Summary
The CDR Reports module in FreePBX allows SQL injection via the order and sort POST parameters used for call detail record listing and sorting.
An authenticated user with access to the CDR section—but without full administrator privileges—can manipulate database queries, potentially leading to data exposure, data tampering, or further compromise depending on the database environment.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs within the FreePBX web-based Administration Control Panel, specifically in the CDR Reports module used to browse and sort call detail records.
It affects deployments where users with limited admin panel access can reach the CDR Reports page and where the application directly incorporates order and sort POST parameters into SQL queries without sufficient validation or parameterization.
The risk is heightened in environments where the FreePBX database contains sensitive call metadata and where the database account used by the application has broad privileges on the underlying schema.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: FreePBX web interface, CDR Reports module endpoint(s)
- Required access: Valid FreePBX Administration Control Panel account with permission to access the CDR section; full administrative rights are not required
- User role: Any role that can reach the CDR Reports page and submit POST requests containing
orderandsortparameters - Trigger point: Submission of crafted POST requests when requesting or refreshing CDR listings, especially where sorting or ordering options are applied
- Why exploitation is possible: The
orderandsortvalues are incorporated into SQL queries in an unsafe way (e.g., direct string concatenation) rather than being constrained to a fixed whitelist or bound as parameters, allowing attacker-controlled fragments to alter the intended SQL statement structure
Why this happens
The root cause aligns with CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection').
In the affected code path, user-controlled POST parameters (order and sort) are used to dynamically construct SQL ORDER BY or related clauses for CDR listings.
Instead of restricting these parameters to a small set of known-safe column names and sort directions or using parameterized query constructs, the values are likely concatenated directly into the SQL string.
This insecure pattern lets an attacker inject additional SQL syntax, modify query behavior, or access data outside the originally intended query scope.
Potential impact
- Exposure of call detail records beyond what the user is normally authorized to see, depending on query context
- Tampering with CDR query results, including falsifying or hiding call records from the reporting view
- Retrieval of additional data from other tables accessible to the FreePBX database user
- Potential alteration or deletion of records if the database account used by the application has write privileges in the affected schema
- Possible stepping stone for privilege escalation or further compromise if SQL features (e.g., stored procedures) can be abused in the environment
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on strictly separating user input from SQL structure and constraining dynamic query elements:
- Replace string-concatenated query construction with parameterized queries or query builders for all user-influenced values
- Treat sort and order parameters as enumerated options:
- Implement an explicit whitelist of allowed column names and sort directions
- Map user-supplied identifiers to internal constants instead of passing them through directly
- Apply robust server-side validation and normalization for all request parameters, especially those influencing query logic
- Limit database privileges granted to the application account so that even if a query is manipulated, the account cannot perform dangerous operations such as arbitrary table modification
- Apply least-privilege to admin panel roles, granting CDR access only where operationally necessary
These patterns help ensure that user-controlled data cannot change the fundamental structure of SQL statements, even in reporting modules.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis:
- Use SAST tools or custom rules to flag direct concatenation of user input into SQL strings, especially around CDR-related modules
- Look for dynamic construction of
ORDER BY,GROUP BY, orLIMITclauses using raw request parameters likeorderandsort - Code review:
- Examine controller or handler code for the CDR Reports module, verifying that all query components derived from request parameters are validated against whitelists
- Check that any dynamic ordering is implemented via safe mappings instead of interpolated strings
- Policy enforcement:
- Enforce secure database access patterns (prepared statements, ORM query builders) as part of development standards and CI checks
- Require security review for any new feature that introduces dynamic reporting or ad hoc query functionality
- Runtime monitoring:
- Inspect database logs for unusual or malformed queries containing user-supplied values in structural positions (e.g., column names) coming from web requests to the CDR Reports endpoints
Automated scanning tools can be integrated into CI/CD pipelines and periodic application assessments to detect similar SQL injection patterns early.

