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CVE-2026-44741

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

SQL Injection (CWE-89) in Pimcore Admin Classic Bundle

CVE-2026-44741

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

SQL Injection

CWE:

CWE-89

Impact:

Database Query Manipulation and Potential Data Exposure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Pimcore's Admin Classic Bundle contains a SQL injection vulnerability in the translation grid date filter because a user-controlled property value is inserted into a SQL expression without parameterization or allowlist validation. An attacker who can submit affected backend filter requests may be able to alter database queries, potentially exposing or modifying data.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Pimcore's Admin Classic Bundle translation grid when processing date-filter JSON. It becomes risky where users can reach the backend interface and provide filter input that is incorporated into the generated SQL query without being constrained to an approved set of properties.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Pimcore backend translation grid filtering
  • Required access: Access to submit requests to the affected backend functionality; deployment-specific authentication and authorization controls may apply
  • Trigger point: Processing a translation grid date filter containing a user-controlled property field
  • Why exploitation is possible: The property value is interpolated directly into a SQL expression instead of being parameterized or checked against a strict allowlist

Why this happens

The underlying bug is an unsafe construction of SQL statements from user-controlled structural input. The translation filter incorporates the property field into a UNIX_TIMESTAMP(DATE(FROM_UNIXTIME(...))) expression without separating data from SQL syntax or validating the field against permitted column mappings. This behavior maps to CWE-89, SQL Injection, because attacker-influenced input can affect database query interpretation.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read data that the database account can access.
  • An attacker could alter query behavior and bypass intended filtering.
  • An attacker may modify or delete database records if the database privileges permit it.
  • The vulnerability could expose sensitive application or administrative information.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on eliminating dynamic SQL construction from

untrusted input and reducing the trust placed in filter fields.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Use parameterized queries for values and trusted server-side mappings for column or property names.
  • Enforce a strict allowlist for filter properties before query generation.
  • Separate structural query composition from user-supplied values.
  • Apply least-privilege permissions to the database account used by the application.
  • Validate filter schemas and reject unexpected fields, types, and operators by default.
  • Treat backend users and client-generated filter JSON as untrusted input.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches may include:

  • Static analysis rules for string interpolation, concatenation, or formatting inside SQL statements.
  • Code review checks for user-controlled JSON fields used as table, column, expression, or clause components.
  • Searches for dynamic SQL near request handlers and filter-processing code.
  • Runtime monitoring for anomalous translation-grid queries, unexpected database errors, and unusual query patterns.
  • CI policy checks requiring parameterized database APIs and approved query-builder abstractions.

Automated application-security review tools may help identify unsafe query construction, but findings should be validated against the actual data flow and authorization model.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/commit/80e57a23d9e19574eddfe9b08e8f26785b2b0d90
github.comgithub.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/pull/1111
github.comgithub.com/pimcore/admin-ui-classic-bundle/releases/tag/v2.3.6
github.comgithub.com/pimcore/pimcore/security/advisories/GHSA-h4ph-crvj-9h92

Frequently asked

questions

It may be exploitable through backend requests when an attacker can access the

affected translation grid filtering functionality. The practical scope

depends on network exposure, authentication, authorization, and database

permissions.

Access to the relevant backend feature is generally the important

prerequisite. Whether that access requires authentication depends on the

deployment's administrative access controls and exposed routes.

Use parameterized queries for data values and map user-selectable properties

to a fixed, server-controlled allowlist rather than inserting property names

directly into SQL expressions.

Treat all filter JSON as untrusted, validate schemas and allowed fields,

enforce least-privilege database accounts, and use code-review or CI rules

that detect dynamic SQL construction.

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