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CVE-2026-44848

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Missing Authorization in Portainer CE

CVE-2026-44848

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Administrative Actions on Docker Daemons

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Portainer Community Edition exposed Docker plugin management endpoints without enforcing proper authorization, allowing standard users with endpoint access to perform privileged plugin operations directly on the underlying Docker daemon.

When a non-admin Portainer user is granted access to a Docker endpoint, they could install, enable, and manage plugins in ways intended only for administrators, significantly expanding their effective privileges on that Docker environment.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Portainer CE deployments that:

  • Run affected versions between 2.33.0 and before 2.33.8, 2.39.2, and 2.41.0
  • Expose Docker endpoints through Portainer's RBAC system
  • Grant non-admin users (Standard User or roles with endpoint-level access) permissions to manage or access Docker endpoints

In this context, the /plugins/* routes are reachable via Portainer but were not bound to Portainer's usual authorization handlers, leaving Docker plugin operations insufficiently protected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Portainer CE UI or API configured to manage Docker endpoints.
  • Required access: Valid non-admin Portainer account with endpoint-level access to at least one Docker endpoint (Standard User or equivalent custom role).
  • Trigger point: Calls to /plugins/* plugin management endpoints that are proxied to the Docker daemon without Portainer applying the intended authorization checks.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The plugin-related endpoints were not registered with the same handler chain as other administrative actions, so role-based access control was not enforced, allowing users with basic endpoint access to invoke privileged plugin operations.

Why this happens

This vulnerability stems from incomplete authorization coverage over the Docker plugin management surfaces in Portainer CE.

While Portainer applies role-based access control (RBAC) to most endpoint operations, the /plugins/* endpoints were not wired into the authorization middleware or handler responsible for enforcing these checks.

Conceptually, this aligns with CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where security-relevant functionality (here, plugin install/enable/management) is reachable without verifying that the caller holds the necessary administrative privileges.

The bug is architectural rather than purely implementation-level: the authorization model did not consistently cover all backend routes, resulting in a gap between the intended privilege design and the actual enforcement.

Potential impact

  • Non-admin users may install arbitrary Docker plugins on accessible endpoints.
  • Standard users could enable or configure plugins that expand their capabilities or alter daemon behavior.
  • Attackers with a standard account can indirectly escalate privileges by deploying plugins that provide broader system access or additional management interfaces.
  • Misuse of plugins could lead to data exfiltration, service disruption, or further lateral movement within the container infrastructure.
  • Security and compliance assumptions about least-privilege access in Portainer-managed Docker environments may no longer hold.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on enforcing consistent authorization controls and minimizing the blast radius of delegated access:

  • Ensure all security-sensitive backend routes, including plugin operations, are covered by a centralized authorization layer that checks role and endpoint permissions before forwarding requests.
  • Treat plugin management as an administrative capability: define explicit RBAC policies that restrict plugin install/enable/disable actions to trusted administrator roles only.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege for endpoint assignments; avoid granting standard users broad access to production Docker endpoints when not strictly necessary.
  • Consider segregating high-risk capabilities (like plugin management, node-level operations, and configuration changes) into dedicated roles that are tightly controlled.
  • Regularly review role definitions and endpoint assignments to verify that they align with organizational security expectations and that no non-admin accounts have unnecessary elevated capabilities.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can focus on both configuration review and behavioral monitoring:

  • Perform configuration audits of Portainer roles and endpoint assignments, looking for non-admin roles that have access to Docker endpoints and verifying whether those roles should ever perform plugin management.
  • Review access logs or audit trails for calls involving Docker plugin APIs or /plugins/* paths, especially those initiated by non-admin accounts, to identify suspicious or unintended usage.
  • Employ policy-as-code or infrastructure-as-code scanning to flag Portainer configurations where plugin management is not constrained to administrative roles.
  • Use application security testing and static analysis on management plane components to ensure every backend route passes through a common authorization middleware and that no "unhandled" endpoints exist.
  • Integrate these checks into CI/CD or deployment pipelines to prevent reintroducing similar authorization gaps in future changes.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/portainer/portainer/security/advisories/GHSA-rrmm-9v76-h3p4

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in environments where Portainer is network-accessible. An attacker who obtains valid credentials for a non-admin account with access to a Docker endpoint can issue plugin management requests via the Portainer API or UI, without needing direct access to the Docker daemon itself.

No. Exploitation specifically involves non-admin users (such as Standard Users or custom roles) that have been granted endpoint-level access. Because the /plugins/* endpoints lacked proper authorization, those users can perform actions intended for administrators.

Adopt a centralized authorization mechanism that all backend routes must pass through, and treat the registration of new endpoints as failing closed unless explicitly associated with the correct authorization checks. For high-risk operations like plugin or extension management, require explicit administrator-level permissions.

Maintain a clear, documented mapping between privileges and backend operations, enforce mandatory code review around new or modified routes, and use automated tests or policy checks to verify that every security-relevant endpoint invokes the authorization layer. Regularly reassess role definitions and perform least-privilege reviews to ensure that powerful capabilities are not inadvertently exposed to standard users.

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