessary system-level permissions to reduce impact if code execution occurs.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify and monitor for this class of issue using a combination of review and automated checks:

  • Static analysis: Flag any use of exec(), eval(), or similar dynamic code execution APIs in configuration loading paths or request-handling code.
  • Configuration and code review: Examine how configuration files are written and read, ensuring that user-facing interfaces cannot directly modify executable artifacts.
  • Policy enforcement: Define coding standards that prohibit executable configuration patterns and require data-only formats for settings.
  • Web access monitoring: Log and review requests to configuration-editing endpoints, alerting on unusual modification patterns or unexpected sources.
  • File integrity monitoring: Track changes to pialert.conf and other critical configuration files, alerting when they are modified outside trusted workflows.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/leiweibau/Pi.Alert/security/advisories/GHSA-r59g-5wf9-f7vv

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the Pi.Alert web interface is accessible over the network and web protection is disabled (which is the default), a remote attacker can reach the configuration editor and inject code without prior access.

In the default configuration, no. With web protection disabled, the configuration editor is effectively unauthenticated. If administrators have enabled protection or placed the interface behind additional access controls, those controls may limit who can exploit it.

The most robust fix is to stop executing configuration as code. Move to a data-only configuration format parsed by a non-executing library, enforce a strict schema for configuration values, and eliminate exec()/eval() from the configuration loading path.

Avoid designs where user-manageable configuration is interpreted as executable code, establish secure coding guidelines that ban dynamic code execution on untrusted input, require authentication for administrative web endpoints by default, and incorporate code review and static analysis checks specifically targeting exec()/eval() usage and configuration handling logic.

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