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CVE-2026-44249

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

IPv6 Subnet Rule Bypass (CWE-284) in Netty Handler

CVE-2026-44249

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Access Control Misconfiguration

CWE:

CWE-284, CWE-697, CWE-1287

Impact:

Network Access Control Bypass

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Netty's handler component contains a logic flaw in IPv6 subnet comparison that allows certain public IP addresses to bypass configured access control rules.

When affected versions are used to enforce IP-based restrictions, an attacker connecting from specific IPv6 addresses may be incorrectly treated as allowed, weakening network-layer access control.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in applications that rely on Netty's netty-handler module to enforce IP-based access control, particularly when IPv6 subnet rules are configured using IpSubnetFilterRule or similar constructs.

It becomes relevant in deployments where:

  • IPv6 is enabled and reachable from clients
  • Access policies depend on accurate subnet matching (e.g., allowlists or denylists)
  • The application assumes Netty will reliably distinguish permitted from non-permitted IPv6 ranges

The flaw is limited to the comparison/masking logic and does not affect connections where IP filtering is not used.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-facing services (servers or gateways) built on Netty that use IPv6-based IP filtering.
  • Required access: Ability to initiate network connections from arbitrary IPv6 addresses to the exposed service.
  • Trigger point: Evaluation of IPv6 addresses against subnet rules via IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo() or equivalent filtering logic.
  • Why exploitation is possible: An incorrect masking operation when comparing IPv6 addresses to configured subnets causes certain valid public IPs to be misclassified, allowing them to slip past intended deny or allow checks.

Why this happens

The root cause is a logic error in how IPv6 addresses are masked and compared against subnet definitions in IpSubnetFilterRule.compareTo().

Instead of applying the subnet mask correctly across the full 128-bit IPv6 address, the implementation performs an incorrect masking operation, leading to mismatches between the intended subnet boundaries and the computed comparison results.

This aligns with CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) because access decisions rely on flawed logic, and CWE-697 (Incorrect Comparison) because the comparison of IP addresses to subnets does not faithfully implement the intended security policy.

In abstract terms, the bug is an error in security-critical comparison logic used to gate access based on client IP attributes.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized clients may access services that should have been restricted by IPv6 subnet rules.
  • Network segmentation and zoning assumptions can be weakened when relying on IP filtering for separation.
  • Application-level rate limiting or abuse prevention tied to IP ranges can be bypassed.
  • Downstream systems trusting Netty-based filters for perimeter enforcement can be indirectly exposed to unexpected traffic.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on strengthening IP-based access control logic and reducing reliance on single-layer IP filtering:

  • Validate all IP filtering and subnet comparison code paths for correct masking and comparison logic, especially for IPv6.
  • Prefer well-tested, standards-compliant libraries or utilities for IP and subnet calculations instead of ad hoc implementations.
  • Implement defense in depth by combining IP-based rules with stronger authentication and authorization mechanisms, rather than using IP filtering as the sole control.
  • Treat IP addresses, particularly IPv6, as untrusted attributes and enforce explicit, least-privilege policies both at the application and infrastructure layers (e.g., firewalls, load balancers).
  • Consider logging and monitoring access control decisions to detect anomalies when filters behave unexpectedly.

How teams detect issues like this

Robust detection combines code-centric review with behavioral observation:

  • Static analysis and review: Flag custom IP and subnet comparison logic used in access control paths; verify that IPv6 comparisons handle 128-bit addressing and masks correctly and do not rely on truncated or misaligned operations.
  • Configuration review: Examine where Netty IpSubnetFilterRule or similar constructs are used as primary access controls, and verify assumptions about what traffic should be blocked or allowed.
  • Dynamic testing: Use automated tests or penetration testing to send traffic from controlled IPv6 addresses at the boundaries of configured subnets to confirm that rules behave as expected.
  • Runtime monitoring: Instrument access logs to correlate incoming IPv6 addresses with the decisions made by access filters, alerting on cases where traffic from disallowed ranges is accepted.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.135.Final
github.comgithub.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.15.Final
github.comgithub.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-3qp7-7mw8-wx86
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26017
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26018
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:26586
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:28573
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:34608
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36820
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37390
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41951
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48124
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48151
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49700
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:49701
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:50085
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53644
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53645
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53646
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54435
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:65126
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66488
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:66545
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44249
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488081
security.access.redhat.comsecurity.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-44249.json

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any remote attacker who can initiate IPv6 connections to a Netty-based service using the affected handler and IP filtering can potentially exploit this issue by connecting from addresses that fall into the masking logic gap.

The attacker needs only network-level access to the exposed service over IPv6. No prior authentication is required if the service relies on IP rules to gate access.

The safest pattern is to correct the IPv6 subnet comparison logic using a well-tested implementation and to ensure all access control decisions use accurate, standards-compliant IP and mask handling. Additionally, avoid embedding fragile, hand-rolled comparison code in security-critical paths.

Use vetted libraries for IP and subnet handling, add unit tests specifically around boundary IPs for IPv4 and IPv6 subnets, and subject access-control-related comparison logic to security-focused code review and automated checks. Combining IP filtering with stronger, identity-based controls further reduces the impact of such logic flaws.

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