Summary
Ella Core's 5G core prior to version 1.10.0 accepts forged PDUSessionResourceSetupResponse messages that advertise any UE's AMF-UE-NGAP-ID without validating that the message arrived on the correct SCTP association for that UE.
This missing association check can allow a compromised or malicious radio with a valid NG Setup to hijack UE sessions and establish unauthorized GTP tunnels, enabling traffic interception or redirection within a private 5G network.
Affected context
This issue affects Ella Core deployments in private 5G networks where:
- Radios (gNBs) establish NGAP connectivity via SCTP to the core.
- PDUSessionResourceSetupResponse messages are accepted from any radio that has completed NG Setup.
- The core relies on AMF-UE-NGAP-ID values in signaling but does not strictly bind those values to a specific SCTP association representing the UE's logical NG-connection.
In such setups, a radio that is legitimately connected to the core can submit responses for sessions belonging to other UEs, as long as it can craft NGAP messages with arbitrary AMF-UE-NGAP-IDs.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: NGAP control plane over SCTP between radios (gNBs) and Ella Core.
- Required access: The attacker must control or compromise a radio (or radio-like endpoint) that has successfully performed NG Setup and maintains an SCTP association with the core.
- Trigger point: Sending a forged PDUSessionResourceSetupResponse NGAP message containing an AMF-UE-NGAP-ID corresponding to a UE associated with another NG-connection.
- Why exploitation is possible: Ella Core does not verify that the AMF-UE-NGAP-ID in the response matches the UE bound to the originating SCTP association. This lack of binding between the signaling identifier and its SCTP association permits cross-association responses and creation of GTP tunnels toward the malicious radio for other UEs' sessions.
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization and association binding flaw in the handling of NGAP signaling messages.
Instead of treating the AMF-UE-NGAP-ID as scoped to a specific SCTP association and UE context, the implementation implicitly trusts the identifier regardless of which association delivered the message.
This maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where the system fails to enforce that operations (here, PDUSessionResourceSetupResponse handling and GTP tunnel creation) are only allowed when the request originates from the correct, pre-authorized association.
The integrity of the NGAP UE context is not tied to the transport-layer association, which allows a malicious or misbehaving radio to impersonate another UE's radio-side endpoint at the control-plane level.
Potential impact
- An attacker-controlled radio could cause the core to create GTP tunnels for UEs that are not actually served by that radio.
- Traffic for affected UEs may be redirected through, or appear to originate from, the malicious radio, enabling interception or manipulation.
- Session hijacking could occur, with the attacker effectively assuming the network-side role of another UE's radio connection.
- Disruption or denial of service for legitimate UEs if their sessions are misrouted or terminated due to inconsistent tunnel state.
- Undermining of network segmentation and trust assumptions in private 5G deployments.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on strengthening association binding and authorization checks in control-plane message handling:
- Enforce strict binding between AMF-UE-NGAP-ID (and similar identifiers) and the SCTP association on which the UE's NG-connection was established.
- Treat NGAP messages that reference a UE context as valid only when they arrive on the exact association logged for that UE.
- Implement defensive checks to reject or log anomalies where signaling for a UE appears on unexpected associations or from unexpected radios.
- Reduce trust in radio-side inputs by treating them as potentially untrusted and enforcing least-privilege behavior for each NG-connection, limiting it to its own UEs.
- Design authorization logic such that any operation that creates or modifies GTP tunnels requires consistent, multi-parameter validation (identifier, association, and expected state).
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of issue using a combination of design review, testing, and runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis and code review: Look for authorization decisions that rely solely on logical identifiers (e.g., UE IDs) without cross-checking the underlying transport association or session context. Flag code paths that accept NGAP messages and create GTP tunnels without verifying association bindings.
- Protocol-level testing: Use conformance or fuzzing tools to send NGAP responses with mismatched AMF-UE-NGAP-IDs over different SCTP associations and verify that they are rejected. Include test cases where radios attempt to manipulate sessions belonging to other UEs or associations.
- Logging and anomaly detection: Enable detailed logging for NGAP messages, including association identifiers and UE IDs, and build alerts for patterns where a UE's context appears on multiple associations unexpectedly.
- Policy enforcement: Establish development policies that require explicit association binding checks for all control-plane messages that mutate session state or establish user-plane tunnels.

