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CVE-2026-41576

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) / HTML Injection in Brave CMS

CVE-2026-41576

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) / HTML Injection

CWE:

CWE-79

Impact:

Phishing and UI Redressing via Malicious Email Content

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Brave CMS contained a stored HTML injection issue in its public contact form that allowed user-supplied message text to be inserted into email templates without HTML escaping.

An attacker could submit crafted HTML as a contact message, which would then be rendered in the administrator's email client, enabling highly convincing phishing or UI spoofing within the email body.

Affected context

The vulnerability occurs in Brave CMS instances that expose the contact form to the public without authentication.

User-supplied message content is processed with nl2br() and passed directly into a Blade email template using {!! $msg !!}, which renders HTML without escaping.

Any HTML sent through the contact form is therefore reflected in notification emails sent to site administrators or configured recipients, relying on how their HTML-capable email clients render the content.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public-facing Brave CMS contact form endpoint.
  • Required access: No authentication; any internet user or bot can submit a message.
  • Trigger point: Administrator (or configured recipient) opens the notification email in an HTML-capable mail client.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application treats user-controlled message content as trusted HTML by:
  • Applying nl2br() (which preserves and augments HTML rather than escaping it)
  • Injecting the resulting string into the Blade email template with {!! $msg !!} (unescaped output)
  • Not sanitizing or limiting HTML tags, allowing arbitrary markup to be rendered in the email client.

Why this happens

The core issue stems from treating untrusted user input as trusted HTML content in a templating context.

Instead of escaping user input (e.g., using escaped output directives) or sanitizing allowed tags, the code path:

  1. Accepts arbitrary user text from the contact form.
  2. Uses nl2br() which does not perform HTML escaping.
  3. Outputs the result using an unescaped Blade directive {!! $msg !!} in the email template.

This pattern maps to CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting), specifically a form of HTML injection where untrusted content is rendered as active markup in an HTML-capable client.

Potential impact

  • Attackers could craft email content that mimics the CMS login form or administrative panels to harvest credentials (phishing).
  • Users receiving the email could be misled by altered visual layout, branding, or fake UI elements embedded in the message body.
  • Administrators might be tricked into clicking attacker-controlled links, leading to external phishing sites or malware distribution pages.
  • The trustworthiness of system-generated emails from the CMS could be undermined, increasing susceptibility to social engineering attacks.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on treating all user-supplied contact form data as untrusted and ensuring it is safely rendered:

  • Use escaped output in templates by default (e.g., Blade's {{ }}) so that user-provided content is HTML-encoded rather than interpreted as markup.
  • If some formatting is desired, apply a dedicated HTML sanitization layer that allows only a minimal, vetted subset of tags and attributes.
  • Keep message handling logic decoupled from presentation: maintain raw text as data, then convert to a safe representation (e.g., text-only or sanitized HTML) at render time.
  • Consider using plain-text email templates or multipart emails where the HTML part is tightly controlled and user input is strictly encoded.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to email content: avoid constructing complex, interactive interfaces inside system-generated emails.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection approaches can combine code-centric and behavior-centric techniques:

  • Static analysis: Flag usage of unescaped template directives (e.g., Blade {!! !!}) when they include variables derived from HTTP request data or other untrusted sources.
  • Code review signals: Review all email- and HTML-generating templates to ensure user input is passed through escaping or sanitization utilities before rendering.
  • Security linters and CI checks: Configure templating or framework-specific linters to warn on unsafe output patterns and enforce secure coding guidelines.
  • Logging and monitoring: Track unusual or repeated contact form submissions containing HTML-like patterns (<, >, <form, <iframe, etc.) and alert on suspicious spikes in such content.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/Ajax30/BraveCMS-2.0/commit/6c5660373cf5f0ca9181603280427aca46ef11ea
github.comgithub.com/Ajax30/BraveCMS-2.0/security/advisories/GHSA-x7cg-8grr-grvx

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. Any remote user with network access to the public contact form can exploit this issue by submitting crafted HTML content as the message.

No. The vulnerable contact form is publicly accessible, and exploitation only requires the ability to submit a form entry; no login or elevated permissions are needed.

The safest pattern is to ensure all user-controlled data is HTML-escaped by default in templates, and only allow very specific markup through a robust HTML sanitization process when absolutely necessary.

Adopt a strict template-output policy where unescaped rendering is prohibited for untrusted data, integrate automated checks to detect unsafe template directives in CI, and standardize on encoding/sanitization utilities for all user input rendered into HTML or email content.

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