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CVE-2026-44025

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Auth Bypass (CWE-306) in Fluentd Monitor Agent APIs

CVE-2026-44025

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Authentication Bypass / Missing Authentication

CWE:

CWE-306

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

The Fluentd Monitor Agent exposes internal metrics and plugin information via a REST API, and prior to version 1.19.3, the /api/plugins.json and related endpoints could return internal instance variables containing sensitive credentials.

If an attacker can access these monitoring endpoints, they may obtain database passwords, API keys, or cloud credentials, making the deployment risky whenever monitor interfaces are reachable from untrusted networks.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in Fluentd deployments that enable the in_monitor_agent plugin to expose operational metrics over HTTP.

In environments where monitoring endpoints are reachable from application networks, shared infrastructure, or externally accessible interfaces, responses from /api/plugins.json and related endpoints may inadvertently include internal instance variables.

These variables can contain configuration secrets such as database connection passwords, API tokens, or cloud provider credentials, particularly when plugins embed these values in their runtime state.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP REST API exposed by the Fluentd Monitor Agent (in_monitor_agent).
  • Required access: Network access to the monitor agent endpoints (e.g., /api/plugins.json, /api/plugins, or similar paths), which may be available from within the cluster, from adjacent services, or from the broader network depending on configuration.
  • Trigger point: Issuing HTTP requests to the affected monitoring endpoints to retrieve JSON or other structured responses.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The Monitor Agent returns serialized internal plugin state without filtering out or redacting sensitive instance variables, and the endpoints lack robust access control for sensitive diagnostic data (CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Resource).

Why this happens

The core bug lies in how the Monitor Agent serializes and exposes plugin information via its REST API.

Instead of limiting output to non-sensitive diagnostic fields, the implementation surfaces internal instance variables wholesale, which may include connection strings, passwords, API keys, and secrets used by output plugins.

Combined with insufficient authentication or authorization enforcement on the monitoring endpoints, this leads to CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Resource) and sensitive information disclosure: critical configuration secrets are accessible through an unauthenticated or weakly protected interface meant only for operational introspection.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may obtain database usernames and passwords used by Fluentd output plugins.
  • Attackers may access API keys or tokens for SaaS, IaaS, or cloud provider integrations.
  • Cloud account compromise could occur if long-lived credentials are exposed.
  • Lateral movement into other services that trust Fluentd's stored credentials can be facilitated.
  • Operational metadata about plugin configuration and topology can aid in targeted attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating monitoring and introspection endpoints as sensitive resources and minimizing secret exposure in runtime state.

Recommended patterns include:

  • Enforce strong authentication and authorization on monitoring APIs, aligning them with administrative or operator access controls.
  • Restrict network access to Monitor Agent endpoints using firewalls, service meshes, or API gateways so they are not reachable from untrusted segments.
  • Design plugin configuration handling so that secrets are not stored directly in instance variables that are serialized or logged; use secret managers and dedicated secure stores.
  • Implement output filtering or redaction layers that explicitly exclude sensitive fields from diagnostic responses.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to Fluentd credentials so that even if some values leak, their blast radius is constrained.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can detect and manage this class of issue by:

  • Reviewing configuration for monitoring and admin endpoints to ensure they require authentication and are scoped to trusted networks.
  • Using static and configuration analysis tools to flag handlers that serialize complete object state, particularly for admin or diagnostic APIs.
  • Performing security-focused code reviews around observability components, looking for exposure of internal instance variables, debugging dumps, or raw configuration output.
  • Running automated scans against operational endpoints (including /api/plugins.json and similar paths) to identify presence of secrets or sensitive fields in responses.
  • Enforcing policy that any monitoring or debug interface must pass a security review before deployment, with automated checks integrated into CI/CD pipelines.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/fluent/fluentd/commit/990921518971699b9a97441970674d1800e29177
github.comgithub.com/fluent/fluentd/pull/5392
github.comgithub.com/fluent/fluentd/releases/tag/v1.19.3
github.comgithub.com/fluent/fluentd/security/advisories/GHSA-pr7j-96cj-549h

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitability depends on how the Monitor Agent endpoints are exposed. If they are reachable from untrusted networks or shared environments without strong authentication, attackers can query them to retrieve sensitive data. In tightly controlled, internal-only setups, the risk is reduced but still relevant for insider threats.

An attacker needs network access to the Fluentd Monitor Agent HTTP interface. No direct access to Fluentd's configuration files is required; the issue stems from the API returning internal plugin state that already contains secrets.

The safest pattern is to treat monitoring APIs as privileged admin interfaces: require robust authentication and authorization, restrict their network exposure, and ensure they never serialize or return secret-bearing fields. Additionally, restructure plugin design so that secrets reside in dedicated secure stores rather than general-purpose instance variables.

To prevent similar issues, incorporate security reviews into the design of monitoring, admin, and debug endpoints; mandate that any serialized object state be explicitly whitelisted to non-sensitive fields; enforce secure-by-default configurations for observability components; and use automated tooling to detect accidental exposure of secrets in logs, APIs, or diagnostics.

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