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CVE-2026-43616

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Path Traversal in Detect-It-Easy

CVE-2026-43616

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal

CWE:

CWE-23

Impact:

Arbitrary File Write and Potential Persistent Code Execution

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

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Summary

Detect-It-Easy versions prior to 3.21 contain a path traversal flaw in their archive extraction logic, allowing crafted archive entries to escape the intended output directory.

By embedding relative traversal sequences or absolute paths in archive filenames, an attacker can write arbitrary files on the filesystem and potentially gain persistent code execution, for example by overwriting user startup scripts.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears when Detect-It-Easy is used to open or process untrusted archive files that it subsequently extracts.

The issue is most relevant in environments where:

  • Archive contents are not fully trusted (e.g., samples from external sources)
  • Archive extraction runs with the user's normal filesystem privileges
  • The application does not enforce strict output directories or sandboxing for extraction

In such cases, insufficient filename sanitization can let archive entries escape the intended extraction directory.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Archive processing functionality within Detect-It-Easy, when handling user-supplied or external archives.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence the archive file being opened or extracted by the user.
  • Trigger point: Extraction of archive entries whose internal filenames contain ../ sequences, similar directory traversal constructs, or absolute paths.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The extraction logic does not normalize or validate archive entry paths against a fixed base directory, so attacker-controlled filenames are used directly, allowing writes to arbitrary locations accessible to the process.

Why this happens

The core issue is insufficient path validation when extracting archive contents, aligning with CWE-23: Relative Path Traversal.

The extraction code trusts archive entry names and concatenates them with the target extraction directory without robust normalization or checks.

When filenames contain ../ sequences or absolute paths, the filesystem APIs interpret them literally, enabling writes outside the intended directory.

This represents a general bug pattern where user-controlled paths are used without constraining them to a safe base directory.

Potential impact

  • Overwriting of user startup scripts (e.g., shell profiles or autorun files), which can lead to persistent code execution on user login or application startup.
  • Creation of new files in sensitive but writable locations, potentially enabling local privilege escalation chains when combined with other weaknesses.
  • Corruption or replacement of application configuration files, leading to arbitrary behavior changes or denial of service.
  • Planting of malicious executables, scripts, or DLLs in directories that are later loaded or executed by other software.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining how paths from archives are interpreted and written:

  • Normalize and validate archive entry paths before extraction, rejecting entries containing .., drive letters, leading slashes, or other constructs that indicate path traversal or absolute paths.
  • Resolve the intended extraction path and ensure it remains under a known, fixed base directory (e.g., by comparing canonical/real paths).
  • Treat archive filenames as untrusted input and apply strict whitelisting of allowed characters and directory structures.
  • Extract archives into a dedicated, access-controlled working directory and avoid reusing sensitive or system directories as extraction targets.
  • Run the application with least-privilege filesystem permissions so that, even if traversal occurs, reachable locations are limited in impact.

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can look for this pattern using:

  • Static analysis: Rules that flag code paths where user-controlled filenames or archive entry names are concatenated with directories and passed directly to file system APIs without normalization or base-path enforcement.
  • Code review: Explicit checks that archive extraction routines validate paths, reject traversal patterns, and compare resolved paths against a fixed root directory.
  • Runtime monitoring: File integrity monitoring or audit logs to detect unexpected file creations or modifications in configuration, startup, or other sensitive directories immediately after archive handling.
  • Secure coding policies: Guidelines and linters that prohibit direct use of untrusted path segments and require canonicalization and bounds checking before file operations.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/DIE-engine/commit/7fd300b926daf19707b2a36f0abe8b60a51308ee
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/DIE-engine/commit/cbbe1688e58ffd430d284bf65f336973f083db69
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/DIE-engine/releases/tag/3.21
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/Detect-It-Easy
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/Formats/commit/56cdf50ee3c72c56284e2819b23e98332842d259
github.comgithub.com/horsicq/XArchive/commit/6a2aa84c2fd120b704f76bb5c5ee3e9b5a7a0fcc
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/detect-it-easy-path-traversal-arbitrary-file-write

Frequently asked

questions

It typically requires a user or process to open and extract a malicious archive. Remote exploitability depends on how Detect-It-Easy is integrated—for example, whether archives from remote sources are automatically processed without user inspection.

An attacker must be able to supply or influence the archive file processed by Detect-It-Easy. The impact then depends on the filesystem permissions of the user running the application and which directories are writable.

Implement strict path canonicalization and validation for all archive entries before extraction. Reject any paths that attempt to traverse directories, use absolute paths, or resolve outside the designated extraction root, and write files only after confirming the resolved path is within that root.

Treat all filenames from untrusted sources as potentially hostile, enforce a fixed extraction base directory, and use centralized utility functions for path validation. Complement this with security reviews and automated checks focusing on file I/O and path handling code paths.

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