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CVE-2026-44020

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

XML Entity Expansion (CWE-776) in Docling USPTO Parser

CVE-2026-44020

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

XML External Entity and Entity Expansion

CWE:

CWE-776, CWE-611

Impact:

Information Disclosure, SSRF, and Denial of Service

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Docling's USPTO patent XML parsers between versions 2.13.0 and 2.74.0 used an unprotected SAX-based XML parser, exposing them to XML External Entity (XXE) style issues including entity expansion.

When processing attacker-controlled patent XML, this flaw can allow reading arbitrary server files, performing SSRF, or triggering denial of service via exponential entity expansion.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Docling deployments that ingest and parse USPTO patent XML in the ICE (v4.x), Grant v2.5, or Application v1.x formats using the built-in patent parsers.

It becomes relevant when XML content can be influenced or supplied by untrusted or semi-trusted sources, such as uploaded documents, batch imports, or external feeds, and is parsed using the default xml.sax.parseString() configuration without disabling external entities or limiting expansion.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: XML-based USPTO patent ingestion endpoints or workflows in Docling.
  • Required access: Ability to submit or control USPTO patent XML content consumed by the Docling parser (e.g., file upload, import pipeline, or feed manipulation).
  • Trigger point: Parsing of the crafted XML via xml.sax.parseString() in the ICE, Grant, or Application USPTO patent parsers.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The parser processes XML entities and external references without restrictions, allowing attackers to define entities that resolve to local files, remote URLs, or recursively expanding entities, leading to information disclosure, SSRF, or resource exhaustion.

Why this happens

At its core, this issue stems from using a generic XML SAX parser configuration that implicitly trusts entity declarations in the input document.

By not disabling external entity resolution or limiting entity expansion, the parser follows attacker-defined entity references and processes them as part of normal XML handling.

This aligns with CWE-776: Improper Restriction of Recursive Entity References in XML, where uncontrolled expansion or resolution of XML entities can be abused to read internal resources, relay arbitrary HTTP requests, or exhaust memory and CPU through exponential expansion.

Potential impact

  • An attacker may read sensitive files from the server filesystem that the Docling process can access.
  • Malicious XML could be used to perform SSRF, making the server send requests to internal services or external endpoints.
  • Excessive entity expansion can cause denial of service by consuming CPU and memory (e.g., Billion Laughs-style attacks).
  • Compromised XML processing may expose internal infrastructure details through error messages or timing behavior.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation focuses on hardening XML parsing and constraining what the parser is allowed to process.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Configuring XML parsers to disable external entity resolution and DTD processing, using secure defaults for all XML inputs.
  • Enforcing strict schema or structure validation on USPTO patent XML, rejecting documents that contain entity declarations or unexpected constructs.
  • Isolating document parsing in low-privilege processes or containers with restricted filesystem and network access to reduce impact if parsing is abused.
  • Treating all incoming XML as untrusted by default, and minimizing the set of XML features required for business logic.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically relies on reviewing how XML is handled and monitored within the application:

  • Static analysis and secure code review can flag uses of xml.sax.parseString() or similar XML APIs without hardened settings (e.g., entity resolution disabled).
  • Security-focused code review checklists can require explicit XML parser hardening whenever new document ingestion paths are added.
  • Runtime monitoring and logging can track unusual XML parsing failures, high resource usage during XML processing, or unexpected outbound HTTP requests from parsing workflows.
  • Automated application security testing tools that include XXE and Billion Laughs payloads can help validate that XML parsers behave safely under adversarial input.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/docling-project/docling/security/advisories/GHSA-m88r-rg27-5xfg
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60520
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-44020
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492456
security.access.redhat.comsecurity.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-44020.json

Frequently asked

questions

Exploitation is scoped to contexts where an attacker can influence the USPTO patent XML content parsed by Docling. In closed, fully trusted pipelines it is less likely, but any user-controlled or external source of XML should be considered a potential attack channel.

The attacker needs the ability to submit or modify USPTO patent XML documents that Docling will parse—such as uploading files, tampering with import feeds, or intercepting and altering documents in transit to the parsing workflow.

The safest pattern is to configure all XML parsers to disable external entities and DTDs by default, restrict entity expansion, and use specialized secure XML parsing utilities that enforce these constraints across every document ingestion path.

Establish a standard secure XML parsing configuration across the codebase, treat all XML inputs as untrusted, review any new document formats for entity usage, and integrate security checks in CI that look for unsafe XML API usage or missing parser hardening.

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