Summary
Arelle's /rest/configure endpoint allows unauthenticated users to instruct the server to load plugins via a plugins query parameter, without enforcing any authentication or authorization.
By pointing this parameter at an attacker-controlled Python file, a remote attacker can cause the Arelle webserver to download and execute arbitrary code with the server's privileges, leading to full remote code execution.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Arelle deployments exposing the /rest/configure REST endpoint over a network, such as internet-facing or internal web services used for XBRL processing.
The risk is highest when:
- The endpoint is reachable from untrusted networks
- There is no additional network or application-layer access control
- The process runs with elevated or broadly scoped privileges
Hosted or shared environments where Arelle is part of a larger analytics or reporting platform are particularly sensitive, as compromise can provide a foothold into wider infrastructure.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) access to the Arelle
/rest/configureendpoint. - Required access: None; the vulnerability is unauthenticated and does not rely on prior session or credentials.
- Trigger point: An HTTP request that supplies the
pluginsquery parameter pointing to a URL containing attacker-controlled Python code. - Why exploitation is possible: The endpoint:
- Invokes the plugin manager based solely on user-supplied input
- Performs no authentication or authorization checks
- Trusts remote plugin URLs and executes downloaded Python code inside the main Arelle process
Why this happens
The core issue is the absence of authentication and authorization on a sensitive configuration function that governs plugin loading, aligning with CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function.
The /rest/configure endpoint exposes a management operation (plugin configuration) directly to unauthenticated callers.
It forwards the unvalidated plugins parameter to the plugin manager, which treats supplied values as trusted sources of executable plugin code.
This design conflates end-user input with privileged administrative operations, allowing arbitrary remote code execution by loading attacker-supplied Python modules.
Potential impact
- Remote execution of arbitrary Python code within the Arelle server process
- Full compromise of the Arelle application and its data
- Unauthorized access to XBRL documents, reports, or connected data stores
- Lateral movement to other systems accessible from the compromised host
- Use of the server as a pivot point for further attacks within the network
- Deployment of malware, backdoors, or data exfiltration tooling under the server's identity
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on isolating sensitive configuration capabilities, enforcing strong access control, and reducing implicit trust in remotely supplied plugins.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Authentication and authorization for administrative endpoints:
- Require authenticated, role-appropriate users for any configuration or plugin management operations.
- Separate admin-only routes from general-purpose API endpoints.
- Principle of least privilege:
- Run the Arelle service under an account with minimal OS and network privileges.
- Restrict file system and network access where plugin code executes.
- Restrict plugin sources and behavior:
- Allow only locally vetted or whitelisted plugin paths instead of arbitrary URLs.
- Introduce a configuration allowlist for approved plugins and disallow runtime loading from untrusted locations.
- Network and deployment hardening:
- Avoid exposing configuration endpoints to untrusted networks.
- Place Arelle behind API gateways, reverse proxies, or firewalls that restrict who can reach administrative functionality.
- Secure-by-default configurations:
- Disable dynamic plugin loading by default, or require explicit administrative enablement.
- Provide configuration flags that can entirely disable remote plugin URL loading in production environments.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines application-layer monitoring, code-level review, and configuration assessment:
- Static and code review signals:
- Identify REST handlers or routes that perform configuration or plugin management without explicit authentication checks.
- Flag code paths where user-supplied parameters are passed directly into plugin-loading, import, or execution APIs.
- Runtime monitoring and logging:
- Log all access to configuration and plugin-related endpoints, including source IPs, parameters, and outcomes.
- Alert on unexpected plugin URLs (e.g., external domains, non-corporate repositories) or sudden changes in plugin configuration.
- Network and infrastructure controls:
- Use WAF or API gateways to restrict or rate-limit access to sensitive endpoints.
- Monitor for anomalous outbound connections from the Arelle server that may indicate downloading attacker-supplied code.
- Automated tooling:
- Incorporate API security testing and SAST tools to detect missing authentication on critical functions.
- Use dependency and configuration scanners to highlight risky default exposure of administrative endpoints.

