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CVE-2026-41588

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.0)

Timing Side-Channel in RELATE Authentication Logic

CVE-2026-41588

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Timing Side-Channel

CWE:

CWE-208, CWE-203

Impact:

Authentication Bypass / Credential Guessing via Timing Analysis

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.0)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

RELATE's authentication logic in course/auth.py previously contained a timing side-channel in the check_sign_in_key() function, allowing an attacker to infer information from response time differences.

Under certain conditions, an attacker who can repeatedly call this authentication endpoint may be able to iteratively recover or validate sign-in keys, significantly weakening access controls.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in RELATE deployments that expose the sign-in functionality backed by check_sign_in_key() in course/auth.py.

It is most relevant where:

  • Attackers can make many sign-in requests and observe precise response times
  • Network conditions are stable enough that processing time differences are measurable
  • Sign-in keys or tokens are validated using operations whose runtime varies with partial correctness

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or semi-public sign-in endpoint using check_sign_in_key()
  • Required access: Ability to send repeated authentication attempts and observe their timing (no prior authentication necessarily required)
  • Trigger point: Repeated calls to the vulnerable key-checking function with crafted or incrementally adjusted sign-in keys
  • Why exploitation is possible: The key comparison or validation logic exhibits data-dependent execution time, leaking information about partial matches or correctness through measurable timing differences

Why this happens

The underlying issue is a classic timing side-channel, mapped to CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy and related to CWE-203: Observable Discrepancy.

In check_sign_in_key(), the key verification logic likely used standard comparison or branching constructs whose runtime depends on how much of the supplied key is correct.

For example, early-exit comparisons, conditional logic, or variable-length operations can cause responses to be slightly faster or slower depending on the input.

Attackers can exploit these variations to infer partial information about valid keys or tokens, undermining the security assumption that key validity is opaque to observers.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may iteratively guess sign-in keys or tokens with significantly fewer attempts than brute force would normally require
  • Authentication checks can be weakened, potentially leading to unauthorized access to courses or user accounts
  • Session or sign-in mechanisms relying on the same key material can be indirectly compromised
  • Broader trust in RELATE's access control model may be undermined if timing data can be collected at scale

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating data-dependent timing differences in authentication and key-validation paths.

Recommended defensive patterns include:

  • Using constant-time comparison routines for keys, tokens, and secrets instead of default string or byte comparisons that short-circuit on the first mismatch
  • Normalizing code paths so that both successful and failed authentication attempts perform similar work and take approximately the same time
  • Reducing the amount of information observable to clients from authentication outcomes, using generic error messages and uniform response handling
  • Applying rate limiting and throttling to authentication endpoints to constrain the volume of measurements attackers can collect
  • Designing authentication flows so that sensitive checks execute after inexpensive, uniform pre-validation steps that mask subtle timing differences

How teams detect issues like this

Identifying timing side-channel vulnerabilities typically involves a mix of code-centric and behavioral analysis:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Look for direct comparisons of secrets using standard equality operators (e.g., string or byte equality on keys) in authentication code
  • Flag early-return logic in key or token validation that exits as soon as a mismatch is found
  • Review authentication error handling for differing processing paths or logging behavior between success and failure
  • Dynamic and empirical testing:
  • Perform controlled timing measurements of authentication endpoints with varying inputs and analyze whether response times correlate with partial correctness
  • Use profiling or tracing to identify variable control paths dependent on secret data
  • Policy and tooling:
  • Enforce secure coding guidelines that mandate constant-time primitives for secret comparison
  • Integrate linting or security scanners that detect non-constant-time comparisons in security-sensitive modules

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/inducer/relate/commit/2f68e16cd3b96d25c188c1aa3f7e13cdb15cdaeb
github.comgithub.com/inducer/relate/security/advisories/GHSA-78j7-9xr9-2728

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the sign-in endpoint using check_sign_in_key() is exposed over the network and an attacker can send a large number of requests while measuring response times with sufficient precision.

Typically, only network-level access to the sign-in endpoint is required. The attacker does not need prior authentication but must be able to generate repeated requests and observe their timing.

The most robust fix is to use constant-time comparison routines for all secret and key validations, combined with uniform control flow and error handling so that success and failure cases are indistinguishable in timing and behavior as much as practical.

Developers should treat all code that processes secrets as side-channel sensitive: adopt constant-time primitives, avoid data-dependent branching on secret values, apply rate limiting to authentication endpoints, and incorporate side-channel-aware reviews and tests into the development lifecycle.

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