Summary
An SQL injection vulnerability in Daptin's /aggregate/:typename endpoint allowed user-supplied column and group query parameters to be passed directly into a raw SQL literal builder without validation or parameterization.
Any authenticated user with a valid session could inject arbitrary SQL expressions into aggregate queries, potentially leading to data exposure, data modification, or disruption of the underlying database.
Affected context
The vulnerability appears in Daptin deployments that expose the /aggregate/:typename endpoint as part of the GraphQL/JSON-API interface.
It is relevant when:
- Clients can control the
columnandgroupquery parameters for aggregate requests - These parameters are passed into
goqu.L()or similar raw SQL literal builders - Database queries are executed with significant read/write permissions
The risk increases in multi-tenant or externally exposed CMS setups where numerous authenticated user accounts can reach this endpoint.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) API, specifically the
/aggregate/:typenameendpoint in the Daptin CMS. - Required access: Any authenticated user with a valid session; no special roles or elevated privileges are required beyond being logged in.
- Input control: Ability to set or manipulate the
columnandgroupquery parameters in aggregate requests. - Trigger point: When the server builds and executes SQL queries using
goqu.L()with these parameters as raw SQL literals. - Why exploitation is possible: The application interpolates unvalidated, user-controlled strings directly into SQL fragments, bypassing parameterization and syntactic constraints, enabling attackers to craft arbitrary SQL expressions.
Why this happens
This issue stems from constructing SQL statements using raw string concatenation patterns instead of parameterized queries.
By passing user-controlled column and group parameters directly into goqu.L(), the code effectively treated untrusted input as trusted SQL syntax.
This maps to CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'), where dynamic SQL construction fails to separate code from data, allowing attackers to alter query structure, logic, and scope.
Potential impact
- Access to data that the authenticated account should not normally see, including other users' records.
- Unauthorized modification or deletion of database records through injected SQL.
- Bypassing of application-level authorization checks enforced outside the database layer.
- Extraction of sensitive metadata about the schema, tables, and columns.
- Potential denial of service at the database level by issuing expensive or disruptive queries.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation should focus on eliminating the pattern of treating user input as raw SQL and enforcing strict separation of data and code.
Recommended defensive approaches include:
- Using parameterized query builders or ORM methods that do not accept arbitrary SQL fragments from user input.
- Whitelisting allowed column and group-by fields, resolving them to known-safe identifiers instead of trusting client-supplied names.
- Applying rigorous server-side validation and normalization for any dynamic query components, rejecting unsupported or malformed values.
- Implementing least-privilege database accounts so that even if a query is abused, its impact on the database is constrained.
- Designing APIs so that clients request higher-level operations (e.g., "group by field X") rather than constructing raw query clauses.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can be approached at both code and runtime levels:
- Static analysis: Configure rules or linters to flag uses of raw SQL builders (e.g.,
goqu.L()or similar APIs) when they are passed user-controlled parameters. - Code review: Look for endpoints where query parameters or request fields are mapped directly into SQL fragments, especially for ORDER BY, GROUP BY, or column lists.
- Security testing: Use automated and manual testing to send crafted input in
columnandgroupparameters to see if errors, unexpected results, or database responses expose injection behavior. - Runtime monitoring: Enable SQL logging or database activity monitoring to detect anomalous or syntactically suspicious queries originating from API endpoints.
- Policy enforcement: Integrate secure coding guidelines into CI/CD, requiring developers to use safe query builders and documented whitelisting patterns for dynamic query parts.

