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CVE-2026-41265

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

Command Injection in Flowise Airtable Agents

CVE-2026-41265

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Command Injection

CWE:

CWE-77

Impact:

Remote Code Execution on Server

Severity:

CRITICAL RISK

(9.8)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

Flowise's Airtable_Agents node evaluates LLM-generated Python scripts without adequate sandboxing, enabling those scripts to run with server-level privileges.

An unauthenticated attacker who can send prompts to a chatflow using this node may inject instructions that cause the LLM to emit malicious Python, leading to arbitrary command execution on the Flowise server.

Affected context

This vulnerability arises in Flowise deployments that use the Airtable Agent node within a chatflow.

The risk materializes when:

  • The chatflow accepts user-controlled prompts (e.g., public or semi-public chat interfaces)
  • The Airtable_Agents class evaluates LLM-generated Python scripts directly on the server
  • There is no effective sandboxing, isolation, or restriction on what that Python code can do

In these conditions, the LLM acts as a code generator whose output is trusted and executed as-is, exposing the host environment to command execution risks.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible chatflows that include the Airtable Agent node
  • Required access: Ability to send prompts to the affected chatflow (no authentication required in many configurations)
  • Trigger point: The Airtable_Agents run method, which evaluates the Python script produced by the LLM
  • Why exploitation is possible:
  • The LLM is instructed to generate Python scripts that are then executed on the server
  • There is no robust sandbox or execution confinement around the generated code
  • The system implicitly trusts the LLM's output, even though it is influenced by untrusted user prompts

Why this happens

The root cause is the direct execution of dynamically generated Python code influenced by untrusted user input, without adequate sandboxing or command restrictions.

In the Airtable_Agents run method, the LLM's response is treated as trusted code and evaluated in the server's Python environment.

Because user prompts can steer the LLM to emit code that invokes system commands or interacts with sensitive resources, this behavior aligns with CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection').

Conceptually, this is a classic "code injection via generated script" pattern: untrusted input (prompts) shapes executable content (Python code) that runs with server privileges, without being subjected to strict whitelisting, sandboxing, or capability-based controls.

Potential impact

  • Remote execution of arbitrary OS commands on the Flowise server
  • Access to environment variables, API keys, and other secrets available to the Flowise runtime
  • Unauthorized access to connected data sources, including Airtable and other integrated services
  • Lateral movement within the hosting environment, potentially affecting other services and infrastructure
  • Data exfiltration, tampering, or destruction within the scope of the Flowise deployment
  • Use of the Flowise server as a pivot for broader network attacks

General mitigation guidance

Effective mitigation focuses on breaking the trust boundary between user prompts, LLM outputs, and executable code:

  • Avoid executing LLM-generated code directly; prefer constrained declarative outputs (e.g., parameterized queries, structured JSON actions) that are interpreted by fixed, vetted logic.
  • If code generation is necessary, enforce strong sandboxing using process isolation, containers, or restricted interpreters with minimal available capabilities.
  • Introduce strict allowlists for operations that generated scripts may perform, and prevent access to filesystem, network, and shell commands by default.
  • Apply the principle of least privilege to the Flowise runtime, ensuring it runs under an account with minimal OS and network permissions.
  • Treat all LLM output as untrusted until validated; integrate validation layers that check for disallowed modules, functions, or patterns in generated scripts.
  • Segregate high-risk nodes (such as code-executing agents) from publicly exposed chatflows, limiting their use to trusted, internal workflows.

How teams detect issues like this

Detection efforts can target both code-level patterns and runtime behavior:

  • Static analysis and code review:
  • Flag dynamic execution constructs (e.g., exec, eval, or equivalent) that operate on content derived from LLM responses or user prompts.
  • Identify locations where LLM outputs are used as code without sanitization, validation, or sandboxing.
  • Review agent/connector implementations for direct shell or subprocess invocation influenced by conversation content.
  • Configuration and policy enforcement:
  • Enforce coding guidelines that prohibit direct execution of dynamically generated scripts in production systems.
  • Integrate pre-commit or CI checks that detect unsandboxed dynamic code execution patterns.
  • Runtime monitoring:
  • Monitor process spawning, command execution, and unusual file or network access originating from the Flowise service.
  • Use logging to capture prompts, LLM responses, and execution decisions for forensic analysis and anomaly detection (with attention to privacy and data protection).
  • Automated secure-code review tools can assist in highlighting unsafe dynamic execution patterns, especially where code paths intersect with LLM-integrated components.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-v38x-c887-992f

Frequently asked

questions

It is highly exploitable in deployments where chatflows using the Airtable Agent node are exposed over a network interface without strict access controls, because an attacker only needs the ability to send crafted prompts to influence the LLM's generated Python code.

Not necessarily. If the chatflow is publicly accessible or does not enforce strong authentication, an attacker can be fully unauthenticated and still exploit the vulnerability by interacting with the Airtable Agent node via normal conversation channels.

The safest pattern is to eliminate direct execution of dynamically generated code and replace it with constrained, declarative outputs that are interpreted by predefined logic.

Where dynamic execution cannot be fully removed, it should be tightly sandboxed, with explicit allowlists and minimal privileges, ensuring that any executed code has extremely limited capability.

Treat LLM output as untrusted input and apply standard secure coding practices: avoid eval/exec and shell calls based on model responses, design interaction protocols around structured, validated outputs, enforce sandboxing and least privilege, and incorporate security reviews specifically focused on how LLM-generated content is consumed by the system.

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