Summary
FreeScout versions prior to 1.8.217 contain a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the mailbox auto-reply feature.
An authenticated user with the updateAutoReply permission can inject malicious script content into the auto-reply message, which is then sent unescaped to customers and executed in their webmail or mail-client context.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in FreeScout deployments where:
- The mailbox auto-reply feature is enabled and configurable by users with
updateAutoReplypermission - User-supplied auto-reply text is stored server-side and reused for outbound emails
- Outgoing auto-reply emails reflect this content into HTML email bodies without proper encoding
It becomes relevant in environments where staff accounts can modify mailbox settings and customers use HTML-capable webmail or mail clients.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Application UI for configuring mailbox auto-reply messages
- Required access: Authenticated FreeScout user with sufficient permission (e.g.,
updateAutoReply) to edit auto-reply content - Trigger point: A customer sends an email to the affected mailbox, causing the application to send an auto-reply containing the stored payload
- Why exploitation is possible: Auto-reply content is treated as trusted HTML and inserted into outgoing emails without appropriate escaping or sanitization, allowing script execution in HTML-capable clients that do not enforce CSP.
Why this happens
This issue stems from insufficient output encoding and validation of user-controlled content that is later rendered in an HTML context.
The auto-reply message field accepts arbitrary HTML-like input and stores it in the database. When an auto-reply email is generated, this stored content is embedded into the email body without context-appropriate escaping or sanitization.
This behavior maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-Site Scripting), where untrusted data flows directly into an HTML/JavaScript context and is interpreted by the client.
Potential impact
- Execution of arbitrary JavaScript in the customer's webmail or mail-client context
- Theft of session identifiers, tokens, or other sensitive data exposed in the webmail UI
- Phishing-style content injection, such as fake login prompts or malicious links embedded in legitimate-looking auto-replies
- Unwanted actions performed on behalf of the customer within integrated webmail services (if applicable)
- Damage to brand trust due to customers receiving malicious content from legitimate support mailboxes
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation focuses on treating auto-reply content as untrusted input and controlling how it is rendered:
- Apply strict, context-aware output encoding (e.g., HTML entity encoding) whenever user-supplied content is inserted into email templates.
- Prefer plain-text storage and rendering for auto-reply messages, or restrict supported markup to a safe subset via an allowlist-based HTML sanitizer.
- Enforce server-side validation to reject content that includes executable elements (e.g.,
<script>, event handlers,javascript:URLs). - Limit who can edit auto-reply content to the minimum set of roles required, and ensure configuration changes are auditable.
- Standardize templating so all user-provided fields pass through centralized encoding/sanitization routines instead of custom rendering paths.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can rely on both code- and behavior-focused approaches:
- Static analysis: Search for email template rendering paths where user-supplied values are concatenated into HTML bodies without escaping functions or sanitization filters.
- Template review: Inspect all mail and notification templates to verify that variables corresponding to configurable text fields are passed through standardized encoding helpers.
- Security testing: Use automated or manual tests to inject benign HTML/JavaScript markers into configuration fields (like auto-reply messages) and observe whether they are reflected unescaped in outbound emails.
- Policy enforcement: Adopt framework-level policies that require encoding for all user-controlled variables in HTML contexts, and use CI-integrated linters or security tools that can flag deviations.

