/

CVE-2026-44319

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Denial of Service via Improper Error Handling

CVE-2026-44319

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Denial of Service via Improper Error Handling

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-617, CWE-755

Impact:

Denial of Service (Process Termination)

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

free5GC's Network Exposure Function (NEF) terminates its entire process when delivery of a stored PFD-subscription notifyUri fails, treating routine network errors as fatal conditions.

An attacker who can register a PFD subscription with a controlled notifyUri and then trigger a PFD change can force NEF to exit, causing a denial of service on its SBI interface until the process is restarted.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in the NEF component of free5GC deployments that:

  • Support PFD (Packet Flow Description) management and notifications
  • Persist PFD subscriptions with caller-supplied notifyUri endpoints
  • Use the PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications() flow to send asynchronous notifications
  • Treat notification delivery failures as fatal errors for the NEF process

It becomes relevant in environments where external or tenant-controlled clients can create or influence PFD subscriptions over the SBI.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: NEF SBI APIs related to PFD management and subscription creation.
  • Required access: Ability to create or modify PFD subscriptions with an arbitrary notifyUri; ability to cause or wait for at least one PFD change affecting that subscription.
  • Trigger point: Asynchronous notification dispatch in PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), where NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) attempts delivery to the stored notifyUri.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Any delivery error leads to logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err), which is equivalent to os.Exit(1) in Go, terminating the entire NEF process instead of handling the error gracefully. An attacker can select an unreachable or misbehaving notifyUri to reliably induce this condition.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper handling of expected runtime errors during notification delivery in a networked service.

In PfdChangeNotifier.FlushNotifications(), the NEF calls NnefPFDmanagementNotify(...) to send notifications to subscriber-provided notifyUri endpoints. Instead of classifying delivery failures as recoverable or local to the subscription, the code invokes a Fatal log call (logger.PFDManageLog.Fatal(err)) whenever an error is returned. In Go, this is effectively an os.Exit(1)-equivalent, causing immediate process termination.

Abstractly, this maps to CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions, where a normal operational error (e.g., an unreachable HTTP endpoint) is escalated to a process-wide fatal failure. It is also related to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation and CWE-617: Reachable Assertion, because attacker-controlled input (notifyUri) can directly drive a code path that intentionally forces process exit. The design couples subscriber-controlled parameters to global lifecycle control rather than isolating failures to the affected subscription.

Potential impact

  • Forced termination of the NEF process, causing a denial of service for all NEF SBI interfaces.
  • Interruption of exposure and policy functions that depend on NEF, potentially degrading overall 5G core functionality.
  • Repeated crashes if malicious PFD subscriptions persist and notification retries occur after restarts.
  • Potential cascading operational issues in orchestrated environments if health checks continuously restart failing NEF instances.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on decoupling routine network errors from process-wide termination and reducing the blast radius of subscriber-controlled parameters:

  • Replace fatal termination on notification delivery error with structured, recoverable error handling that logs the failure and continues processing.
  • Treat subscriber-provided notifyUri values as untrusted input and apply validation, normalization, and policy checks before storing them.
  • Implement per-subscription error budgets or backoff strategies so that repeated failures for one endpoint do not affect global service availability.
  • Use defensive coding patterns where network I/O and external calls cannot directly invoke process exit paths; centralize shutdown logic under controlled conditions only.
  • Apply least-privilege and isolation at the component level so that failure modes of NEF notification flows do not cascade into broader core-network outages.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can rely on both code-centric and operational signals:

  • Static analysis & code review:
  • Flag any usage of fatal logging or direct process exit (e.g., log.Fatal, os.Exit) within runtime error paths that can be influenced by external input.
  • Review notification and callback mechanisms for tight coupling between I/O failures and global shutdown logic.
  • Identify and annotate code paths where subscriber-controlled fields (like URLs) are used in control-flow decisions affecting service lifecycle.
  • Runtime & observability:
  • Monitor NEF process exits and restart loops correlated with PFD change events or notification attempts.
  • Use structured logging to distinguish between expected transient network errors and genuine internal consistency failures.
  • Policy enforcement:
  • Introduce coding standards that forbid fatal exits in request-handling, notification, and other multi-tenant execution paths.
  • Incorporate automated checks in CI to detect prohibited patterns (e.g., log.Fatal in library or handler packages).

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/924
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-rxrq-fv76-26pr
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/nef/commit/f110517b1189801950b50668a593398687049074
github.comgithub.com/free5gc/nef/pull/25

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, in typical deployments where external or tenant clients can create PFD subscriptions through NEF SBI APIs. If an attacker can supply a notifyUri and cause a PFD change, they can remotely trigger the NEF process termination.

The attacker needs logical access to whichever interface or API allows them to register or modify PFD subscriptions on the NEF. This is usually authenticated and authorized control-plane access, but in multi-tenant or misconfigured environments it may be more broadly exposed.

The safest pattern is to treat notification delivery failures as non-fatal: validate notifyUri inputs, log and handle errors locally to the subscription, and avoid any use of fatal logging or process exits in notification code paths. Global shutdown should be reserved for unrecoverable internal integrity violations, not external connectivity issues.

Establish coding guidelines that forbid fatal exits in externally triggered paths, enforce input validation on all subscriber-provided endpoints, and integrate automated checks for improper error handling patterns. During design and review, explicitly model how external failures (network timeouts, unreachable URLs) are handled to ensure they degrade gracefully rather than terminate core services.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.