Summary
Flowise's cloud.password reset functionality previously transmitted reset links over unsecured HTTP instead of HTTPS.
An attacker on the same network as the user could intercept the reset URL via man-in-the-middle techniques and use it to take over the victim's account during the reset process.
Affected context
This vulnerability occurs in Flowise's cloud-hosted environment when users initiate a password reset through cloud.flowiseai.com and receive a reset link that uses plain HTTP.
It is most relevant when:
- Users are connected over untrusted or shared networks (e.g., public Wi-Fi, corporate guest networks)
- Network traffic can be observed or manipulated by an attacker on the same segment
- The password reset link is used shortly after issuance while still valid
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Password reset flow on cloud.flowiseai.com
- Required access: Ability to observe or interfere with network traffic between the user and Flowise (e.g., on-path attacker on local network or compromised router)
- Trigger point: User requests a password reset and receives/uses a reset link sent over HTTP
- Why exploitation is possible: The reset link, which acts as a bearer token granting password reset privileges, is transmitted in cleartext over HTTP, allowing interception and reuse by an attacker without needing the victim's credentials
Why this happens
The underlying issue maps to CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information.
The password reset mechanism relied on HTTP instead of enforcing HTTPS, causing sensitive account recovery tokens to travel unencrypted over the network.
Since password reset URLs typically embed time-bound, single-use tokens that authorize a privileged operation (changing the user's password), treating them as non-sensitive data over an insecure transport creates an opportunity for network-level adversaries to capture and replay these tokens.
Potential impact
- Unauthorized access to user accounts via captured password reset links
- Complete account takeover, including ability to set a new password and lock out the legitimate user
- Exposure of associated application data and configurations accessible through the compromised account
- Facilitation of further lateral movement if the same credentials are reused across other services
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation centers on enforcing secure transport for all sensitive operations and tokens:
- Enforce HTTPS (TLS) by default across all authentication and account recovery endpoints, including password reset link generation and consumption
- Implement HTTP-to-HTTPS redirects with HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) to minimize downgrade risks
- Treat password reset URLs as sensitive bearer tokens, ensuring they are never transmitted over cleartext channels or logged in plaintext
- Use least-privilege design for reset tokens: short expiry, single use, and scoped strictly to password reset functionality
- Separate public and administrative interfaces where feasible, and apply stricter transport policies to all authentication-related paths
How teams detect issues like this
Organizations can detect and guard against similar issues using a combination of testing and policy enforcement:
- Add automated security tests (e.g., integration or DAST scans) to verify that all authentication and password reset endpoints enforce HTTPS and reject HTTP requests
- Use static configuration reviews or infrastructure-as-code scanning to ensure TLS is required at load balancers, reverse proxies, and API gateways
- Monitor web server and application logs for sensitive endpoints being accessed via HTTP, and treat such events as misconfigurations or policy violations
- Incorporate security-focused code and config review checklists covering transport security, especially around account recovery flows

