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CVE-2026-41379

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Missing Authorization in OpenClaw Talk Voice Configuration

CVE-2026-41379

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Missing Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Privilege Escalation and Unauthorized Configuration Modification

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw before 2026.3.28 contains a privilege escalation issue where authenticated operators with write permissions can modify admin-only Talk Voice configuration settings.

By abusing the chat.send endpoint, an attacker with operator.write privileges may gain access to sensitive voice configuration persistence that should be restricted to administrators.

Affected context

This vulnerability affects OpenClaw deployments where:

  • The Talk Voice feature is enabled and uses shared configuration persistence.
  • The authorization layer does not strongly separate operator and admin privileges for configuration-related operations.
  • The chat.send endpoint is exposed to users with operator.write privileges.

In such environments, the endpoint's permissions are broad enough to allow indirect interaction with admin-class voice configuration data.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Application API layer, specifically the chat.send endpoint.
  • Required access: Valid authenticated account with operator.write privileges (no need for admin-level access).
  • Trigger point: Sending crafted chat.send requests that cause the application to read or update Talk Voice configuration fields.
  • Why exploitation is possible: Authorization checks verify that the caller is an operator with write access but do not enforce a finer-grained policy distinguishing between operator-level operations and admin-only configuration updates, allowing privilege escalation to admin-class configuration.

Why this happens

The root cause is a missing or incomplete authorization check on an operation that touches admin-only Talk Voice configuration persistence.

Functionality exposed via chat.send appears to be designed for operator-level interaction but is implicitly trusted to perform actions against configuration resources that should be owned by administrators.

This aligns with CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where access control logic fails to verify that the authenticated principal has the appropriate role or privilege scope for the specific resource, allowing lower-privileged users to perform high-privilege actions.

Potential impact

  • Modification of admin-only Talk Voice configuration settings.
  • Escalation of operator accounts to effective admin-level influence over voice features.
  • Disruption of voice communication flows (e.g., misrouting, disabling, or degrading service).
  • Introduction of malicious or unsafe voice routing or recording behaviors impacting confidentiality or compliance.
  • Potential pivot opportunities if voice configuration interacts with other sensitive subsystems.

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on enforcing strict, role-aware authorization for every configuration access path:

  • Apply least privilege by clearly separating operator and admin privilege scopes, especially for configuration endpoints.
  • Introduce fine-grained authorization checks at the resource and operation level (e.g., explicit policies for admin-only configuration objects).
  • Centralize authorization logic so that all code paths reaching Talk Voice configuration persistence pass through a consistent policy enforcement layer.
  • Treat multi-purpose endpoints like chat.send as untrusted conduits, ensuring they cannot implicitly invoke admin-level operations without explicit policy checks.
  • Implement defense-in-depth by validating that configuration changes originate from expected roles and contexts before persisting them.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection generally involves both code-focused and behavior-focused approaches:

  • Static analysis / code review:
  • Flag endpoints where low-privilege roles (e.g., operator.write) can call functions that interact with admin-only configuration stores.
  • Review access control logic for role checks that are too coarse (e.g., "is authenticated" or "has write" without checking specific role or resource ownership).
  • Track call chains from chat.send and similar endpoints to configuration persistence layers and ensure authorization is enforced at each boundary.
  • Policy and runtime monitoring:
  • Log and monitor configuration changes to Talk Voice settings, including caller identity and role; alert on modifications made by non-admin accounts.
  • Use access control testing in CI/CD to assert that operator-role test accounts cannot perform admin-only operations.
  • Automated tooling:
  • Employ automated review tools or security linters configured with rules for detecting missing or inconsistent authorization checks on critical resources.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/e34694733fc64931ed4a543c73d84ad3435d5df1
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-3q42-xmxv-9vfr
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-privilege-escalation-via-chat-send-to-admin-class-talk-voice-config

Frequently asked

questions

Yes, if the OpenClaw API (including chat.send) is accessible over the network and an attacker can authenticate as an operator with write permissions, they can exploit the issue remotely without local system access.

The attacker must have valid credentials for an account with operator.write privileges. No direct admin account access is required, but the flaw allows operator-level users to influence admin-only Talk Voice configuration.

Apply strict, role-based authorization at all points where Talk Voice configuration is read or modified, ensuring that only administrator roles can access admin-class configuration. Centralize and standardize access control checks rather than relying on assumptions tied to endpoint names or typical usage.

Design APIs with explicit privilege boundaries, adopt a least-privilege model for all roles, and enforce fine-grained authorization at the resource level. Complement this with regular access control reviews, automated tests that exercise privilege boundaries, and security tooling that flags endpoints capable of performing high-privilege actions without appropriate role checks.

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