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CVE-2026-41304

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection in WWBN AVideo CloneSite

CVE-2026-41304

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

WWBN AVideo's CloneSite plugin builds shell commands using unsanitized user input from the url parameter in the cloneServer.json.php endpoint.

By injecting shell metacharacters into this parameter, an attacker can break out of the expected wget URL context and achieve remote code execution (RCE) on the hosting server.

Affected context

This vulnerability appears in WWBN AVideo deployments that:

  • Have the CloneSite plugin installed and enabled
  • Expose the cloneServer.json.php endpoint to users over HTTP(S)
  • Use PHP's exec() or similar functions to run a wget command constructed with the url parameter

The issue is present when user-provided URLs are passed directly into shell commands without robust quoting, escaping, or parameterization.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoint cloneServer.json.php in the CloneSite plugin.
  • Required access: Ability to send crafted HTTP requests to the endpoint (typically remote network access; authentication requirements depend on site configuration).
  • Trigger point: Supplying a specially crafted url parameter containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |) that is concatenated into the wget command.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The application constructs a shell command string by directly interpolating user-controlled input and passes it to exec() without proper sanitization, escaping, or use of safer process invocation APIs.

Why this happens

The underlying bug is a classic command injection issue, categorized as CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

Instead of treating the url parameter as untrusted data to be safely passed as an argument, the code concatenates it into a shell command line that is executed by exec().

Because shell metacharacters (such as ;, &&, or |) are not neutralized, the shell interprets them as control operators, allowing attackers to append arbitrary commands that run with the privileges of the web server or PHP process.

Potential impact

  • Execution of arbitrary system commands on the AVideo server
  • Full compromise of the underlying operating system account running the web application
  • Access to or exfiltration of sensitive files, configuration secrets, and video content
  • Installation of persistent backdoors, cryptominers, or additional malware
  • Lateral movement within the hosting environment or internal network, depending on privileges
  • Service disruption, data tampering, or complete takeover of the video platform

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on eliminating direct shell command construction from user input and enforcing strict command invocation patterns:

  • Prefer high-level language APIs (e.g., PHP stream wrappers, cURL libraries, or HTTP clients) instead of shelling out to wget for network downloads.
  • If shell utilities must be used, invoke them via functions that accept argument arrays (e.g., proc_open or equivalent patterns) and avoid invoking a shell altogether.
  • Apply strict input validation to the url parameter:
  • Enforce a whitelist of allowed URL schemes (e.g., https only)
  • Optionally restrict allowed hostnames or domains
  • Reject input containing shell metacharacters or unexpected characters
  • Run the application under least-privilege OS accounts and consider additional isolation (containers, jails, or mandatory access controls) so that, even if a command is injected, the blast radius is reduced.
  • Centralize command execution logic and implement consistent safe patterns rather than inlining exec() calls throughout the codebase.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and operational approaches:

  • Static analysis:
  • Search for use of exec(), shell_exec(), system(), passthru(), or backtick operators where user input (e.g., $_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST) flows into command strings.
  • Flag patterns where variables named url or request parameters are concatenated into strings passed to shell functions.
  • Code review signals:
  • Any place where shell commands are dynamically constructed from request data.
  • Lack of explicit validation, URL parsing, or encoding before command execution.
  • Reuse of generic helper functions that wrap exec() without strict argument handling.
  • Runtime and log-based indicators:
  • Web server or PHP logs containing suspicious url values with shell metacharacters.
  • System logs showing unexpected wget invocations or shell commands spawning from the web server process.
  • Use of EDR or HIDS tools to alert on unusual child processes spawned by the web server.
  • Automated SAST/IAST and secure code scanning tools can be configured with rules to highlight the use of shell execution APIs and untrusted input flows in PHP applications like AVideo.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/473c609fc2defdea8b937b00e86ce88eba1f15bb
github.comgithub.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-xr6f-h4x7-r6qp

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. If the cloneServer.json.php endpoint is reachable over the network, an attacker can exploit the issue remotely by sending crafted HTTP requests with a malicious url parameter.

The attacker needs the ability to interact with the vulnerable endpoint. In many deployments this may be unauthenticated HTTP access; in others, access might require application-level authentication or VPN, depending on how the AVideo instance is exposed.

Replace shell-based wget calls with a safe HTTP client library in PHP, treat the url parameter as untrusted data with strict validation, and avoid passing user input into any shell or command execution function. When external tools are unavoidable, pass arguments as structured parameters to process APIs rather than constructing shell command strings.

Establish coding standards that prohibit direct use of exec()-like functions with user input, require the use of higher-level APIs for external interactions, and enforce these practices through code review and automated static analysis. Complement this with least-privilege deployment and regular security testing so potential injection points are identified early in development.

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