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CVE-2026-44326

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

Missing Authorization in free5GC NEF

CVE-2026-44326

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-862

Impact:

Unauthorized Remote Manipulation of 5G Traffic Steering Policies

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.4)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

free5GC's Network Exposure Function (NEF) exposes the 3gpp-traffic-influence API without enforcing OAuth2/bearer-token authorization, allowing unauthenticated or forged-token access.

A remote network attacker who can reach the NEF over the SBI can create, read, update, and delete traffic influence subscriptions, including AnyUeInd=true rules that may impact traffic steering for large groups of UEs.

Affected context

This issue affects free5GC deployments where:

  • The NEF component is deployed and reachable on the Service-Based Interface (SBI).
  • The 3gpp-traffic-influence API route group is mounted by NEF.
  • Operators rely on OAuth2/bearer-token authorization or configuration-based disabling (ServiceList) to protect or hide this API.

Even when the ServiceList configuration does not declare the 3gpp-traffic-influence service, the underlying route group remains reachable and unauthenticated.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: NEF's SBI HTTP/REST endpoint exposing the 3gpp-traffic-influence API.
  • Required access: Network-level ability to send HTTP requests to the NEF SBI (e.g., from another network function, compromised host, or misconfigured network segment).
  • Authentication state: No valid credentials are required; requests without an Authorization header or with arbitrary bearer tokens are accepted.
  • Trigger point: Any HTTP operation (POST, GET, PATCH, DELETE) on the traffic-influence subscription endpoints.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The NEF request handling path for the 3gpp-traffic-influence API does not invoke inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization checks, and the route group is active regardless of ServiceList configuration.

Why this happens

The vulnerability arises from missing authorization enforcement on a sensitive API surface.

In the NEF implementation, the 3gpp-traffic-influence route group is mounted without binding to the authentication/authorization middleware responsible for validating OAuth2/bearer tokens and enforcing access control policies.

Additionally, configuration intended to disable the service (ServiceList) does not actually gate access to the underlying routes, leaving the API exposed even when operators believe it is turned off.

This maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization, where sensitive operations are made accessible without adequate permission checks, effectively treating any inbound request as trusted.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may create new traffic influence subscriptions to steer or bias UE traffic flows.
  • Existing traffic influence subscriptions can be read, leaking operational policy information.
  • Subscriptions can be patched or deleted, disrupting expected traffic steering behavior.
  • AnyUeInd=true rules may be abused to impact groups of UEs or any-UE traffic, potentially enabling large-scale service degradation or misrouting.
  • Operators may experience unexpected data-plane behavior despite believing the service is disabled in configuration.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on enforcing strong authorization at the NEF boundary and avoiding configuration states where APIs are exposed without controls.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Ensuring that all NEF SBI route groups, especially 3gpp-traffic-influence, are consistently protected by OAuth2/bearer-token validation middleware and explicit authorization checks.
  • Implementing a central, default-deny access control policy for NEF APIs, where each operation requires explicit authorization rules.
  • Binding service enable/disable configuration switches to actual route registration, so disabled services do not mount any network-accessible endpoints.
  • Segmenting the NEF SBI network to limit which components or networks can originate requests, and applying mutual TLS and strict identity verification where appropriate.
  • Applying least-privilege principles to NEF clients, ensuring only authorized network functions can request traffic influence changes.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect this class of issue using a mix of code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis / code scanning: Look for HTTP route registrations in NEF that lack attachment to common authentication/authorization middleware or filters; flag handlers performing subscription CRUD without access checks.
  • Configuration/code review: Verify that ServiceList or similar configuration flags truly gate route registration, and ensure there are no "always-on" route groups for sensitive APIs.
  • Runtime security testing: Use API fuzzing and negative security tests to send requests without Authorization headers or with invalid tokens and verify that they are rejected with proper error codes.
  • Logging and monitoring: Enable detailed access logs on NEF endpoints; alert on traffic-influence operations originating from unexpected sources or lacking valid authentication context.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/859
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-3p28-73q7-45xp
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the NEF's SBI is reachable from untrusted networks or if upstream network segmentation is weak. In many deployments the SBI is intended to be internal, but any misconfiguration or compromise that exposes NEF to a broader network can make this effectively remotely exploitable.

The attacker only needs network access to the NEF's SBI endpoint. No valid OAuth2 token or credentials are required, and even obviously invalid bearer tokens are accepted by the vulnerable API routes.

Apply a default-deny authorization model for all NEF APIs and explicitly bind the 3gpp-traffic-influence routes to robust OAuth2/bearer-token validation and authorization checks. Additionally, ensure that configuration switches actually control whether routes are registered and exposed on the network.

Adopt a secure-by-default API framework where authentication and authorization middleware are mandatory for all routes, require security-focused code review for any control-plane API, and regularly perform negative testing to verify that unauthenticated or improperly authenticated requests are rejected for all sensitive operations.

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