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CVE-2026-44551

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

Improper Authentication in Open WebUI LDAP Simple Bind

CVE-2026-44551

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Authentication Bypass and Account Takeover

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Open WebUI's LDAP authentication endpoint fails to reject empty passwords, allowing a Simple Bind attempt with an empty string to be treated as a valid credential on permissive LDAP servers.

When this occurs, the application issues a full session token for the target user, effectively bypassing password verification and enabling unauthorized access.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in Open WebUI deployments that:

  • Enable LDAP-based authentication using Simple Bind
  • Integrate with LDAP servers that accept empty passwords as successful binds for certain accounts
  • Rely on the backend to enforce password presence instead of applying client-side constraints

In these environments, the authentication flow trusts the bind result without explicitly verifying that a non-empty password was supplied.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or internal Open WebUI login endpoint configured with LDAP authentication
  • Required access: Ability to reach the LDAP-backed authentication route (e.g., network access to the Open WebUI instance)
  • Trigger point: Submitting a login request that specifies a valid username (or LDAP DN) with an empty password field
  • Why exploitation is possible: The LdapForm model accepts empty strings, and the backend performs a Simple Bind without enforcing a minimum password length. On vulnerable LDAP servers, an empty password may result in a successful bind, which the application treats as a valid login and issues a session token.

Why this happens

The core issue is an Improper Authentication pattern where the presence and validity of credentials are not fully verified before granting access.

At the design level, the Pydantic LdapForm model allows password: str with no minimum length or non-empty constraint, so empty strings are treated as valid input.

The authentication logic then forwards this empty password directly into Connection.bind(), assuming the directory server will enforce correctness.

This maps to CWE-287, because the application delegates critical authentication checks to an external system without enforcing a baseline requirement (non-empty secrets) and then unconditionally trusts a successful bind result.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized login to Open WebUI as arbitrary LDAP-backed users where empty passwords are accepted
  • Full session token issuance, enabling account takeover and access to protected AI workflows or data
  • Escalation to administrative or privileged accounts if their LDAP entries are affected
  • Indirect access to downstream systems or data integrated with Open WebUI under the compromised identity

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on tightening credential validation and reducing reliance on permissive authentication flows:

  • Enforce non-empty password constraints at the input model or request-handling layer, rejecting authentication attempts with missing or empty passwords.
  • Apply minimum secret complexity or length policies in the application, independent of LDAP server behavior.
  • Introduce explicit checks that the password field is present and non-whitespace before performing directory binds.
  • Limit the privileges of accounts that may be used with LDAP authentication and avoid accounts that intentionally rely on empty or null passwords.
  • Centralize authentication logic to ensure all code paths use consistent, strict validation rules before delegating to external identity providers.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this class of issue using:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Search for authentication flows where user input is forwarded directly into bind() or similar APIs without checks for emptiness or minimal length.
  • Flag Pydantic (or similar) models for authentication that lack validation constraints on password fields.
  • Review for patterns where success responses depend solely on external identity provider results without local sanity checks.
  • Runtime and logging analysis:
  • Monitor authentication logs for successful logins with missing or obviously invalid passwords.
  • Configure anomaly detection for repeated successful logins with unusually short or empty credentials.
  • Security policy enforcement:
  • Include automated checks in CI/CD pipelines that require explicit validation rules for credentials in new authentication features.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-2r4p-jpmg-48f4

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on both Open WebUI's configuration and the behavior of the backing LDAP server. If the LDAP server treats empty passwords as successful binds for certain accounts, an attacker who can reach the login endpoint may log in without knowing any real password.

The attacker typically needs knowledge of a valid username or LDAP DN configured for Open WebUI. They do not need to know the actual password if the LDAP server accepts empty passwords for that account.

Introduce strict server-side validation that rejects any authentication request where the password is empty or missing, and centralize this check so all LDAP-backed login flows enforce it consistently.

Treat authentication as a first-class security boundary: enforce minimal password requirements in application-level models, avoid relying on external systems to reject obviously invalid input, and incorporate security-focused reviews or automated checks for all new authentication or identity-related code paths.

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