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CVE-2026-44116

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

SSRF in OpenClaw Zalo Plugin sendPhoto

CVE-2026-44116

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized Access to Internal Resources via SSRF

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw's Zalo plugin contains a server-side request forgery flaw in the sendPhoto function, where outbound photo URLs are not properly validated by the SSRF guard.

By supplying crafted photo URLs to the Zalo Bot API, an attacker can coerce the server into making arbitrary requests to internal endpoints, potentially exposing internal services and data.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in OpenClaw deployments that use the Zalo plugin's sendPhoto function to fetch images from user-supplied URLs and forward them through the Zalo Bot API.

Because the SSRF guard is not properly applied to these outbound URLs, any environment where the OpenClaw server can reach internal networks, metadata services, or other protected endpoints may be exposed.

The risk increases when OpenClaw is deployed in cloud or containerized environments where internal services are addressable from the application host.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Zalo Bot API interface exposed by OpenClaw (e.g., bot commands, message handlers, or HTTP endpoints that accept photo URLs).
  • Required access: Ability to invoke the Zalo plugin's sendPhoto function with a controllable photo URL parameter (such as sending crafted bot messages or API calls).
  • Trigger point: When the application processes the sendPhoto request and performs an outbound HTTP(S) call to retrieve the specified photo.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The SSRF guard does not fully validate or restrict the target URL, allowing requests to internal IP ranges, hostnames, or protocols that should not be reachable from the external interface.

Why this happens

This issue stems from incomplete or incorrectly applied validation on outbound URLs used by the sendPhoto function.

Instead of enforcing strict allowlists, normalization, and scheme/host checks, the SSRF guard fails to block attacker-controlled URLs that resolve to internal or otherwise sensitive endpoints.

Conceptually, this aligns with CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery, where an application acts as a proxy, issuing HTTP requests on behalf of an attacker to unintended destinations due to insufficient outbound request controls.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized access to internal HTTP services that are not directly exposed to the internet.
  • Access to cloud or platform metadata services, which could reveal instance credentials or configuration data.
  • Discovery of internal network structure through response behavior and timing.
  • Potential interaction with internal admin panels, APIs, or debug endpoints that assume a trusted caller.
  • Use of the application as a pivot point for further attacks or data exfiltration.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining outbound requests and reducing trust in user-supplied URLs:

  • Apply strict allowlists for outbound destinations, limiting requests to known and intended image hosting domains.
  • Normalize and rigorously validate URLs, including scheme, host, port, and path, before performing any outbound request.
  • Block requests to private IP ranges, link-local addresses, loopback interfaces, and non-HTTP(S) schemes by default.
  • Introduce a dedicated, limited egress network path for media retrieval, such as a proxy with enforced filtering rules.
  • Use least-privilege networking and segmentation so the OpenClaw server cannot directly reach sensitive internal services.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can rely on both code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis: Look for outbound HTTP client usage (e.g., URL fetchers) that consume user-supplied URLs without robust allowlist checks or IP range filtering.
  • Code review: Flag any feature that proxies or fetches remote resources based on user input, ensuring a consistent SSRF protection pattern is applied.
  • Runtime monitoring: Inspect outbound traffic for unusual destinations, such as private IP ranges, loopback addresses, or cloud metadata endpoints.
  • Policy enforcement: Use application security gateways or egress firewalls that enforce domain-level restrictions and block calls to non-approved endpoints.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/a65eb1b864b7630c1242a82de9e5799b80583c3f
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-2hh7-c75g-qj2r
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-server-side-request-forgery-in-zalo-photo-url-validation

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If an attacker can interact with the Zalo plugin's sendPhoto functionality over the network, they can exploit the flaw by providing crafted photo URLs, even without direct access to internal networks.

The attacker needs the ability to send inputs that control the photo URL parameter to the Zalo Bot API—typically via bot messages, integrations, or any exposed API that triggers sendPhoto. They do not need shell access or direct network connectivity to internal services.

The safest approach is to enforce a strict allowlist of permitted domains and schemes for outbound image requests, ensure URL normalization and validation, and centralize SSRF protections so all outbound fetches use the same hardened guard logic.

Design features that fetch remote resources with SSRF in mind from the outset: avoid proxying arbitrary user-specified URLs, apply consistent validation utilities, restrict network egress by default, and include targeted checks for SSRF patterns in code review and automated testing.

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