/

CVE-2026-41670

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

Input Validation Error in SSO / SAML Processing

CVE-2026-41670

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Input Validation Error in SSO / SAML Processing

CWE:

CWE-20, CWE-601

Impact:

Exposure and redirection of signed SAML responses containing user identity attributes

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(8.2)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Admidio's SAML Identity Provider implementation previously trusted the AssertionConsumerServiceURL value supplied in incoming AuthnRequest messages, without checking it against the registered ACS URL for the service provider.

An attacker who knows a valid service provider Entity ID can abuse this to redirect signed SAML responses containing user identity attributes to an attacker-controlled endpoint, enabling unauthorized disclosure of sensitive identity data.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects Admidio deployments configured as a SAML Identity Provider (IdP) using the SSO module.

It is present where:

  • Service providers (SPs) are registered with Entity IDs and ACS URLs in the Admidio database, and
  • The IdP accepts and processes SAML AuthnRequest messages from SPs, and
  • The AssertionConsumerServiceURL from the AuthnRequest is used directly as the response destination, instead of being checked against the stored smc_acs_url for that SP.

In such setups, the IdP may send valid, signed SAML responses to arbitrary URLs if they are supplied in crafted AuthnRequests.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Admidio's SAML IdP endpoint that receives AuthnRequest messages.
  • Required knowledge: The attacker must know the Entity ID of a registered service provider client, or otherwise be able to reference a valid SP configuration.
  • Required access: Ability to send SAML AuthnRequest messages to the Admidio IdP endpoint (typically over the network where the SSO integration is exposed).
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted AuthnRequest containing a malicious AssertionConsumerServiceURL parameter.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The IdP implementation uses the AssertionConsumerServiceURL from the incoming request directly as the destination for the SAML response, without validating it against the canonical ACS URL (smc_acs_url) stored for that SP. This lack of validation (CWE-20) effectively enables an open redirect of sensitive SAML assertions (related to CWE-601) to attacker-controlled endpoints.

Why this happens

The underlying issue is improper input validation in the SAML protocol implementation.

Instead of treating the AssertionConsumerServiceURL in the incoming AuthnRequest as untrusted input that must match previously registered metadata, the IdP trusts this value and uses it as the response destination.

This maps to CWE-20: Improper Input Validation, because a critical parameter that controls where sensitive authentication responses are delivered is not constrained or verified against trusted configuration (the smc_acs_url in the database).

The behavior also resembles CWE-601: Open Redirect, as the SAML response is effectively redirected to an arbitrary URL chosen by the requester, but with the added risk that the redirected payload contains signed identity assertions and user attributes.

Conceptually, this is an architectural flaw in the SSO flow: the IdP relies on caller-provided routing information instead of enforcing its own metadata-driven trust anchors.

Potential impact

  • Unauthorized disclosure of signed SAML responses containing user identity data (e.g., login name, email address, roles, profile fields).
  • Exposure of SSO assertions to attacker-controlled endpoints, enabling credential or attribute theft.
  • Facilitation of downstream impersonation attacks if other systems accept the leaked assertions.
  • Increased risk of phishing or replay scenarios where captured SAML responses are reused in less strictly configured environments.
  • Undermining of trust boundaries between the IdP and its legitimate service providers.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally involves enforcing strict metadata-based validation of SAML endpoint parameters and reducing trust in caller-supplied URLs.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Deriving the ACS destination URL exclusively from the IdP's trusted configuration (e.g., the smc_acs_url registered for each SP) instead of using values from incoming AuthnRequests.
  • Validating any protocol-supplied URLs against a whitelist of configured endpoints for the corresponding Entity ID, rejecting requests that do not match.
  • Applying robust input validation rules to all SSO-related parameters, especially those that influence redirects or response destinations.
  • Centralizing SAML configuration parsing and validation to avoid bypasses and ensure consistent checks across all SSO flows.
  • Minimizing included identity attributes in assertions to the least necessary set, reducing the sensitivity of any potential disclosure.
  • Logging and monitoring unusual ACS URL usage patterns to detect potential abuse.

These patterns help ensure that response routing in SSO protocols is driven by trusted metadata, not by untrusted requests.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can focus on both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Look for instances where SAML destinations (e.g., AssertionConsumerServiceURL) are taken directly from request objects and used for redirects or response construction.
  • Flag any logic that bypasses or omits comparison of incoming ACS URLs with stored SP metadata.
  • Examine SSO and SAML handling code for reliance on user- or request-provided URLs without whitelist checks.
  • Policy and configuration checks:
  • Enforce policies in CI pipelines that require SSO components to validate protocol endpoints against configuration.
  • Use automated review tools that understand SAML frameworks and can highlight risky flows involving redirect or callback URLs.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Log ACS URLs and endpoints used for sending SAML responses and alert on destinations that are not in the registered configuration.
  • Identify anomalous patterns, such as SAML responses being sent to external or unexpected domains.

Combining static validation of redirect-like patterns with runtime observability of assertion destinations can surface this class of vulnerability early.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Admidio/admidio/releases/tag/v5.0.9
github.comgithub.com/Admidio/admidio/security/advisories/GHSA-p9w9-87c8-m235

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any party that can send SAML AuthnRequest messages to the Admidio IdP endpoint and knows a valid service provider Entity ID can attempt to exploit the issue, even without direct access to a user's browser session.

The attacker must have network access to the SAML IdP endpoint and knowledge of a registered SP's Entity ID. They do not need authenticated access to Admidio itself to craft and send malicious AuthnRequests if the endpoint is exposed.

The IdP should ignore or strictly validate the AssertionConsumerServiceURL from incoming AuthnRequests and instead select the response destination from its own trusted configuration. The ACS URL should be looked up based on the SP's Entity ID and enforced as the only valid endpoint.

Design SSO and SAML flows so that all critical endpoints (ACS URLs, redirect URIs, callback URLs) are derived from vetted metadata and never from client-supplied parameters alone. Apply centralized validation, use allowlists for redirect-like URLs, minimize the data carried in assertions, and incorporate automated checks in code review and CI to flag unvalidated use of URLs in authentication and authorization paths.

Find out what's already
exploitable in your codebase.