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CVE-2026-44252

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

Broken Access Control (CWE-863) in Wazuh Manager API

CVE-2026-44252

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Broken Access Control

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Administrative Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

A broken access control vulnerability in Wazuh Manager allows a low-privilege read-only API user to retrieve the cluster key and abuse trusted worker communications. With network access to the cluster communication port, an attacker may impersonate a worker, submit forged authorization data, and gain administrative control over users, credentials, configuration, and agent operations.

Affected context

The issue affects Wazuh Manager deployments where a read-only API account can access raw manager configuration containing the cluster key, and where the manager accepts worker-originated authorization context without independently validating its integrity. Exploitation also depends on network reachability to the cluster communication service on TCP port 1516.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Wazuh Manager API and cluster communication service
  • Required access: A low-privilege API account with manager:read permission, plus network access to TCP port 1516
  • Trigger point: Retrieval of raw manager configuration followed by a forged distributed API request
  • Why exploitation is possible: The cluster key can be disclosed to an authorized but low-privilege user, while worker-supplied authorization context is trusted without sufficient integrity and privilege verification

Why this happens

The vulnerability results from exposing a sensitive cluster authentication key through an API response available to a low-privilege read-only user. The manager then relies on attacker-influenced worker authorization data, including RBAC permissions and mode, instead of independently establishing the caller's identity and effective privileges.

This maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where access-control decisions fail to enforce the intended permissions for a protected operation. The underlying insecure pattern combines excessive disclosure of trust material with authorization decisions based on untrusted or insufficiently validated context.

Potential impact

  • An attacker could impersonate a Wazuh cluster worker
  • An attacker could create users or assign administrator privileges
  • Credentials and API tokens could be exposed or misused
  • Manager configuration could be modified without authorization
  • Actions could be executed across monitored agents
  • The Wazuh deployment could experience loss of administrative control

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on protecting cluster trust material and ensuring that every authorization decision is independently verified.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Preventing low-privilege API responses from exposing cluster keys or other authentication material
  • Treating worker-supplied RBAC data as untrusted input
  • Deriving effective permissions from server-side identity and policy rather than request-provided authorization fields
  • Applying strict authentication and integrity checks to cluster communication
  • Restricting TCP port 1516 to expected cluster peers through network policy or equivalent controls
  • Using least-privilege service accounts and narrowly scoped administrator roles
  • Rotating exposed cluster keys, credentials, and API tokens when disclosure is suspected
  • Auditing and invalidating unexpected users, roles, tokens, and configuration changes

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect related risks through:

  • Static analysis and code review rules that flag authorization decisions based on client-controlled permission fields
  • Tests verifying that low-privilege API users cannot retrieve secrets from raw configuration endpoints
  • Integration tests that attempt to alter RBAC context in distributed requests
  • Network monitoring for unexpected connections to TCP port 1516
  • Audit-log reviews for newly created users, administrator role assignments, token issuance, configuration changes, and unusual agent actions
  • Policy enforcement requiring server-side authorization checks for every privileged API operation

Automated security review tools may help identify exposed secrets and trust-boundary violations, but deployment-level testing remains important.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/wazuh/wazuh/commit/b3459f5663702aea14e91330a7a6912081fed2eb
github.comgithub.com/wazuh/wazuh/pull/35307
github.comgithub.com/wazuh/wazuh/releases/tag/v4.14.5
github.comgithub.com/wazuh/wazuh/releases/tag/v5.0.0-beta3
github.comgithub.com/wazuh/wazuh/security/advisories/GHSA-34fx-c2xw-xcpg

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploitable over the network when an attacker has access to the Wazuh API with the required low-privilege permission and can reach the cluster communication service.

No. A low-privilege read-only API account may be sufficient if it can retrieve the exposed cluster key and the attacker can reach the relevant cluster endpoint.

Protect cluster keys from low-privilege API responses and ensure the manager independently authenticates workers and derives authorization from trusted server-side policy.

Enforce least privilege, isolate cluster communication, test authorization boundaries, prevent client-controlled RBAC context from influencing access decisions, and monitor sensitive administrative activity.

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