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CVE-2026-44330

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

Missing Authorization in free5GC

CVE-2026-44330

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Network Function Control and Traffic Description Data

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(10.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

free5GC's NEF exposes the nnef-pfdmanagement SBI route group without enforcing OAuth2/bearer-token authorization, allowing any reachable client to interact with these APIs using arbitrary or forged tokens.

An attacker with network access to the NEF SBI can read PFD application data and create or delete PFD change-notification subscriptions, bypassing the protections operators expect from NRF-driven OAuth2 configuration.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects free5GC deployments where:

  • The NEF is reachable on the SBI (e.g., from other core NFs or mis-scoped networks/VPNs)
  • OAuth2 / bearer-token based protection is expected on NEF SBI interfaces
  • The nnef-pfdmanagement API is enabled and included in the runtime ServiceList as a production path

Under these conditions, the PFD management endpoints are accessible without effective inbound authorization checks, even if the rest of the NEF SBI is correctly protected.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: NEF SBI HTTP(S) endpoints exposing nnef-pfdmanagement
  • Required access: Network-layer ability to send requests to the NEF SBI (e.g., from another NF, from a peered network, or from an incorrectly segregated segment)
  • Authentication state: No valid OAuth2 token is required; attackers can supply arbitrary or forged bearer tokens (such as Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token)
  • Trigger point: Direct HTTP(S) requests to:
  • GET /applications
  • GET /applications/{appID}
  • POST /subscriptions
  • DELETE /subscriptions/{subID}
  • Why exploitation is possible: The nnef-pfdmanagement route group is mounted without inbound auth middleware, so the NEF does not validate bearer tokens or enforce authorization policies on these specific endpoints.

Why this happens

The core issue aligns with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where an access control decision is missing or incorrectly enforced on a security-sensitive operation.

In this case, the NEF's nnef-pfdmanagement route group is:

  • Declared as part of the runtime ServiceList (indicating a production, OAuth2-protected SBI service)
  • Mounted in the HTTP routing layer without attaching the OAuth2/bearer-token authorization middleware used for other SBI route groups (such as OAM and traffic-influence)

This design oversight disconnects security configuration from the routing configuration: the system assumes that being in the ServiceList implies protection by OAuth2, but the actual route registration omits the middleware that performs token validation and authorization checks. The result is a silently unprotected path within an otherwise protected interface.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read PFD application data via GET /applications and GET /applications/{appID}, gaining visibility into traffic patterns and service descriptions.
  • An attacker could create arbitrary PFD change-notification subscriptions, potentially using them as a control or observation channel.
  • An attacker can delete existing PFD change-notification subscriptions, disrupting expected monitoring or dynamic policy update flows.
  • An attacker may leverage detailed PFD information to refine further attacks on user-plane traffic or other core network functions.
  • Misuse of PFD data and subscriptions could contribute to broader signaling abuse, traffic manipulation, or denial-of-service scenarios.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on ensuring consistent, centralized authorization enforcement for all SBI routes and avoiding unguarded "special case" endpoints:

  • Attach a common authentication and authorization middleware layer to all NEF SBI route groups, including nnef-pfdmanagement, rather than configuring protection per-route in an ad hoc manner.
  • Drive route protection from a single, declarative policy source (such as the ServiceList or a security configuration file) so that any service declared as OAuth2-protected is automatically bound to the correct auth middleware.
  • Treat bearer tokens as untrusted until validated; all handlers that process SBI traffic should assume invalid or missing tokens by default and rely on middleware to gate access.
  • Limit NEF SBI network exposure according to the principle of least privilege, ensuring only required network functions or segments can reach these endpoints.
  • Implement defense-in-depth by combining authorization middleware with network segmentation, API gateway policy controls, and logging of unauthorized or malformed token usage.

How teams detect issues like this

Teams can identify and monitor this class of issue using several complementary approaches:

  • Static analysis and code inspection:
  • Search for NEF SBI route registrations where handlers are mounted without the standard OAuth2/bearer-token middleware.
  • Enforce patterns such as "all SBI routes must pass through a shared auth wrapper" and flag exceptions for manual review.
  • Configuration and policy review:
  • Compare the runtime ServiceList against the actual registered routes to verify that all declared services are covered by the appropriate security policies.
  • Review security configuration driven from NRF or other service discovery components to ensure it maps correctly to code-level enforcement.
  • Dynamic and integration testing:
  • Add automated tests that issue requests with invalid or fake bearer tokens to all SBI endpoints and assert that they are rejected.
  • Run API security scanners against NEF interfaces to detect endpoints that return sensitive data or accept state-changing operations without proper authorization.
  • Operational monitoring:
  • Log and alert on requests to NEF SBI endpoints that use obviously invalid bearer tokens or no Authorization header, especially if they still result in successful responses.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-rwww-x45w-p52w

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, but only if the NEF SBI is exposed—directly or indirectly—to untrusted networks. In typical deployments, exploitation requires network-level access to the NEF SBI from within the operator's environment or from a peered network, but misconfiguration could extend this reach.

No. The affected nnef-pfdmanagement endpoints do not validate bearer tokens, so any arbitrary or forged token—including obviously invalid values—can be used to access PFD data and manage subscriptions.

The robust fix is to ensure that all NEF SBI route groups, including nnef-pfdmanagement, are consistently wrapped with the standard OAuth2/bearer-token authorization middleware, ideally driven by a centralized policy that links ServiceList declarations to concrete route protections.

Adopt a security-by-default routing architecture where SBI endpoints are protected unless explicitly exempted, enforce centralized authorization policies tied to service declarations, and augment this with automated tests and static checks that verify every SBI route is guarded by the appropriate authentication and authorization layers.

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