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CVE-2026-41419

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion in 4ga Boards Archive

CVE-2026-41419

Deferred

Vulnerability type

Category:

Path Traversal / Local File Inclusion

CWE:

CWE-22

Impact:

Unauthorized Local File Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

4ga Boards contains a path traversal issue in its BOARDS archive import feature that allows an authenticated user with board import privileges to trick the server into ingesting arbitrary files from the host filesystem as board attachments.

Once imported, these files can then be downloaded via the normal application interface, leading to unauthorized local file disclosure.

Affected context

The vulnerability exists in 4ga Boards instances that expose the BOARDS archive import feature to authenticated users with board import privileges.

When processing an uploaded archive, the server-side import logic uses file paths in a way that permits traversal outside the intended storage directory, allowing it to read arbitrary files on the host.

This behavior becomes risky wherever the application server has access to sensitive files (e.g., configuration, logs, or other application data), and where import-capable accounts are not strictly limited.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint handling BOARDS archive import in 4ga Boards.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated user account with permissions to import boards/archives.
  • Trigger point: Submission of a crafted archive containing paths or metadata that cause the import handler to resolve to files outside the expected directory.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The server-side import logic does not adequately normalize and constrain file paths to a safe base directory, allowing directory traversal to arbitrary readable locations on the host and then exposing those ingested files back through the attachment download mechanism.

Why this happens

This issue stems from improper validation and canonicalization of file paths during archive import, mapping directly to CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal').

The import mechanism trusts archive-internal paths or user-controlled references when resolving file locations on the server, and fails to enforce that all resolved paths remain within an intended, restricted storage directory.

As a result, attackers with import privileges can craft inputs that cause the application to treat arbitrary host files as if they were legitimate board attachments, making normally non-web-accessible files available via the application.

Potential impact

  • Disclosure of sensitive application configuration files that may contain credentials or API keys.
  • Exposure of log files revealing internal system behavior, user activity, or other sensitive debugging data.
  • Disclosure of other users' data or internal project information stored on the same host.
  • Assistance in chaining to further attacks (e.g., credential reuse, targeted exploitation) by revealing internal system details.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation patterns focus on hardening path handling, constraining file access, and minimizing privilege:

  • Strict path normalization and validation: Resolve all paths to their canonical form and enforce that they stay within a single designated storage root for imported content. Reject or sanitize any paths containing traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or absolute path indicators.
  • Dedicated storage directories: Ensure import processes only ever read from uploaded archives and write into isolated, application-controlled directories, never directly mapping paths into the host filesystem.
  • Least-privilege filesystem access: Run the application under an account with minimal OS-level permissions, restricting read access to only those directories necessary for operation.
  • Permission scoping for imports: Limit archive import capabilities to a small, trusted set of users or service accounts, and consider additional approvals for high-risk operations.
  • Defense-in-depth validations: Implement size, type, and content checks for imported archives and attachments to reduce the chance of abusing import logic for unintended purposes.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection can combine code-centered review with runtime monitoring:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Look for file handling code in the archive import path that concatenates user-controlled or archive-derived paths with server paths without enforcing a fixed root directory.
  • Flag usage of directory traversal-prone constructs such as direct handling of ../ segments or lack of canonicalization (realpath-style checks).
  • Ensure that any file ingestion layer has explicit checks that reject absolute paths and paths escaping the intended storage directory.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Use SAST tools configured with rules for CWE-22 to scan for unvalidated file path operations and unsafe file system calls.
  • Operational monitoring:
  • Monitor server logs for unusual access patterns where attachments correspond to system file paths (e.g., /etc/, application config, or log directories).
  • Track archive imports and subsequent downloads, especially when attachments have names or paths resembling system files.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/RARgames/4gaBoards/security/advisories/GHSA-rrjq-7x8g-cmgm

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, but only through the authenticated web interface. An attacker must have network access to the 4ga Boards instance and valid credentials with board import privileges to exploit the issue.

The attacker needs an authenticated 4ga Boards account with permissions to import BOARDS archives. Anonymous or low-privileged users without import rights generally cannot exploit this flaw.

The most robust fix is to enforce strict path confinement for all file operations during archive import: normalize paths, ensure they resolve under a single, predefined storage directory, and reject any archive entries that attempt to escape that directory or reference absolute paths.

Adopt a consistent file handling strategy that treats all user-controlled paths and archive contents as untrusted, enforce canonical path checks in shared utilities, use automated checks for CWE-22 patterns in CI, and review any new features involving file import/export with a dedicated security checklist focused on path traversal and file disclosure risks.

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