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CVE-2026-41297

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

SSRF in OpenClaw Marketplace Plugin Downloader

CVE-2026-41297

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

CWE:

CWE-918

Impact:

Unauthorized access to internal network resources via server-side requests

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.6)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

OpenClaw versions before 2026.3.31 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the marketplace plugin download flow, where unvalidated redirects are followed during archive retrieval.

A remote attacker can abuse this behavior to make the OpenClaw server initiate requests to arbitrary internal or external endpoints, potentially exposing internal services or being used as a pivot for further attacks.

Affected context

This vulnerability occurs in OpenClaw's marketplace plugin download mechanism, specifically in the marketplace.ts module that fetches plugin archives from marketplace endpoints.

When the server processes a plugin download, it follows HTTP redirects from the initial URL without restricting the final destination.

Environments where OpenClaw can reach internal services (e.g., databases, admin panels, metadata APIs, cloud instance metadata services, or other internal HTTP interfaces) are at particular risk.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Public or exposed OpenClaw instances that allow remote users to trigger marketplace plugin downloads.
  • Required access: Ability to supply or influence the marketplace download URL or plugin reference that results in HTTP redirects (typically over a network API or web interface).
  • Trigger point: The server-side HTTP client within marketplace.ts follows an HTTP 3xx redirect when fetching a plugin archive.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The redirect handling logic does not validate or constrain the redirect target; as a result, an attacker-controlled redirect can point to arbitrary internal or external hosts and ports, causing the server to issue the request on the attacker's behalf.

Why this happens

The root cause is a failure to validate and constrain redirect targets when performing server-side HTTP requests for plugin archive downloads.

The marketplace.ts module appears to trust redirect responses from initial marketplace URLs and automatically follows them, without enforcing restrictions such as allowed hostnames, schemes, or network ranges.

This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), where an attacker can cause the application's server-side HTTP client to send requests to unintended destinations, leveraging the server's network position and trust relationships.

Potential impact

  • Access to internal HTTP(S) services that are not directly exposed to the public internet
  • Discovery of internal network structure, service endpoints, and open ports
  • Interaction with internal administration panels or APIs that rely on network-based trust
  • Attempts to access cloud instance metadata endpoints (potentially leading to credential or token exposure)
  • Use of the OpenClaw server as a proxy to mask attacker origin when targeting third-party systems
  • Potential stepping stone for lateral movement depending on accessible internal services and their own vulnerabilities

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on constraining server-side HTTP requests and reducing trust in redirect behavior:

  • Enforce strict allowlists for outbound HTTP requests from the plugin marketplace downloader (e.g., limit to specific hostnames or domains).
  • Disable or tightly control automatic redirect following, or validate the redirect target against a set of allowed destinations before following it.
  • Implement network-level egress controls (firewall rules, proxy policies, VPC controls) to prevent the application server from reaching sensitive internal or metadata endpoints.
  • Normalize and validate URLs before use: enforce safe schemes (e.g., https only), disallow IP-literals or link-local ranges, and block SSRF-prone destinations such as 169.254.169.254 and equivalent metadata IPs.
  • Apply least-privilege network design, placing OpenClaw in segments that cannot directly communicate with highly sensitive internal services where possible.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection typically combines code-centric and infrastructure-centric approaches:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag usages of HTTP clients in marketplace.ts (and similar modules) that follow redirects without validating target hosts.
  • Look for absence of hostname/domain allowlists, URL scheme checks, or network range filtering on outbound requests.
  • Review plugin download flows for any user-influenced URLs or IDs that are dereferenced server-side.
  • Runtime and logging analysis:
  • Instrument outbound HTTP client code to log destination host, port, and path for plugin download requests.
  • Monitor for unusual or non-marketplace destinations, especially IP addresses, internal hostnames (e.g., *.local, *.corp), or known metadata endpoints.
  • Network-level monitoring:
  • Use egress firewalls or proxies with logging to detect unexpected outbound calls from OpenClaw to internal address spaces or restricted ranges.
  • Automated security testing tools or DAST can be configured to probe plugin download endpoints for SSRF behaviors by supplying URLs that redirect to monitoring endpoints or blocked ranges.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/2ce44ca6a1302b166a128abbd78f72114f2f4f52
github.comgithub.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-vjx8-8p7h-82gr
vulncheck.comvulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-server-side-request-forgery-via-marketplace-plugin-download-redirect

Frequently asked

questions

Yes. As described, a remote attacker who can trigger marketplace plugin downloads and influence the redirect behavior can exploit this issue over the network, without local access to the server.

The attacker needs the ability to invoke the marketplace plugin download functionality with parameters that cause the server to follow redirects under their control. This could be via a web UI, API call, or plugin configuration that the attacker can submit or manipulate.

The most robust fix is to restrict where the plugin downloader can connect: enforce strict domain or hostname allowlists, validate redirect locations against those allowlists, and avoid automatic redirect following to arbitrary destinations. Combining this with network egress restrictions greatly limits exposure.

Adopt a defensive design for all server-initiated HTTP requests: treat all user-supplied or indirectly influenced URLs as untrusted, validate against allowlists, block sensitive IP ranges and metadata endpoints, and ensure that new outbound-request features are reviewed with an explicit SSRF threat model, including redirect handling.

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