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CVE-2026-41186

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

Unauthenticated pprof Exposure (CWE-200) in Calico

CVE-2026-41186

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Information Exposure

CWE:

CWE-200, CWE-489

Impact:

Sensitive Information Disclosure

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.5)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

When Calico's shared debug server is enabled, certain Calico components expose Go pprof data on all network interfaces without authentication. Any pod that can reach the listener may retrieve heap contents, goroutine stacks, and command-line arguments, potentially revealing sensitive information held in process memory.

Affected context

The issue occurs in Calico deployments where the opt-in shared debug server is enabled for the kube-controllers or Goldmane components. The affected pprof listeners bind to 0.0.0.0 and do not require authentication, so their exposure depends on network reachability from other pods or connected clients.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Network-accessible Go pprof debug listener
  • Required access: Network reachability to the listener; pod-level access may be sufficient
  • Trigger point: Requests to the exposed pprof endpoints
  • Why exploitation is possible: The debug service lacks authentication and binds beyond localhost, allowing reachable clients to retrieve diagnostic data

Why this happens

The underlying issue is an unauthenticated debug interface exposed on a broad network address. This insecure deployment pattern maps primarily to CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, because diagnostic endpoints may disclose process memory and execution details to clients that have not been authorized. The enabled debug functionality also reflects CWE-489: Active Debug Code, where diagnostic capabilities remain available in a production-like runtime without adequate access controls.

Potential impact

  • Attackers may obtain sensitive values present in process heap memory
  • Goroutine stacks may disclose function arguments, internal paths, tokens, or application state
  • Command-line arguments may reveal configuration details or operational secrets
  • Exposed runtime information could support follow-on attacks or lateral movement

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on reducing debug-interface exposure and limiting the trust placed in diagnostic endpoints.

Common defensive patterns include:

  • Keeping shared debug services disabled unless operationally necessary
  • Binding diagnostic listeners to localhost or another tightly controlled interface
  • Placing debug endpoints behind authenticated, authorized administrative access
  • Restricting listener reachability with network policies and dedicated management paths
  • Avoiding secrets in command-line arguments and reducing sensitive data retained in process memory
  • Running Calico components with least-privilege identities and restrictive network permissions

How teams detect issues like this

Organizations can identify this exposure through:

  • Configuration reviews that flag enabled shared debug servers
  • Network scans for pprof listeners bound to 0.0.0.0 or other broad interfaces
  • Static and deployment-policy checks for unauthenticated diagnostic endpoints
  • Code review signals involving pprof registration, debug listener startup, and missing authentication middleware
  • Kubernetes network-policy validation confirming that diagnostic ports are unreachable from ordinary workloads

Automated configuration and code review tools may help enforce these controls consistently.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12491
github.comgithub.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12633
github.comgithub.com/projectcalico/calico/pull/12634
tigera.iotigera.io/security-bulletins/tta-2026-004/

Frequently asked

questions

It can be exploited over the network by any pod or client with reachability to the exposed debug listener. It is not generally exposed when the shared debug server remains disabled.

No application-level authentication is required by the listener. The key prerequisite is network access to the pprof service.

Keep the shared debug server disabled unless required, and when it is necessary, restrict it to localhost or a controlled management interface behind authentication and network access controls.

Treat diagnostic endpoints as sensitive administrative services, enforce secure-by-default binding and authentication, apply restrictive network policies, and continuously scan deployments for exposed debug listeners.

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