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CVE-2026-44472

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

Improper Authentication (CWE-287) in Saleor Accounts

CVE-2026-44472

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authentication

CWE:

CWE-287

Impact:

Unauthorized account access and exposure of personal commerce data

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Saleor's account activation flow can treat email-link confirmation as sufficient account ownership proof and automatically associate anonymous commerce data with an attacker-created account. If an attacker registers first using another person's email address and the intended recipient activates that account, the attacker may access merged orders and personal information without knowing the account password.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Saleor account activation and anonymous-data association flows when an account is created with an email address that has not yet been registered by its legitimate owner. Risk is present when activation relies only on a mailbox link and the platform automatically links anonymous orders or gift-card records associated with that email address without requiring an additional authentication factor.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Account registration, email activation, and anonymous commerce-data association
  • Required access: Ability to create an account using a victim's email address; access to the victim's mailbox is not required by the attacker
  • Trigger point: The victim follows the activation link delivered to that mailbox
  • Why exploitation is possible: The activation flow may accept email verification as sufficient proof of account ownership and link existing anonymous objects without password confirmation or another independent factor

Why this happens

The underlying flaw is an authentication-design error in which possession of an email activation link is treated as equivalent to complete account ownership verification. The account-confirmation process can then associate anonymous commerce records based on an email address without confirming control of the account credentials or requiring another authentication factor. This maps to CWE-287: Improper Authentication, because the application does not adequately authenticate the party receiving access to the account and linked data.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could gain access to an account created under another person's email address
  • The attacker could view merged order history and related personal information
  • Names, addresses, and phone numbers could be exposed
  • Anonymous orders or gift-card records could be associated with the wrong account
  • The incident could undermine customer privacy and account ownership integrity

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation typically focuses on separating email verification from account ownership authorization and avoiding automatic data linking based solely on an email address.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Require password confirmation or another independent authentication factor before linking anonymous objects to an account
  • Disable automatic merging by default unless ownership and authorization checks have succeeded
  • Use explicit, authenticated workflows for claiming anonymous orders and gift-card data
  • Bind activation and account-linking decisions to a verified account-creation transaction rather than only to an email address
  • Minimize the data exposed during account activation and apply least-privilege access to linked commerce records
  • Record and review account-linking events for anomalous email reuse and unexpected ownership changes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can assess this risk through:

  • Static analysis and code review checks for account-linking decisions based only on email equality or email-token validation
  • Tests that attempt pre-registration with an existing user's email address and verify that activation cannot claim unrelated commerce data
  • Review of authentication flows for missing password confirmation or secondary-factor requirements before sensitive object association
  • Monitoring for newly created accounts that immediately receive historical orders, gift cards, addresses, or other personal records
  • Policy enforcement requiring explicit authorization before anonymous data is attached to an authenticated account
  • Automated security testing and neutral code-review tools that flag authentication decisions relying on a single weak or indirect proof

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/commit/299cdfb1a5737108b78b5c2c0d29b94f3b7331a2
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/commit/42516727823cb74cb6b875070956debecf9ffdb8
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/commit/5110542c164991384fa3c4f01983e8c76823ce0f
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/commit/dc63e422afc9f6ce115d75f045886b01b4f13e2b
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/releases/tag/3.21.67
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/releases/tag/3.22.63
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/releases/tag/3.23.22
github.comgithub.com/saleor/saleor/security/advisories/GHSA-6whj-8p3f-2xqp

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, it may be exploitable through the application's account registration and activation flows. The attacker generally needs to register first with the victim's email address, while the victim's later activation action completes the account state change.

No. The described attack relies on the victim opening the legitimate activation message. The attacker benefits when the application associates the victim's anonymous commerce data with the attacker-created account.

Do not treat email verification alone as authorization to claim an account or link sensitive anonymous records. Require password confirmation or another independent authentication factor before performing data association.

Test account lifecycle and ownership-transfer scenarios, separate verification from authorization, restrict automatic data merging, and monitor account-linking operations for unexpected historical-data access.

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