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CVE-2026-42929

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

Hard-Coded Credentials in Danelec MacGregor Voyage Data

CVE-2026-42929

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Hard-Coded Credentials

CWE:

CWE-798

Impact:

Unauthorized Access and Device Compromise

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.3)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Danelec MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder devices contain default accounts with hard-coded credentials that cannot be easily changed or disabled by standard configuration.

If an attacker can reach the management or network interfaces of the recorder, these built-in credentials may allow unauthorized access to device functions and stored voyage data.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects deployments of Danelec MacGregor Voyage Data Recorder units that:

  • Ship with vendor-defined default user accounts
  • Use static, hard-coded passwords or keys across multiple devices
  • Expose administrative, configuration, or data access interfaces over shipboard or connected networks

Risk increases when recorders are reachable from shared vessel networks, remote monitoring links, or poorly segmented OT/IT environments.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible interfaces of the voyage data recorder (e.g., web, telnet/SSH, proprietary management ports, or serial-to-IP gateways).
  • Required access: Ability to send traffic to the device management or login interface from the vessel network or a connected remote access path.
  • Trigger point: Attempting authentication using the known default username/password or credential pair.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Credentials are hard-coded and reused, so anyone aware of the defaults can authenticate without needing to guess or phish unique passwords.

Why this happens

The core issue maps to CWE-798: Use of Hard-Coded Credentials. The product embeds fixed credentials directly into firmware or configuration, often identical across many units.

This design treats authentication secrets as static implementation details rather than per-installation secrets that can be rotated, disabled, or centrally managed.

As a result, compromise of one device or leak of vendor documentation can expose credentials valid for many installations, undermining the intended access control model.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized login to the voyage data recorder management interface
  • Modification or deletion of recorded voyage data, which could affect incident investigations
  • Tampering with configuration, including logging parameters, time settings, or sensor inputs
  • Use of the device as a foothold for lateral movement within the vessel network
  • Potential disruption of recorder availability, including forced reboots or denial of service

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on reducing trust in built-in credentials and constraining access to the device:

  • Place the voyage data recorder on a strictly segmented network zone, minimizing which hosts can reach its management interfaces.
  • Enforce upstream network access controls (firewalls, VLANs, ACLs) so that only authorized management workstations can connect.
  • Where the product allows, disable default accounts, change default passwords, and prefer unique, strong credentials per device.
  • Wrap recorder access behind an authenticated jump host or bastion that enforces strong identity verification and logging.
  • Apply least-privilege principles to any accounts used, avoiding shared or generic admin access where alternatives exist.
  • Incorporate the recorder into broader OT security baselines, including secure remote access procedures and vendor maintenance policies.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection should combine configuration review with ongoing monitoring:

  • Perform periodic security assessments of voyage data recorders to verify that default or shared credentials are not in use where they can be changed.
  • Use network scanning and asset inventory tools to identify reachable management ports and confirm they are restricted to expected sources.
  • Review device logs (where available) for repeated logins using the same account from unusual locations or times, which may indicate abuse of shared credentials.
  • In code or firmware review contexts, flag embedded usernames/passwords, hard-coded keys, and credential-like constants.
  • Integrate policy checks in procurement and acceptance testing to detect and document products that rely on default or non-changeable credentials.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2026/icsa-26-148-01.json
cisa.govcisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-148-01
danelec.comdanelec.com/contact

Frequently asked

questions

It can be, if the voyage data recorder's management or login interfaces are reachable from remote networks (for example via poorly restricted remote access, satellite links, or exposed shipboard networks). If interfaces are strictly isolated and only accessible locally under controlled procedures, remote exploitation is less likely.

An attacker needs network-level access to the device's exposed services or physical access through connected consoles. Once they can reach the login prompt, knowledge of the hard-coded credentials may allow immediate authenticated access.

Wherever the product supports it, change or disable default accounts and move to unique, strong credentials per installation. Surround the device with strong network segmentation and access control so that only designated management systems can initiate connections.

Organizations can adopt procurement and security review policies that reject or constrain products relying on non-removable default credentials, require per-device secrets, and mandate secure onboarding (unique credentials at first boot). At an engineering level, vendors should avoid hard-coding secrets, implement secure provisioning workflows, and support credential rotation and revocation throughout the device lifecycle.

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