Summary
Open WebUI's OpenAI router exposes a /responses endpoint that forwards requests to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control.
Any authenticated user with a valid session can invoke arbitrary configured models by calling this proxy endpoint, bypassing the stricter checks applied to the primary chat completion API.
Affected context
This issue appears in Open WebUI deployments where multiple models are configured behind the OpenAI router, including models restricted to specific users, groups, or access grants.
The vulnerability is present when the /api/openai/responses endpoint is exposed to authenticated users and is used as a generic proxy to upstream LLM providers, but does not replicate the ownership, group membership, or AccessGrant checks applied by generate_chat_completion.
Any environment that relies on per-model authorization to separate tenants, teams, or sensitivity levels may be affected if users can reach this endpoint.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) API endpoint
/api/openai/responsesexposed by Open WebUI. - Required access: Any authenticated user account with a valid session (no special roles or model permissions needed).
- Trigger point: Sending a POST request to
/api/openai/responseswith a chosenmodelidentifier in the request body. - Why exploitation is possible: The /responses proxy verifies only session validity via
get_verified_userand omits the per-model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrant checks enforced by the primary chat completion path, enabling direct invocation of models regardless of configured access rules.
Why this happens
The root cause is inconsistent authorization enforcement between two code paths that reach the same upstream LLM infrastructure.
The primary generate_chat_completion handler enforces per-model access control by checking model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants, while the /responses proxy path only validates session authenticity.
This divergence maps to CWE-284: Improper Access Control and CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where an endpoint exposes sensitive operations without applying the same authorization logic as other, better-protected entry points.
Conceptually, the proxy endpoint treats any authenticated user as authorized for all configured models, effectively collapsing model-level access boundaries.
Potential impact
- Authenticated users may interact with models they are not intended to access, including restricted, paid, or tenant-specific models.
- Users could indirectly access data or capabilities exposed only through certain models (for example, models fine-tuned on sensitive or proprietary datasets).
- Cross-tenant or cross-group isolation may be weakened, enabling one group's users to leverage another group's models.
- Operational costs may increase if high-cost models can be invoked by a wider audience than anticipated.
- Security and compliance controls based on model segmentation may be undermined.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on aligning authorization across all pathways that reach upstream LLM providers.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Enforcing a single, shared authorization layer that all model invocation endpoints must call, ensuring consistent checks for ownership, group membership, and access grants.
- Treating any "proxy" or "passthrough" endpoints as high risk and requiring them to reuse the same access control routines as primary business APIs.
- Designing model configurations with explicit access policies, and failing closed when policy data is missing or cannot be evaluated.
- Applying least-privilege principles so that authenticated sessions are not implicitly authorized for all models, and introducing clear separation of duties for administrative model management.
- Centralizing policy configuration and avoiding ad hoc authorization checks dispersed across handlers or routes.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection efforts can center on both code-level and operational signals:
- Static analysis / code review: Flag routes that invoke upstream LLM providers or sensitive operations without calling the standard authorization utilities used elsewhere in the codebase.
- Policy checks: Enforce rules that all external-facing endpoints must explicitly reference a shared authorization function or middleware before forwarding requests.
- Logging and monitoring: Instrument endpoints like
/api/openai/responseswith structured logs capturing user identity, model identifier, and authorization decisions, then alert on unexpected cross-model access patterns. - Automated security testing: Use integration tests to simulate users with differing model entitlements and validate that they cannot invoke models outside their assigned scope.

