Summary
WWBN AVideo versions 29.0 and below contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) issue in the LiveLinks proxy where URL validation is applied, but a DNS time-of-check/time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allows DNS rebinding between validation and the actual HTTP request.
Under certain conditions, an attacker controlling DNS records for a validated domain can redirect the proxied request to internal services, potentially exposing internal endpoints or metadata.
Affected context
This vulnerability affects AVideo deployments that:
- Use the LiveLinks proxy feature to fetch remote content
- Rely on
isSSRFSafeURL()or similar URL validation to prevent SSRF - Perform DNS resolution at validation time, but issue the outbound HTTP request later
In such setups, URLs that appear safe during initial DNS resolution may later resolve to internal IPs or services at request time if an attacker can perform DNS rebinding.
Exploit preconditions
- Attack surface: HTTP(S) endpoints in AVideo that proxy or fetch external URLs via LiveLinks.
- Required access: Ability to submit or influence LiveLinks URLs (for example, as an authenticated user or via any external input field that the proxy uses).
- Trigger point: The application validates the URL using
isSSRFSafeURL()and later issues an HTTP request to that URL via the proxy. - Why exploitation is possible: The validation step and the actual HTTP request rely on DNS resolution at different times. An attacker-controlled domain can return a benign IP during validation and then, after validation passes, change DNS responses to point to internal addresses, creating a DNS rebinding TOCTOU flaw that bypasses the original SSRF safeguards.
Why this happens
The underlying issue is a classic Server-Side Request Forgery pattern where the server makes outbound HTTP requests based on user-controlled URLs, combined with a time-of-check/time-of-use gap in DNS handling.
The isSSRFSafeURL() logic checks the resolved IP or hostname to ensure it does not target internal or disallowed ranges, but this check happens before the actual request is sent.
Because DNS can be changed between validation and use, an attacker can perform DNS rebinding so that the same hostname later resolves to an internal resource, even though it appeared safe earlier.
This maps to CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), with the additional nuance of a DNS TOCTOU condition that undermines the protective URL validation.
Potential impact
- Access to internal HTTP-based services that are not directly exposed to the internet
- Retrieval of internal configuration or instance metadata, where such services exist
- Potential interaction with internal APIs, which may allow data exfiltration or modification depending on internal service behavior
- Use of the AVideo server as a pivot point for further network reconnaissance within the internal environment
General mitigation guidance
Effective mitigation focuses on hardening SSRF defenses and eliminating DNS TOCTOU gaps:
- Avoid relying solely on hostname or one-time DNS resolution for SSRF validation; instead, re-validate the resolved IP at the time of the actual request.
- Prefer using low-level connection controls (such as explicit IP allowlists / denylists) that operate on the final destination address rather than the hostname alone.
- Restrict outbound HTTP(S) egress from the AVideo server to a minimal set of trusted destinations, using firewall rules or network policy.
- Where possible, disable or limit proxying of arbitrary user-supplied URLs and replace it with curated, server-side configured endpoints.
- Run the AVideo application with least-privilege network access and avoid colocating highly sensitive internal services on networks reachable from web-tier hosts.
How teams detect issues like this
Detection typically combines code-level analysis with runtime monitoring:
- Static analysis or manual code review to identify places where user-controlled URLs are fetched server-side and validated using hostname-based or single-time DNS checks.
- Review of helper functions like
isSSRFSafeURL()to ensure they are invoked at the point of use and that they also validate the final resolved IP address. - Security testing (including dynamic application security testing) that attempts SSRF via attacker-controlled domains, specifically using DNS rebinding scenarios.
- Network monitoring and logging of outbound HTTP requests from the AVideo server, with alerts for connections to internal IP ranges or unexpected services.
- Use of automated security scanners and SAST/DAST tools capable of flagging SSRF patterns and DNS rebinding-sensitive logic.

