Summary
TypeBot's Sheets API handler does not verify whether an authenticated user belongs to the workspace whose Google Sheets credentials are requested. An authenticated user may therefore access and decrypt another workspace's OAuth credentials and retrieve limited spreadsheet metadata and data.
Affected context
The issue occurs in TypeBot deployments using the Sheets API endpoint for retrieving Google Sheets information. Risk exists when an authenticated account can invoke the handler while the request is not checked against the target workspace's membership or authorization policy.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: The authenticated
POST /api/sheets/getSheetsAPI endpoint - Required access: Any valid authenticated TypeBot account, subject to deployment authentication controls
- Trigger point: A request handled by
handleGetSheetsfor a workspace the requester does not belong to - Why exploitation is possible: The handler does not validate workspace membership before decrypting and using the target workspace's Google Sheets OAuth credentials
Why this happens
The underlying bug is an authorization failure in which authentication is treated as sufficient permission to access workspace-scoped resources. Because the handler does not enforce an object-level membership or authorization check before accessing credentials and spreadsheet information, users may cross a workspace security boundary. This behavior maps to CWE-862: Missing Authorization.
Potential impact
- An unauthorized user may retrieve spreadsheet names, IDs, and column headers
- Google Sheets OAuth credentials may be exposed through unauthorized decryption and use
- Confidential workspace data may be disclosed
- An attacker could potentially use exposed credentials to access additional authorized Google Sheets resources
- Workspace isolation and tenant confidentiality may be weakened
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation generally focuses on enforcing authorization at every workspace-scoped resource boundary.
Common defensive patterns include:
- Verify workspace membership and required roles before retrieving or decrypting credentials
- Derive the target workspace from the authenticated session where possible instead of trusting client-supplied identifiers
- Apply deny-by-default, object-level authorization checks consistently across API handlers
- Minimize credential decryption and limit tokens to the narrowest required scopes
- Return only the spreadsheet fields required by the requesting operation
- Use centralized authorization middleware or policy enforcement to reduce handler-specific omissions
- Log and monitor denied cross-workspace access attempts without exposing credential material
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect this class of issue through:
- Static analysis and code review checks for workspace or tenant identifiers used without nearby authorization checks
- Review of API handlers that retrieve, decrypt, or proxy workspace-scoped secrets
- Authorization tests using authenticated users from separate workspaces
- Negative test cases confirming that valid authentication alone does not grant cross-workspace access
- Runtime policy monitoring for unusual cross-workspace resource access and repeated authorization failures
- Automated security review tools that identify missing object-level access-control enforcement

