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CVE-2026-40599

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

Improper Authorization in ClearanceKit macOS File Access

CVE-2026-40599

Analyzed

Vulnerability type

Category:

Improper Authorization

CWE:

CWE-863

Impact:

Authorization Bypass Leading to Unrestricted File Access

Severity:

HIGH RISK

(7.1)

CVSS version:

3.1

Catch this CVE while code is being written

Detect vulnerable code directly in pull requests, so CVEs are fixed before merge.

Summary

ClearanceKit, a macOS file access enforcement framework, incorrectly classifies certain signed processes as trusted Apple platform binaries when they have an empty Team ID but a non-empty Signing ID.

Malicious software can exploit this misclassification to impersonate an Apple process on the global allowlist and gain access to all files protected by ClearanceKit's policies.

Affected context

The vulnerability appears in macOS environments where ClearanceKit is used to intercept file-system events and enforce per-process access policies.

It specifically impacts configurations that rely on ClearanceKit's internal logic for distinguishing Apple platform binaries from third-party or untrusted processes.

When process identity is evaluated using Team ID and Signing ID metadata, processes with an empty Team ID may be incorrectly treated as trusted Apple binaries as long as they present a non-empty Signing ID, expanding trust beyond intended boundaries.

Exploit preconditions

  • Attack surface: Local processes attempting file-system access on a macOS host using ClearanceKit.
  • Required access: Ability to execute code on the target system (e.g., running a malicious application or binary).
  • Trigger point: The moment ClearanceKit evaluates the process signature (Team ID and Signing ID) to decide whether it is a trusted Apple platform binary and checks it against the global allowlist.
  • Why exploitation is possible: The authorization logic equates a specific combination of signature attributes (empty Team ID + non-empty Signing ID) with a trusted Apple platform binary, allowing untrusted code to be misclassified and receive broad file access permissions.

Why this happens

The root cause is an improper authorization decision based on incomplete or overly permissive process identity checks.

Instead of strictly validating that a process is signed by Apple using a valid, expected Team ID, the logic infers Apple trust from a non-empty Signing ID even when the Team ID is empty.

This misinterpretation of code-signing metadata maps to CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization, where security decisions (in this case, whether to apply a restrictive file access policy) are made using flawed conditions.

Conceptually, the framework conflates "has some signature fields set" with "is a trusted platform binary," allowing impersonation of a highly privileged trust category.

Potential impact

  • Malicious processes may gain access to all files guarded by ClearanceKit policies.
  • Sensitive user data (documents, key material, application data) could be read or exfiltrated by unauthorized software.
  • Integrity of protected configuration files may be compromised if write access is permitted under the same trust assumptions.
  • Security assumptions of applications relying on ClearanceKit as a protection layer can be undermined, potentially enabling broader system compromise in conjunction with other flaws.

General mitigation guidance

Mitigation generally focuses on hardening identity-based authorization checks and reducing implicit trust:

  • Ensure trust decisions for "platform" or "system" binaries are based on strong, explicit criteria such as known Apple Team IDs, certificate anchors, or well-defined signing chains.
  • Treat missing or empty identity attributes (e.g., Team ID) as a reason to deny elevated trust, not as a neutral value.
  • Apply a default-deny posture for file access: processes should only receive broad or global access when they match a narrowly defined, positively verified trust profile.
  • Separate policy logic for Apple platform binaries and third-party apps, avoiding shared or ambiguous matching rules.
  • Complement code-signing checks with additional context where feasible (e.g., binary location, entitlements) to reduce the chance of impersonation.

How teams detect issues like this

Effective detection of similar authorization issues typically involves:

  • Code review patterns: Inspect access-control logic for special-casing of "trusted" identities, focusing on conditions where empty or missing fields (like Team ID) are treated as acceptable or equivalent to a trusted state.
  • Static analysis: Use custom rules or security linters to flag comparisons involving partial signature information (e.g., checks on Signing ID without corresponding Team ID verification) and logic that broadens trust based on incomplete attributes.
  • Policy testing: Implement automated tests that simulate processes with various combinations of Team ID and Signing ID to verify that only intended binaries are classified as trusted.
  • Runtime monitoring: Log and periodically review which processes are classified as Apple platform binaries or added to global allowlists, alerting on unexpected or non-Apple identities being granted unrestricted access.
  • Security gating in CI/CD: For projects integrating ClearanceKit, include authorization logic checks as part of security reviews before releasing new policy or identity-handling changes.

Sources

SourceLink
github.comgithub.com/craigjbass/clearancekit/security/advisories/GHSA-w253-42qp-5f2x

Frequently asked

questions

Not by itself. An attacker generally needs the ability to execute or install malicious code on the affected macOS system. Once local execution is obtained, the attacker can craft or use a process that triggers the misclassification to gain wider file access than intended.

The attacker requires local code execution privileges—such as running a user-space application—on a system where ClearanceKit is actively enforcing file access policies. Elevated privileges (like root) are not strictly necessary to exploit the logical misclassification, though they may be used in combination with this flaw for greater impact.

Tighten the authorization logic so that classification of trusted Apple platform binaries is based on explicit, fully validated attributes—primarily known Team IDs and verified signing chains—rather than partial or inferred identity data. Any process lacking a valid, expected Team ID or signing lineage should not be granted global allowlist privileges.

Treat identity and trust classifications as security-critical code paths that require threat modeling, peer review, and regression tests. Use a default-deny approach, avoid assumptions based on empty or partial fields, require explicit mapping of trusted identities, and incorporate automated tests and static checks that simulate edge cases in signing metadata and authorization logic.

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