/

CVE-2026-43003

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

Untrusted Deployment Image Execution (CWE-829) in IPA

CVE-2026-43003

Modified

Vulnerability type

Category:

Execution of Untrusted Code

CWE:

CWE-829, CWE-78

Impact:

Arbitrary Code Execution During Deployment

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenStack ironic-python-agent may execute grub-install inside the chroot of a deployed partition image, implicitly trusting the image's contents.

If the image is malicious, this behavior can lead to arbitrary code execution during deployment, making bare metal provisioning workflows risky when image integrity is not assured.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in environments using OpenStack Ironic with ironic-python-agent to provision bare metal nodes.

It is most relevant when IPA performs bootloader installation (grub-install) from within the chroot of the newly deployed partition image.

The risk increases in deployments that consume images from semi-trusted or external sources, or where image integrity and provenance are not strictly enforced.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Bare metal provisioning pipeline using Ironic and IPA.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or modify the partition image that ironic-python-agent deploys.
  • Trigger point: Execution of grub-install from within the chroot of the deployed image during the provisioning process.
  • Why exploitation is possible: IPA implicitly trusts the deployed image's filesystem and runs system-level commands within it, allowing attacker-controlled binaries or scripts to run with elevated privileges.

Why this happens

The core issue is that the provisioning agent executes commands within a chroot built from an image whose contents may not be fully trusted or validated.

This maps to CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere, because the deployment workflow incorporates and executes functionality originating from an external image without strong trust guarantees.

In practice, the bootloader installation step (grub-install) can be influenced or replaced by attacker-controlled code, turning a maintenance operation into a code execution primitive.

Potential impact

  • Malicious code execution on newly provisioned bare metal hosts
  • Installation of backdoored bootloaders or persistence mechanisms
  • Subversion of the operating system image and initialization scripts
  • Lateral movement opportunities if compromised hosts join sensitive clusters
  • Undermining of the integrity of the provisioning pipeline and image catalog

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on tightening trust boundaries around deployment images and constraining what is executed during provisioning.

Useful patterns include:

  • Enforcing strong image provenance, signing, and verification before use.
  • Treating deployment images as untrusted until validated, avoiding direct execution of their binaries in privileged contexts.
  • Isolating bootloader installation logic from the image, using agent-owned tooling rather than image-provided executables where feasible.
  • Applying least privilege to provisioning operations and limiting the scope of commands executed within chroot environments.
  • Incorporating defense-in-depth controls such as secure boot, measured boot, and runtime attestation to detect tampering.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code and operational signals:

  • Code review and threat modeling of provisioning workflows to identify places where untrusted images influence executed commands.
  • Static analysis or policy checks ensuring that agents do not call system-level tools from within image-derived chroots without validation.
  • Logging and monitoring of deployment-time commands (such as grub-install) and correlating them with image sources and integrity checks.
  • Periodic audits of image pipelines, including verification that only approved, signed images enter production provisioning flows.

Sources

SourceLink
bugs.launchpad.netbugs.launchpad.net/ironic-python-agent/+bug/2148310
github.comgithub.com/openstack/ironic-python-agent/blob/236b33abffe6688afc39c21e351cc3889b3db2dd/ironic_python_agent/efi_utils.py#L134-L139
openwall.comopenwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/06/16/11
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:51038
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:57801
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60446
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:60454
access.redhat.comaccess.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-43003
bugzilla.redhat.combugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2464306
security.access.redhat.comsecurity.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-43003.json

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if an attacker can remotely supply or influence the images used by ironic-python-agent via image services, CI pipelines, or compromised artifact repositories.

The attacker must be able to introduce a malicious partition image into the provisioning workflow—through an image catalog, build pipeline, or direct manipulation of the image source.

The safest approach is to avoid executing commands from within untrusted images and to centralize critical tooling (like bootloader installers) inside trusted agent components, combined with strong image signing and verification.

Design provisioning and deployment systems around strict trust boundaries: require cryptographic verification of images, minimize execution of image-provided binaries during setup, and enforce code review and policy checks on any logic that runs in chroot or similar environments.

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