Summary
Ruby's Net::IMAP library contains a command injection flaw where symbol arguments passed to IMAP commands are not safely encoded, allowing crafted input to inject arbitrary IMAP commands via CRLF sequences.
When applications pass untrusted values as symbols into Net::IMAP commands, an attacker may gain full control over the IMAP session, potentially manipulating mailboxes, messages, and authentication state.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects Ruby applications that use Net::IMAP and pass user-influenced or otherwise untrusted values as symbol arguments into IMAP commands (for example, mailbox names, search keys, or flags represented as symbols).
It is most relevant in scenarios where IMAP operations are parameterized based on external input (web requests, APIs, or configuration) and where those inputs are converted into symbols or directly provided as symbols to Net::IMAP methods without strict validation.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Any Ruby application exposing IMAP-related functionality (e.g., webmail, message processing services, automation tools) built on Net::IMAP.
- Required access: Ability to influence or control symbol arguments passed into Net::IMAP commands (directly or indirectly via user input, multi-tenant configuration, or plugin interfaces).
- Trigger point: Invocation of IMAP commands (e.g., SELECT, EXAMINE, SEARCH, FETCH, STORE) where at least one parameter originates from a symbol containing or derived from attacker-controlled data.
- Why exploitation is possible: Net::IMAP improperly interpolates or serializes symbol arguments into IMAP command strings without robust escaping or CRLF sanitization, enabling injection of
\r\nsequences and additional IMAP commands (mapping to CWE-77 and CWE-93).
Why this happens
The core issue stems from treating symbol arguments as inherently safe when constructing IMAP protocol commands.
Net::IMAP converts symbols into their string representation and concatenates them directly into IMAP commands, without normalizing or encoding characters that are significant to the protocol such as CR (\r) and LF (\n).
This direct concatenation creates a classic command injection scenario (CWE-77) within a text-based protocol, and a CRLF injection problem (CWE-93), where attacker-controlled values can terminate an existing command and start new ones.
Abstractly, the bug class is "unsanitized interpolation of untrusted arguments into a textual command language," similar to SQL injection but at the IMAP protocol layer.
Potential impact
- Attackers may inject arbitrary IMAP commands in the context of the authenticated session.
- Mailboxes could be listed, selected, or renamed without authorization.
- Messages may be read, copied, altered, flagged, or deleted.
- IMAP session state could be manipulated to bypass expected application logic.
- In some configurations, attackers might chain this with credential misuse to pivot into other accounts or servers.
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation relies on treating all protocol-level arguments as untrusted and normalizing them before use.
General defensive patterns include:
- Avoid interpolating symbols or strings directly into IMAP commands; instead, rely on APIs that handle encoding and quoting in a structured fashion.
- Enforce strict whitelists for IMAP command parameters (e.g., known-safe mailbox names, flags, and search keys) and reject or normalize anything outside the expected set.
- Implement canonicalization logic that removes or rejects control characters (such as CR and LF) and other non-printable bytes when building IMAP commands.
- Isolate IMAP client behavior behind a narrow interface where only vetted parameters are allowed, minimizing direct user input reaching Net::IMAP.
- Use least-privilege IMAP credentials so that, even if command injection occurs, exposed capabilities are reduced.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically focuses on tracing where untrusted data flows into IMAP-related functionality and how it is serialized.
High-level approaches:
- Static analysis: Create rules that flag Net::IMAP method calls where arguments are derived from request parameters, environment variables, or other untrusted sources, especially when converted to symbols.
- Code review: Look for patterns like
imap.select(some_symbol)orimap.search([:key, value_symbol])where symbols are created from or influenced by external data. - Logging and anomaly detection: Monitor IMAP command logs (where available) for unexpected control characters, duplicate commands, or unusual mailbox operations that could indicate injection.
- Policy enforcement: Introduce coding guidelines that prohibit direct string or symbol interpolation into protocol commands and mandate use of validated parameter builders or safe wrappers around Net::IMAP.

