Summary
Froxlor's DomainZones.add API endpoint fails to sanitize newline characters in TXT record content before generating BIND zone files. An authenticated customer with DNS editing privileges can inject additional BIND directives and DNS records into the zone file on disk, potentially taking over or redirecting DNS for affected domains.
Affected context
This vulnerability appears in Froxlor deployments that use the DNS management features to generate BIND zone files from user-supplied data.
In particular, it affects environments where:
- Customers are allowed to edit DNS records (including TXT records) through the Froxlor interface or API
- BIND configuration is automatically rebuilt from Froxlor data via a scheduled cron job
- The resulting zone files are used directly by BIND for authoritative DNS responses
Under these conditions, unsanitized newline characters in TXT record values can break the expected record structure and introduce unintended directives or records.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: Froxlor DNS management interface / DomainZones.add API.
- Required access: Authenticated customer-level access with DNS editing enabled for at least one domain.
- Configuration requirements: BIND zone files must be generated from Froxlor data and consumed by a BIND server without additional validation.
- Trigger point: Submission or update of a TXT record whose value includes crafted newline characters; exploitation materializes when the DNS rebuild cron writes the zone file and BIND reloads it.
- Why exploitation is possible: The application incorporates TXT record content into zone file templates without normalizing or rejecting newline characters, allowing user-controlled content to escape the intended TXT record context and be interpreted as separate BIND directives or records.
Why this happens
The core issue is improper neutralization of special elements in data written into a BIND zone file template, mapping to CWE-74: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection').
Froxlor treats user-supplied TXT record values as inert data but fails to strip or encode newline characters before placing them into the textual zone file.
Because BIND's zone file format is line-oriented, these newline characters terminate the current record and allow subsequent user-controlled text to be parsed as standalone directives (such as $INCLUDE or $GENERATE) or additional DNS records (like A, MX, or CNAME).
The previous fix for related record types (LOC, RP, SSHFP, TLSA) did not extend the sanitization logic to TXT records, leaving an inconsistent defense that attackers can still leverage.
Potential impact
- Attackers can inject arbitrary DNS records (A, MX, CNAME, etc.) into the affected zone, which may:
- Redirect web traffic to attacker-controlled hosts
- Redirect email delivery to malicious mail servers
- Interfere with other application-specific DNS uses (e.g., SPF, DKIM via TXT records)
- Attackers can inject BIND directives such as
$INCLUDEor$GENERATE, which may: - Pull in additional configuration or zones from files accessible to the BIND process
- Expand their control over multiple records or subdomains with concise payloads
- DNS integrity for the impacted domains can be compromised, leading to:
- Phishing and credential theft via domain impersonation
- Service disruption or denial of service for legitimate users
- Potential expansion of control if included files or generated records expose broader infrastructure details or misconfigurations.
General mitigation guidance
Mitigation strategies should focus on rigidly treating DNS record content as untrusted data and enforcing strict encoding and formatting rules before writing zone files:
- Normalize and validate all record values, especially TXT records, to explicitly reject or encode newline characters and other control characters that are meaningful in BIND zone syntax.
- Apply a central sanitization routine for all DNS record types that share output paths, avoiding type-specific ad hoc filters that are easy to miss when adding new types.
- Enforce conservative schemas for DNS record content (e.g., restricting character sets and maximum lengths) so records cannot carry embedded directives.
- Separate data and templates clearly: render zone files from a fixed, vetted template where user fields are always escaped or quoted properly according to BIND's documented rules.
- Run DNS rebuild processes with least privilege and limit the directories and files BIND can access, reducing the impact of any injected
$INCLUDEstatements.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection can combine code-level inspection with configuration and runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis and code review:
- Search for code paths that concatenate user-supplied DNS record content directly into BIND zone file strings without normalization.
- Flag any handling of record values where newline characters, semicolons, or other BIND control characters are not explicitly filtered or encoded.
- Verify that the same sanitization logic is consistently applied across all DNS record types and APIs (UI and programmatic).
- Policy and configuration checks:
- Implement CI rules that scan templates and generation scripts for direct interpolation of unvalidated DNS content.
- Enforce naming and content policies for records, rejecting values that don't match expected patterns for their type.
- Runtime auditing:
- Periodically diff generated zone files against a known-good baseline or policy to detect unexpected directives (
$INCLUDE,$GENERATE) or records not associated with approved changes. - Monitor BIND logs for unusual reloads, parse errors, or inclusion paths that may indicate tampering.

